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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Frequent references to “hawkish” and “dovish” leaders in Israel, or Turkey’s “secular” 
and “Islamist” leaders, lack a systematic analysis of the personalities of political 
leadership in Israel and Turkey.  Notwithstanding, such portrayals attract not only 
domestic actors in these countries but also others across the globe.  Scholars, pundits, the 
public, as well as the policymakers, easily adapt these dichotomous and simplistic 
perceptions of leadership in Israel and Turkey.  Utilizing contemporary at-a-distance 
measures of personality assessment (specifically, leadership traits analysis and 
operational code analysis), this study draws profiles all of Israel’s and Turkey’s prime 
ministers since November 1991.  As such, this dissertation expands the political 
leadership literatures to two strategically located countries in the Middle East.  In its 
unique design with two methods of personality assessment, it illustrates the gains from 
such an approach.  Then, this study also makes an effort to link leadership styles and 
belief systems with foreign policy behavior.  The results cast doubt on simplistic 
appraisals of political leadership in terms of “hawkish” and “dovish” in Israel and 
“secular” and “Islamist” in Turkey.  Furthermore, the findings here suggest the 
significance of distrust of others (a personality trait in Leadership Traits Analysis) in 
predicting conflictual foreign policy behavior.  In much broader terms, this dissertation 
also contributes to understanding political leaders of the Middle East.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Henry Kissinger once said, “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by 
impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities 
make” (cited in Byman and Pollack 2001).  In the field of international relations, Synder, 
Bruck, and Sapin in 1962 founded their argument on what Kissinger told: The individual 
constitutes the heart of international politics (also see Hudson 2005).  In contrast to such 
assessments, however, the individual level of analysis has not necessarily been the most 
attractive one to many political scientists.  Instead, systemic factors such as the 
distribution of power have appealed to many in their attempts to explain international 
politics.  During the latter half of the 20th century, and particularly following Snyder, 
Bruck, and Sapin’s footsteps, there has been a strong interest in the individuals who are 
indeed the source of all state actions.   
 
For many who follow the tradition of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962), individual 
characteristics of political leaders influence state behavior.1  Personality characteristics 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Snyder, Bruck and Sapin published their Foreign Policy Decision-Making originally in 1962; an 
earlier, 1954 version was also printed as “Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series No. 3” at 
Princeton University.  Unless otherwise noted, any citations here refer to an updated edition 
!
!
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(such as beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style) affect personal 
orientation to behavior, which in turn shapes one’s general orientation to foreign affairs 
(Hermann 1980a: 12).  As such, in contrast to variants of realism, individuals–––or, 
groups of individuals–––are the source of all state actions (Hudson 2005; Walker and 
Schafer 2004).  This argument by corollary means that “a well-reasoned and informed 
account of outcomes in foreign policy requires a sophisticated understanding of leaders” 
(Renfro 2009: 26).  Grove recently argues that “[e]specially in a world of great 
uncertainty and ambiguity, as opposed to rigid Cold War environment, individual leaders 
make a difference” (2007: 1).  Indeed, leaders in every political system or culture make 
their own imprints in foreign (and domestic) policy.  Nonetheless, the extant studies of 
political leadership heavily focus on Western democracies and systematic studies of non-
Western leaders remain in scarcity. 
 
In the broader study of international relations, the lure of systemic factors in explaining 
international politics is possibly still strong (see Byman and Pollack 2001 for a 
discussion).  The study of individuals in the subfield of foreign policy analysis, on the 
other hand, has expanded since Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962).  This inquiry has 
benefited from and is closely connected with the field of psychology.2  Indeed, most 
research after Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin focused on individual or small group decision 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
published in 2002 (Foreign Policy Decision-Making, revisited) with additional chapters by 
Valerie M. Hudson and Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier. 
 
2 See, Levy (2003) for a review. 
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making.  Most, if not all, of these works have implications for the study of political 
leadership.  Studies about various topics, such as cognitive biases (Jervis 1976), 
groupthink (Janis 1972), motives (Barber 1972; Etheredge 1978; Winter 1973), have shed 
light on the decision making processes.  In a review of the relevant literature, Young and 
Schafer (1998) identify operational code analysis, image theory, cognitive mapping, and 
leadership traits analysis as the most significant research programs about leaders’ 
cognition.3   
 
This dissertation employs Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis as 
its methods of leadership assessment.  Leadership Traits Analysis (LTA) is a method 
designed specifically to explain how leaders’ react to constraints, are motivated towards 
the world, and their openness to information, etc. and then with these to assess a 
leadership style profile.  As such, LTA involves a careful content analysis of leaders’ 
discourse and its quantification into seven traits (for a review, see Hermann 2003a).  It is 
assumed that the frequency of use of certain words in leaders’ discourse indicates the 
very saliency of the content (Hermann 2003a: 186).  Operational Code Analysis, on the 
other hand, is the study of core belief system of an individual leader and “asks what the 
individual knows, feels, and wants regarding the exercise of power in human affairs” 
(Schafer and Walker 2006a: 29).  Contemporary examples of this research employ 
Walker, Schafer, and Young’s (1998) the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to measure 
leaders’ operational code indexes.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For recent reviews, see Preston (2010), and Rosati and Miller (2010). 
!
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While the literature on psychological characteristics of individuals and their effects on 
foreign policy have proven beyond doubt that they make a difference, the direct 
implications of idiosyncratic factors for foreign policy behavior are not as well 
established.  Arguably there are two reasons for this.  The first is that once scholars 
theoretically founded such frameworks as the Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational 
Code Analysis then the literature has rather focused on discussions about what certain 
differences exist between, for instance, scripted and spontaneous materials (Mahdasian 
2002; Shannon and Keller 2007), leaders’ belief systems about democracies and non-
democracies (Schafer and Walker 2006c), profiles of one leader or a group of leaders 
(among many others, Feldman and Valenty 2001; Hermann 1980a, 1987, 2003b, 2003c; 
Feng 2005, 2006; Renfro 2009).  The second reason is that while the larger body of 
research that relates psychological characteristics with foreign policy progressed steadily, 
it lacked––or, it was time consuming to develop––the complementary body of research 
that would provide it with reliable and systematic data on foreign policy behavior.   
 
One of the premises of this study is that presently this linkage between individual 
characteristics and foreign policy behavior is possible with advances in the assessment of 
political leadership at–a–distance and quantitative international relations research.  
Specifically, thanks to the availability of automated content analysis programs, easier 
access to public domain verbal materials, now words become data in the study of foreign 
policy analysis and broadly in international relations field.  Hence the marriage between 
the political psychology and large–N foreign policy behavior datasets can take place.  
Indeed, one can create reliable and systematic personality and event data for a diverse set 
!
!
5 
of leaders and countries.  Such undertakings would help expand the extant literatures and 
advance the study of foreign policy analysis by seeking answers to old and new 
questions.   
 
 
Overview 
!
This dissertation makes the effort to link leadership styles and belief systems with foreign 
policy behavior.  For reasons further discussed later in Chapter 3, Israel and Turkey, and 
all of their prime ministers, in the post-Cold War era are selected.  Israel and Turkey, and 
their respective political leadership, provide important political settings to explore for the 
study of international relations in broad terms.  First of all, the geographic location of 
both countries makes the implications of this research most significant not only for 
contemporary scholarship but also from a policy making perspective. At the least, this 
study can help understand frequent references to “hawkish” and “dovish” leaders in 
Israel, or Turkey’s “secular” and “religious” leaders, from a systematic analysis of these 
very leaders.  Then, understanding political leadership in Israel and Turkey is also 
important, because both are influential countries in their immediate geography and also 
globally.  For instance, Israel and its relationship with its neighbors constitute the key to 
peace efforts in the Middle East.  Likewise, Turkey’s recent rise to an eminent status in 
world politics requires an understanding of its politics. In addition, the political and 
economic relations of both countries with the Western world, and most notably with the 
United States, make them important actors in that respect as well.   
!
!
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These notwithstanding, there is a relative dearth of research on Israel’s and Turkey’s 
political leaders and foreign policy.  Hence, in addition to its theoretical and 
methodological goals, this dissertation is an attempt at this direction.  What do personal 
and political backgrounds of leaders in Israel and Turkey reveal about their leadership 
styles and beliefs?  What can assessment of political leadership in Israel and Turkey tell 
about their respective foreign policies?  Are those popular images of hawks v. doves and 
secular v. religious leadership and the implications they often carry for foreign policy 
preferences reflected on leadership styles and beliefs of Israel’s and Turkey’s leaders?  
 
The organization and main points of this study are as follows.  The following chapter first 
briefly reviews the relevant literature, explains specific theoretical background and 
coding procedures to two techniques of assessing political leaders at-a-distance: 
Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis.  I argue for utilizing both in 
explaining leadership characteristics of Israel’s and Turkey’s prime ministers.  Next, 
Chapter 3 sets the research design of this research and also puts forward the hypotheses.  
In this chapter, I also introduce the large-N dataset that measures the dependent variables 
in the analyses conducted.  The following two chapters, Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, 
present leadership style and operational code profiles of Israeli and Turkish prime 
ministers (as well as the results of statistical tests for each country). Then, Chapter 6 
illustrates how at-a-distance methods of personality analysis can provide meaningful 
explanations of political leadership and foreign policy in the case of Turkey.  This 
chapter looks at Turkey’s prime minister Erdogan and explores his leadership style on 
!
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foreign policy issues at home in Turkey and abroad.  In Chapter 7, I conclude with a 
review of the findings and implications of this dissertation for future research for in 
similar vein.  
 
This dissertation is an important milestone in leadership studies for its attempt to marry 
individual and state level data.  As I review such attempts later in the following pages, 
they have been rare and calls for this kind of research have not been met.  It is my 
contention here that understanding political leadership is indispensible to acquiring a 
nuanced approach to explaining world politics. The assessment of political leadership in 
Israel and Turkey, and their foreign policy behavior under different prime ministers, since 
the end of the Cold War support this argument.  Hence, this dissertation is another 
testament to those following the steps of Synder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962).   
 
The use of Leadership Traits and Operational Code methods of leadership assessment in 
one study is another unique contribution of this dissertation.  It illustrates that utilizing 
more than one method in profiling same individuals is useful for it brings forth additional 
information, which helps drawing fuller picture of the individual leader.   
 
Finally, for its comprehensive account of Israel’s and Turkey’s prime ministers and 
foreign policy in the past two decades, this dissertation is a significant contribution to 
scholarship specific to these two countries.  My findings here question the simple, 
dichotomous labels of “hawks” or “doves,” “secular” and “religious.”  Political leaders in 
Israel and Turkey, or for that matter anywhere else, rarely fit into such broad perceptions.  
!
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Moreover, as modern personality theory would suggest, such labels would fail to capture 
the dynamic notions of personality that may change depending on the nature of topic, 
audience, etc.  In broader terms, this dissertation also contributes to understanding 
political leaders of the Middle East.  Both Israel and Turkey, as I argue above, are crucial 
actors in the region; profiles of their political leadership as such shed light on 
understanding politics of the Middle East. 
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Chapter 2 
Leaders and Foreign Policy 
 
 
 
This work is based on the premise that the individual constitutes the center of all analysis 
in the study of foreign policy, and broadly speaking of international relations (Hudson 
2005, 2007).  Studying political leaders, however, require unique methods, because 
leaders are not available or willing to interview for psychological analysis.  “At–a–
distance” techniques are especially designed to overcome this problem in leadership 
studies.  Utilizing leaders’ publicly available verbal records (speeches, interviews, letters, 
etc.), “at–a–distance” methods profile political leaders.   
 
At–a–distance measurement of political leaders originate from psychology and its various 
tests and practices of personality assessment.  Nonetheless, because these are not 
applicable in the study of political leaders, at–a–distance measurement is based on 
analysis of leaders’ verbal material than their psychological tests.  These methods require 
meticulously designed procedures of coding and operationalization of personality 
measures selected (Winter 2003: 22).  In essence, then, these are adaptations of 
conventional personality measurements in psychology (Winter 1992: 86).  In Leadership 
Traits Analysis, for instance, the intent is to assess the influence of one trait on behavior 
(Hermann 1974: 202).  “The specific traits [are] selected because of their measurement 
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possibilities and because there is some theoretical basis in the extant psychological 
literature for hypothesizing about their affect on policy making” (Hermann 1974: 204).  
These foundations for each LTA variable are explained in detail in Hermann’s early work 
–for instance, Hermann 1974: 204-209.  In contemporary Operational Code Analysis, 
“operational code” refers to a belief system composed of philosophical and instrumental 
beliefs (George 1969).  Distinct from its original definition in Leites (1951, 1953) as 
political strategy of Bolshevik ideology, this reconceptualization moved the operational 
code notion into the domain of cognitive theory (Walker and Schafer 2010).  As such, 
beliefs as “subjective representations of reality” are central to Operational Code Analysis 
as a method of at–a–distance measurement (Walker and Schafer 2006: 4). 
 
“At–a–distance” methods have been automated since the introduction of some certain 
computer software–––specifically, Profiler Plus (explained in the following chapter).  In 
collaboration with the leading scholars in the study of political leadership, the Profiler 
Plus program coded various “at–a–distance” methods into computer scripts to analyze 
text.  Since its inception, automated analysis proliferated studies particularly using 
leadership traits analysis and operational code analysis.  Indeed, these two approaches 
become “the empirical basis” of a special issue of Political Psychology that dealt with at–
a–distance assessment of political personalities (Schafer 2000: 518).  These two 
approaches also stand as major exceptions to the lack of attempts that looked directly into 
any possible linkage between idiosyncratic factors and foreign policy behavior.1  In order 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For instance, Hermann (1980a), Rosati (1984, 1987), and Walker (1977). 
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to test the match between leader personality characteristics (traits and operational codes) 
with foreign policy behavior, both research programs occasionally add an events dataset 
on state behavior to their analysis (for instance Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999).  
Nonetheless, events data still remains a rather scarce, or under-utilized, element in other 
similar studies.  Indeed, Young and Schafer (1998) note that while the relationship 
between beliefs and policy positions is a common ground in the operational code 
research, “[o]nly rarely… has the link between the operational code and behavior been 
made explicit” (73).  More than a decade since its publication, Young and Schafer’s 
argument still remains largely true and others have also echoed their statement (for 
instance, Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009).   
 
In this section, because they are so central to understanding the respective at–a–distance 
assessment technique, first I explain each leadership trait and operational code variables 
as to their coding procedures.  A review of some foundational works in Leadership Traits 
Analysis (LTA) and Operational Code Analysis follows each section.2  Then, I discuss 
how this present work relates with the extant literatures.  There are two motivations in 
particular; one, as it is implied above, is to link individual–level data with events data.  
Then, this study aims to expand the geographic focus of the existing literatures into non–
Western contexts. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 In the extant literature, Leadership Traits Analysis is often abbreviated to LTA.  There is no 
common abbreviation for Operational Code Analysis, yet it is simply referred to as “op code.”  
Here, I follow the current terminology as I use LTA and occasionally use “op code” as well.  
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Leadership Traits Analysis 
 
As one of the long standing approaches to how psychological characteristics of political 
leaders affect their foreign policy, the Leadership Traits Analysis (LTA) framework 
proved to be a fruitful line of research (Dyson 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d; 
Hermann 1976, 1980a, 1984, 1987; 1993, 2003a; Hermann and Milburn 1977; Kaarbo 
and Hermann 1998; Renfro 2009; Shannon and Keller 2007; Taysi and Preston 2001).  
This particular research program derives from the assumption that one can infer a 
leader’s personality from his or her verbal records.  In other words, leaders’ choices of 
certain words reflect their personalities.  As Hermann (2003a: 186) explains, “In effect, 
the trait analysis is quantitative in nature and employs frequency counts.  At issue is what 
percentage of the time in responding to interviewers’ questions when leaders could 
exhibit particular words and phrases are they, indeed, used.”  Each trait is calculated 
according to a coding scheme developed by Hermann, and the scores for each range from 
zero to one (discussed later). 
 
According to Hermann, the most useful traits in assessing leadership style are (1) the 
belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and 
influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in 
one’s environment), (4) self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving 
and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others’ 
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ideas and sensitivities, (6) general distrust or suspiciousness of others, and (7) the 
intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (2003a: 184).  Before a further 
discussion of the LTA literature, it is worth explaining each trait individually and the 
coding procedures associated with them, as well as how leadership styles can be assessed 
based on LTA scores.  Behavioral predictions with respect to each trait are also discussed 
later in this chapter and in the following as hypotheses are revealed.  The following 
borrows primarily from Hermann’s (2003a) discussion; the traits are listed alphabetically 
and the abbreviations are used throughout this dissertation. 
 
Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) 
 
This trait measures an individual leader’s perception of the degree of control he or she 
believes has over the situations they deal with.  Leaders with high Belief in Ability to 
Control Events (BACE) scores often cast more interest and are active in the policy 
making process.  In addition, they do not delegate authority and rather take initiative than 
wait for others.  When a leader has a low BACE score, the opposite is true: s/he is 
expected to be rather reactive and follow a ‘wait–and–see’ policy before they decide to 
take action.  Leaders with low BACE scores are more likely to blame others for mistakes 
or failures because they often delegate authority to others.  Hermann (2003a: 190) also 
argues that when a leader does not believe that s/he has any control over what happens 
“fear of failure may supersede and crowd out sense of timing.”  The BACE score is 
calculated by “the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the 
speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has taken responsibility for planning 
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or initiating an action.  The overall score for any leader is the average of this percentage 
across the total number of interview responses being examined” (Hermann 2003a: 189). 
 
Conceptual Complexity (CC) 
 
This trait assesses an individual’s ability to approach other people, places, policies, or 
ideas, etc. from multiple perspectives.  As such, a conceptually complex leader can 
reason that there may be various explanations for a particular thing or happening.  They 
would be more comfortable with the idea that there is ambiguity in the political world.  A 
conceptually complex leader would seek additional contextual information from their 
environments and invite other actors in the decision making processes for that purpose.  
Because these leaders do not necessarily trust their first response to an event and seek 
more information, they also take their time to reach a decision.  Leaders with low 
Conceptual Complexity (CC) scores, to the contrary, would find less ambiguity in the 
world, because they have a dichotomous, ‘black–and–white’ understanding of the world 
around them.  Such leaders are more likely to trust their intuition and make decisions 
based on some stereotypes.  The first step in calculating a leader’s CC score is focusing 
on the use of certain words in speech.  For instance, “approximately,” “possibility,” 
“trend,” and “for example” suggest high conceptual complexity.  In contrast, 
“absolutely,” “without a doubt,” “certainly,” and “irreversible” indicate low levels of 
conceptual complexity.  The CC score is derived from the percentage of high complexity 
words to the total number of words that suggest either high or low conceptual complexity 
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(Mahdasian 2002: 28).  “The overall score for any leader is his or her average score 
across interview responses” (Hermann 2003a: 196–197). 
 
Distrust of Others (DIS) 
 
Distrust of others reflects a leader’s perception of his/her trust in the motives and actions 
of other actors.  Leaders high in Distrust of Others (DIS) scores become very suspicious 
of those who are competitors for their own positions or against their cause and ideology.  
These leaders always look for ulterior motives and designs in others’ behavior.  Given 
their distrust of others, these leaders are rather willing to do some things on their own 
than depend on others to take care of them.  In addition, leaders high in DIS find some 
utility in shuffling their advisors around so that they cannot challenge their authority over 
the long run.  Leaders with low DIS scores, on the other hand, are capable of evaluating 
things based on their past experiences with the people they are dealing with and the 
nature of circumstances.  “In coding for distrust of others, the focus is on noun and noun 
phrases referring to persons other than the leader and to groups other than those with 
whom the leader identifies” (Hermann 2003a: 202).  When the noun or noun phrase 
indicates distrust, then it is coded.  The DIS score is the ratio of such uses to the total 
number of references to other actors in the leader’s response. 
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In–group Bias (IGB)3  
 
In–group bias is the leadership trait that assesses the individual’s view of the centrality 
his/her own group (social, political, ethnic, etc.) to the world.  Leaders have strong 
emotional attachments to this in–group, and perceive it as the best (Hermann 2003a: 
201).  High In–group bias (IGB) scores indicate that leaders value the identity of their 
group, its culture and status, and they would like to maintain these at all costs.  Leaders 
high in in–group bias become very protective of their in–group and find other groups’ 
interests in their group as interference in their internal affairs.  These leaders tend to have 
an “us–vs.–them” view of the world.  Finally, leaders with high In–group bias (IGB) 
scores are more likely to see the positive characteristics of their group but reject any 
problems with the group.  Hermann notes that leaders low in in–group bias still feel an 
attachment to their group and are interested in maintaining the group identity.  However, 
these leaders tend not to have the friends and enemies perception of the world.  The 
nature of the situation often conditions the “us–vs.–them” categorization for leaders low 
in in–group bias.  According to Hermann, these leaders “may use interactions such as 
summit conferences and positive diplomatic gestures as strategies for tempering domestic 
discontent” (2003a: 202).  “In coding for in-group bias, the unit of analysis is a word or 
phrase referring to the particular leader’s own group.  Of interest is ascertaining the 
following information when the leader makes a reference to his or her group: are the 
modifiers used favorable (e.g., great, peace-loving, progressive, successful, prosperous); 
do they suggest strength (e.g., powerful, capable, made great advances, has boundless 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In Hermann’s earlier works, In–Group Bias appeared as “nationalism” (see, Hermann 1980a). 
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resources); or do they indicate the need to maintain group honor and identity (e.g.,  “need 
to defend firmly our borders,” “must maintain our own interpretation,” decide our own 
policies”)?  If any of these modifiers are present, the phrase indicates in-group bias” 
(Hermann 2003a: 201; italics in original).  The In-group Bias (IGB) score is the ratio of 
references to the in–group that have these modifiers to the total number of references to 
the group.   
 
Need for Power (PWR) 
 
The need for power and influence trait indicates a leader’s aspiration to establish, 
maintain, or restore his or her power over other individuals, groups, or the world at large 
(Winter 1973:250).  The need for power trait can be traced when the speaker is (a) 
proposing or engaging in a strong action such as a verbal threat or an accusation, (b) 
giving advice or assistance when it is not solicited, (c) attempting to regulate the behavior 
others, (d) trying to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else so long as the concern is 
not to reach an agreement or avoid disagreement, (e) seeking recognition and praise with 
an action, and (f) concerned with his or her reputation or position.  Leaders who have 
high Need for Power (PWR) scores “will insert themselves into the political process at 
every opportunity” (Mahdasian 2002: 26).  These leaders do not necessarily care for 
others around them; others are only instrumental as long as they serve a purpose.  When a 
leader is low in need for power, Hermann expects that s/he would be interested in 
empowering others by sharing with them a sense of responsibility and accountability for 
what happens.  As such, these leaders do not bother that others receive credit for 
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accomplishments.  In other words, leaders with low PWR scores “are willing to open up 
the political process to allow other actors significant influence” (Mahdasian 2002: 26).  
Hermann posits that such behaviors create high morale in leader’s followers and a sense 
of team spirit and goal clarity, also that in doing so these leaders aim to establish a 
relationship of trust with their followers.  The Need for Power (PWR) score “is 
determined by calculating the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response 
indicate that the speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has engaged in one 
of those behaviors.  The overall score for any leader is the average of this percentage 
across the total number of interview responses examined” (Hermann 2003a: 190). 
 
Self–Confidence (SC) 
 
Hermann describes the self–confidence trait as an indication of “one’s sense of self–
importance, an individual’s image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects 
and persons in the environment” (2003a: 194).  A leader whose self-confidence score is 
high does not search for more information to evaluate themselves or their behavior; 
hence, they are closed to incoming information from the environment.  These leaders are 
less likely to be affected by “contextual contingencies” and behavioral consistency is 
important for them.  Leaders with low Self–Confidence (SC) scores, on the other hand, 
search for new information from their environment as they are challenged by changing 
circumstances and do not know what to do or how to conform to those circumstances.  As 
such, these individuals are likely to behave inconsistently since the environment around 
them conditions their behavior and not their needs and desires.  “A score on this trait is 
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determined by calculation the percentage of times [my, myself, I, me, and mine] are used 
in an interview response” (Hermann 2003a: 195).  When a leader uses these pronouns in 
his/her speech, then three criteria have to be met for a count: the use of the pronoun (1) 
represents instigation of an activity, (2) presents the self as an authority figure, and (3) 
reflects the self as the recipient of a positive response from another person or group.  
“The trait score is then calculated by dividing the number of positive instances by the 
total number of self references in the text” (Mahdasian 2002: 28).   
 
Task Focus (TASK) 
 
This trait reflects if a leader’s orientation is towards the completion of a task (problem 
solving) or the maintenance of group spirit and morale (building relationships).  “For 
leaders who emphasize the problem, moving the group (nation, government, ethnic 
group, religious group, union, etc.) forward toward a goal is their principal purpose for 
assuming leadership.  For those who emphasize group maintenance and establishing 
relationships, keeping the loyalty of constituents and morale are the central functions of 
leadership” (Hermann 2003a: 198).  Once again, the score for Task Focus (TASK) is 
calculated by the count of certain words in an interview response.  Examples of task–
oriented words are “accomplishment,” “achieve(ment),” “plan,” “position,” “tactic”; 
examples of group-maintenance words are “appreciation,” “collaboration,” 
“disappoint(ment),” and “suffering.”  The TASK score is the ratio of task–oriented words 
to the total of task–oriented and group–maintenance words. 
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Table 2.1 Leadership Traits Analysis: Trait Conceptualization and Coding Scheme 
Trait Description Coding 
Belief can control 
events 
Perception of the world as 
an environment leader can 
influence. Leader’s own 
state is perceived as an 
influential actor in the 
international system. 
Percentage of verbs used that reflect 
action or planning for action of the 
leader or relevant group. 
Conceptual 
complexity 
Capability of discerning 
different dimensions of the 
environment when 
describing actors, places, 
ideas, and situations. 
Percentage of words related to high 
complexity (i.e., ‘‘approximately,’’ 
‘‘possibility,’’ ‘‘trend’’) vs. low 
complexity (i.e., ‘‘absolutely,’’ 
‘‘certainly,’’ ‘‘irreversible’’). 
Distrust of others Doubt about and wariness 
of others. 
Percentage of nouns that indicate 
misgivings or suspicions that others 
intend harm toward speaker or 
speaker’s group. 
In–group bias Perception of one’s group 
as holding a central role, 
accompanied with strong 
feelings of national identity 
and honor. 
Percentage of references to the 
group that are favorable (i.e., 
‘‘successful,’’ ‘‘prosperous,’’ 
‘‘great’’), show strength (i.e., 
‘‘powerful,’’ ‘‘capable’’) or a need 
to maintain group identity (i.e., 
‘‘decide our own policies,’’ 
‘‘defend our borders’’). 
Need for power A concern with gaining, 
keeping and restoring 
power over others. 
Percentage of verbs that reflect 
actions of attack, advise, influence 
the behavior of others, concern with 
reputation. 
Self confidence Personal image of self–
importance in terms of the 
ability to deal with the 
environment. 
Percentage of personal pronouns 
used such as ‘‘my,’’ ‘‘myself,’’ 
‘‘I,’’ ‘‘me,’’ and ‘‘mine,’’ which 
show speaker perceives self as the 
instigator of an activity, an 
authority figure, or a recipient of a 
positive reward. 
Task focus Relative focus on problem 
solving versus maintenance 
of relationship to others. 
Higher score indicates 
greater problem focus. 
Percentage of words related to 
instrumental activities (i.e., 
‘‘accomplishment,’’ ‘‘plan,’’ 
‘‘proposal’’) versus concern for 
other’s feelings and desires (i.e., 
‘‘collaboration,’’ ‘‘amnesty,’’ 
‘‘appreciation’’). 
Source: Dyson (2006: 292).
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These seven traits help develop a leader’s profile; however, scores for each trait are 
meaningful only when they are compared to another set of scores––that is, those of a 
norming group.  Hermann’s research now encompasses leadership traits scores for 122 
political leaders and 87 heads of state (Hermann 2003a); this is often treated as the 
norming group in the literature and the means and standard deviations from those for 
either the whole group or sub–groups such as leaders from a particular country or region 
become the basis for comparison.4  Alternatively, a leader’s scores can be compared 
across time, issue, or under other different circumstances.  When a leader’s scores are a 
standard deviation below the norming group’s mean, then s/he profiles low in that trait; 
accordingly, when a trait is a standard deviation above the norming group’s, then the 
leader has a high score for the trait in question.  When a leader’s score is close to the 
norming group’s mean, the leader is moderate in that particular trait.  Based on such a 
comparison of a particular leader’s personality traits scores with a norming group, 
different leadership styles can be assessed (Hermann 2003a; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998).  
 
Leaders have different styles of decision making because they “relate to those around 
them––whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders––and how they structure 
interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions” in 
different manners (Hermann 2003a: 181).  Once leaders are compared to a norming 
group, the answers to three particular questions define leadership style (Hermann 2003a): 
1) How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment––do they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The extant LTA literature suffers from a misspecification of its norming group (discussed later).  
Hermann’s average leader profiles, along with others, are presented in Table 2.7 (page 29). 
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respect or challenge such constraints? 
2) How open are leaders to incoming information––do they selectively use 
information or are they open to information directing their response? 
3) What are the leaders’ reasons for seeking their positions––are they driven by an 
internal focus of attention within themselves or by the relationships that can be 
formed with salient constituents? 
 
Tables 2.2 through 2.6 summarize how leadership styles can be decided according to the 
three questions above and based on how a leader’s trait scores compare with the norming 
group selected.  First, how a leader ranks according to his/her scores in Belief in One’s 
Own Ability to Control Events (BACE) and Need for Power (PWR) help determine the 
leader’s responsiveness to constraints.  Here, leader personality is assessed as to “how 
important it is for them to exert control and influence over the environment in which they 
find themselves, and the constraints that environment poses, as opposed to being 
adaptable to the situation and remaining open to responding to the demands of domestic 
and international constituencies and circumstances” (Hermann 2003a: 182).  Table 2.2 
summarizes behavioral expectations from a leader depending on their BACE and PWR 
scores.   
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Table 2.2 Leader’s Reaction to Constraints 
 
Need for power Belief in One’s Own Ability to Control Events Low High 
Low 
Respect constraints; work 
within such parameters 
toward goals; compromise 
and consensus building 
important.  
Challenge constraints but less 
successful in doing so because too 
direct and open in use of power; less 
able to read how to manipulate 
people and setting behind the scenes 
to have desired influence. 
High 
Challenge constraints but 
more comfortable doing so 
in an indirect fashion—
behind the scenes; good at 
being "power behind the 
throne" where they can pull 
strings but are less 
accountable for result.  
Challenge constraints; are skillful 
in both direct and indirect influence; 
know what they want and take 
charge to see it happens.  
Source: Hermann (2003a: 188) 
 
 
Table 2.3 Rules for Determining Openness to Information 
 
Scores on Conceptual Complexity  
and Self-Confidence 
Openness to 
Contextual Information 
CC > SC Open 
CC < SC Closed 
CC and SC Both High Open 
CC and SC Both Low Closed 
Source: Hermann (2003a: 194) 
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A leader’s Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Self-Confidence (SC) scores together 
indicate his/her openness to new information.  Table 2.3 displays the rules to decide when 
one can expect a leader would be open or close to new information.  This assessment is 
important because the two ends suggest distinct approaches to decision making (Kaarbo 
and Hermann 1998).  Leaders who are open to contextual information act as “cue–takers” 
and seek information both supportive and discrepant of their own.  Leaders who are less 
open to new information, on the other hand, act as “advocates” of their own agendas and 
ideas; they seek support for their position and work to persuade others along the way.  
Hermann (2003a: 192) argues that a leader whose CC score is higher than his/her SC 
score––hence, who is open to new information––is able to get others to do things because 
others perceive that the leader is interested in what happens to them and that s/he is 
concerned about helping them. 
 
In relation to the third question about why leaders seek their positions, Hermann (2003a: 
197) notes that there are two issues that must be accounted for assessing a leader’s 
motivations: one is why the leader sought the office, and the other is the leader’s 
motivations in leading and securing their group (also, their position within).  These 
motives are so important that they “shape [leaders’] character––what is important in their 
lives and what drives them to act” (Hermann 2003a: 183).  Based on the conclusions 
from relevant literature, Hermann generalizes two types of motivation in political leaders.  
One is a leader driven by an internal focus such as an ideology, a set of specific interests, 
problems or a cause that force them to act.  The latter group of leaders are motivated by a 
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desired relationship with others in their environment and they take action because of 
these factors other than themselves.   
 
 
Table 2.4 Rules for Assessing Motivation for Seeking Office 
 
Score on Task Focus Motivation for Seeking Office 
High Problem 
Moderate Context-specific 
Low Relationship 
Source: Hermann (2003a: 198) 
 
 
Task Focus (TASK) score can help profile a leader for his/her motivation for seeking 
office.  Table 2.4 illustrates how this can be determined.  Together the In-Group Bias 
(IGB) and Distrust of Others (DIS) scores assess a leader’s motivation towards the 
world––or leader’s identification with the group.  Table 2.5 summarizes this discussion.  
Taken as a whole, these evaluations suggest distinct leadership styles as a function of 
responsiveness to constraints, openness to information, and motivation.  In Table 2.6 
these different leadership styles are summarized.5   
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 A similar table can be found in Hermann, Preston, Korany, and Shaw (2001), which displays 
some differences with the one in Hermann’s own work (2003a).  The reason for those is that the 
former article focuses on decision units and the latter is about leadership styles.  Table 2.6 is 
borrowed from Hermann (2003a) given the focus of this dissertation.   
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Table 2.5 Motivation Toward World 
 
In-group 
Bias 
Distrust of others 
Low High 
Low 
World is not a threatening place; 
conflicts are perceived as context-
specific and are reacted to on a case-
by-case basis; leaders recognize that 
their country, like many others, has to 
deal with certain constraints that limit 
what one can do and call for 
flexibility of response; moreover, 
there are certain international arenas 
where cooperation with others is both 
possible and feasible. 
(Focus is on taking advantage of 
opportunities and relationships) 
World is perceived as conflict 
prone, but because other countries 
are viewed as having constraints 
on what they can do, some 
flexibility in response is possible; 
leaders, however, must vigilantly 
monitor developments in the 
international arena and prudently 
prepare to contain an adversary's 
actions while still pursuing their 
countries' interests. 
(Focus is on taking advantage of 
opportunities and building 
relationships while remaining 
vigilant) 
High 
While the international system is 
essentially a zero-sum game, leaders 
view that it is bounded by a specified 
set of international norms; even so, 
adversaries are perceived as 
inherently threatening and 
confrontation is viewed to be ongoing 
as leaders work to limit the threat and 
enhance their countries' capabilities 
and relative status.  
(Focus is on dealing with threats and 
solving problems even though some 
situations nay appear to offer 
opportunities) 
International politics is centered 
around a set of adversaries that are 
viewed as "evil" and intent on 
spreading their ideology or 
extending their power at the 
expense of others; leaders perceive 
that they have a moral imperative 
to confront these adversaries; as a 
result, they are likely to take risks 
and to engage in highly aggressive 
and assertive behavior. 
(Focus is on eliminating potential 
threats and problems) 
Source: Hermann (2003a: 200) 
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Most extant literature in LTA base their discussion on conclusions from leadership style 
and how a leader compares to the norming group selected.  Hence, a leader profile is 
created.  Hermann (2003a: 206) notes, however, that these profiles can be 
“contextualized” as well.  In doing so, it would be possible to discuss the stability of a 
leader’s traits.  Otherwise, one assumes that these traits are relatively stable across time, 
topics, audience and any other contextual features that a leader may be sensitive to.  For 
instance, Hermann suggests looking at the effects of the audience and if a leader’s scores 
differ according to whom they are talking with and in what setting (Hermann 2003a: 
206).  According to Hermann (2003a: 208), such further investigations beyond 
constructing a general leadership profile would add “depth and nuance” to a leader’s 
profile.  Indeed, some recent work is based on questioning this very assumption about the 
stability of leaders traits (for instance, Mahdasian 2002). 
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Table 2.6 Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, 
Openness to Information, and Motivation 
 
Responsiveness 
to Constraints 
Openness to 
Information 
Motivation 
Problem Focus Relationship Focus 
Challenges 
constraints 
Closed to 
information 
Expansionistic 
(Focus of attention is on 
expanding leader's, 
government's, and state's 
span of control) 
Evangelistic 
(Focus of attention is 
on persuading others to 
join in one's mission, in 
mobilizing others 
around one's message) 
Challenges 
constraints 
Open to 
information 
Actively Independent 
(Focus of attention is on 
maintaining one's own 
and the government's 
maneuverability and 
independence in a world 
that is perceived to 
continually try to limit 
both) 
Directive 
(Focus of attention is 
on maintaining one's 
own and the 
government's status and 
acceptance by others by 
engaging in actions on 
the world stage that 
enhance the state's 
reputation) 
Respects 
constraints 
Closed to 
information 
Incremental 
(Focus of attention is on 
improving state's 
economy and/or security 
in incremental steps 
while avoiding the 
obstacles that will 
inevitably arise along the 
way) 
Influential 
(Focus of attention is 
on building cooperative 
relationships with other 
governments and states 
in order to play a 
leadership role; by 
working with others, 
one can gain more than 
is possible on one's 
own) 
Respects 
constraints 
Open to 
information 
Opportunistic 
(Focus of attention is on 
assessing what is 
possible in the current 
situation and context 
given what one wants to 
achieve and considering 
what important 
constituencies will 
allow) 
Collegial 
(Focus of attention is 
on reconciling 
differences and 
building consensus— 
on gaining prestige and 
status through 
empowering others and 
sharing accountability) 
Source: Hermann (2003a: 185)   
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A Review of Leadership Traits Analysis Literature 
 
Margaret Hermann’s (1980a) article “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the 
Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders” builds upon Hermann’s (1974, 1976, 1978) 
previous work on political personality.  This article is significant for its unique (and still 
rare) attempt to link personality and behavior within a conceptual framework.  In 1980, 
Hermann’s study included forty–five heads of government from across the world.  Her 
analyses showed that when leaders had little interest or training in foreign policy then 
their personality characteristics were the most influential (Hermann 1980a: 43–44). 
 
Since, LTA has been applied to a large number of heads of states and political leaders 
(multiple works), as well as heads of international organizations such as the United 
Nations (Kille 2006; Kille and Scully 2003).  Hermann’s individual and collaborated 
research now spans a worldwide geography of leaders from about 50 countries (Hermann 
2003a: 204–205).  Specifically, it is 87 heads of state from forty-six countries and 122 
political leaders from forty-eight countries.  The latter list includes, in addition to the 87 
heads of state, prominent members of the various branches of the government–––and the 
leadership of the opposition, and revolutionary leaders since 1945.  While the means (and 
standard deviations) for this sample–––or, its sub–groups––of heads of state or political 
leaders are often used as a reference point for comparison, some now report their own 
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reference groups.  For instance, Dyson (2006) compares Tony Blair’s traits scores (Prime 
minister of Great Britain, 1997–2007) with all other British prime ministers since 1945.   
 
One problem with the extant literature is that as the transition from hand–coding to fully 
automated coding has been taking place in the past decade or so, there appears to be some 
confusion as to the reference groups reported in published works.  While both of 
Hermann’s samples are based on hand coding of leaders, now a new reference 
(“norming”) group is also being published that is the average profile of 51 political 
leaders (Dyson 2006; Dyson and Billordo 2004) that come from automated coding.6  
Scholars must be aware of how these profiles were calculated and compare their own 
leader profiles with Hermann’s (or others’) only when the same methods are used.  Table 
2.8 (below) shows the average leadership profiles in Hermann (2003a) and Dyson (2006), 
and the latest available data from Social Science Automation, Inc. (SSA).7 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Azamat Sakiev, Hermann’s research assistant at Syracuse University, confirms that these are 
hand–coded results (email communication, May 31, 2010).  While Hermann (2003a) does not 
explicitly state the coding procedure, Michael Young also concludes that the average profiles 
reported by Hermann are hand–coded (personal communication, June 9, 2010).   
 
7 Michael Young and Margaret Hermann founded Social Science Automation Inc. in 1997.  The 
company specializes in automated text analysis and provides services to government, business, 
and academic clients (www.socialscience.net).  The Social Science Automation average scores, 
reported here, come in a file in the ProfilerPlus download package, and are calculated in June 25, 
2007 according to the documentation.   
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Table 2.7 Average LTA Profiles 
Leadership Trait 87 heads of 
state  
(Hermann 
2003a) 
122 political 
leaders 
(Hermann 
2003a) 
51 political 
leaders 
(Dyson 2006) 
214 political 
leaders 
(SSA) 
Belief can control 
events 
Mean = .44  
Low < .30  
High > .58 
Mean = .45 
Low < .33 
High > .57 
Mean = .35 
stdev = .04 
Mean = .34 
stdev = .04 
Conceptual complexity Mean = .44  
Low < .32  
High > .56 
Mean = .45 
Low < .32 
High > .58 
Mean = .57 
stdev = .04 
Mean = .65 
stdev = .04 
Distrust of others Mean = .41  
Low < .25  
High > .56 
Mean = .38 
Low < .20 
High > .56 
Mean = .12 
stdev = .04 
Mean = .01 
stdev = 0 
In-group bias Mean = .42  
Low < .32  
High > .53 
Mean = .43 
Low < .34 
High > .53 
Mean = .09 
stdev = .02 
Mean = .51 
stdev = .07 
Need for power Mean = .50  
Low < .37  
High > .62 
Mean = .50 
Low < .38 
High > .62 
Mean = .24 
stdev = .03 
Mean = .26 
stdev = .04 
Self confidence Mean = .62  
Low < .44  
High > .81 
Mean = .57 
Low < .34 
High > .80 
Mean = .41 
stdev = .08 
Mean = .36 
stdev = .09 
Task focus Mean = .59  
Low < .46  
High > .71 
Mean = .62 
Low < .48 
High > .76 
Mean = .63 
stdev = .06 
Mean = .73 
stdev = .06 
 
 
Many profiles that have been developed by applying LTA showed accuracy in describing 
the personalities of political leaders around the world.  Hermann (2003a: 211) notes that 
the profiles of twenty–one leaders in her own work match closely with the accounts of 
journalists and former government personnel.  For instance, in her recent work on 
Saddam Hussein’s leadership style, Hermann (2003b) portrays Hussein as a leader who 
had an expansionistic orientation (see Table 2.6, above, page 26) to politics because he 
had high scores in nationalism, need for power, distrust of others, and self–confidence.  
 
!
32 
Saddam Hussein, according to this profile, saw the political world full of threats and 
sought to defend himself and Iraq by keeping, as well as, increasing power and influence 
in the world.   
 
As Hermann (2003b) shows, for Hussein politics was the art of dealing with these threats; 
hence, he pursued policies of building various types of weaponry, affecting world oil 
prices, invading neighbors’ territories (Iran in 1980; Kuwait in 1990), trying to assume 
leadership in the Arab world, and challenging the United States at times.  In addition, 
Hermann is to the point in her description of Hussein as a “Machiavellian” in his 
relationship with his advisers and others.  Saddam Hussein did not have any attachments 
to anyone but his relationships served him a purpose.  For instance, Hussein’s motivation 
to approach Yasser Arafat in the late 1980s was to claim leadership in the Arab world by 
showing his support and sympathy to the Palestinians and filling the gap of Egypt and 
Jordan at the time.  Likewise, many accounts of Saddam Hussein’s relations with his 
advisers and those in his inner circle do indeed correspond to Hermann’s (2003b) profile 
that they had to follow Hussein’s orders and will no matter what the consequences of 
those would be, since doing otherwise would mean leaving the inner circle and in some 
circumstances torture or even death (for instance, the assassination of Saddam Hussein’s 
son–in–law Hussein Kamal in February 1996––see, Post 2003: 354).  Similar profiles of 
other world leaders exist in the LTA literature; among many others, Hermann’s own 
work contains profiles of African leaders, Hafez al-Asad of Syria, and Bill Clinton.  
Among others, Taysi and Preston (2001) profile Iran’s president Khatami.   
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Most recent works in LTA shed light on the decision making during the Iraq war (Dyson 
2006, 2009a, 2009d; Shannon and Keller 2007) and explain how leadership styles 
mattered for policy making at the time.  A leadership traits analysis of Tony Blair shows 
how his preferences and behavior explain Britain’s choice in Iraq (Dyson 2006).  Blair, 
according to his personality profile, had a high Belief in Ability to Control Events 
(BACE), a low Conceptual Complexity (CC), and a high Need for Power  (PWR); as the 
Iraq war unfolded, Blair “demonstrated a proactive policy orientation, internal locus of 
control in terms of shaping events, a binary information processing and framing style, 
and a preference to work through tightly held processes in policy making” (Dyson 2006: 
303).  In his later work, Dyson (2009d) explores the leadership in the United States 
administration––specifically, then the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.   
 
In another study employing LTA, Shannon and Keller (2007) show that against some 
constructivist and realist propositions about how international norms violated due to 
global social pressures or self–interest and anarchic nature of world politics––
respectively, leaders’ beliefs and their decision making styles have significant impact on 
why and how leaders may defy international norms.  Shannon and Keller look at 
leadership traits of the members of the George W. Bush administration and their positions 
regarding the 2003 Iraq war.8  Bringing insights from political leadership literature, 
Shannon and Keller’s analysis show that particular leadership traits (such as high BACE, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 These individuals are: President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz.  
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PWR, DIS, and IGB) can predict a leader’s propensity to respect or challenge 
international norms.  These works illustrate the significance of LTA as a method of 
explaining foreign policy behavior and linking it with the personalities of decision-
makers.   
 
 
Operational Code Analysis 
 
Operational code analysis is the study of core belief system of an individual leader and 
“asks what the individual knows, feels, and wants regarding the exercise of power in 
human affairs” (Schafer and Walker 2006a:29).  Since power relationships entail a social 
relationship of self and others in the exercise of power, operational code analysis is about 
the identification of a leader’s political belief system about self and others and their 
interactions with each other (Schafer and Walker 2006a).  Like Hermann’s LTA, 
Operational Code Analysis is an at–a–distance technique as well and is based on the 
assumption that a leader’s belief system manifests itself in his or her use of the language.   
 
Present literature in operational code analysis (discussed later in this chapter) uses the 
Verbs in Context System (VICS) method (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998) to find 
quantitative answers to George’s (1969) ten questions about philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs.  These questions are: 
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Philosophical Beliefs 
1. What is the “essential” nature of political life?  Is the political universe essentially 
one of harmony or conflict?  What is the fundamental character of one’s political 
opponents? 
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political 
values and aspirations?  Can one be optimistic, must one be pessimistic on this 
score; and in what respects the one and/ or the other? 
3. Is the political future predictable?  In what sense and to what extent? 
4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development?  
What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction? 
5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development? 
Instrumental Beliefs 
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? 
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? 
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? 
4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest? 
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests? 
 
As one can infer from the questions to assess an individual’s philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs, the former rather relate to how the leader perceives the world and 
his or her role within that world.  Instrumental beliefs assess the leader’s choices in 
achieving his or her political objectives.  In the VICS, the first philosophical belief and 
instrumental belief are called “master beliefs”––hence, they are “theoretically and 
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empirically” related to the other beliefs in philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Shafer 
and Walker 2006a: 33).9  Master beliefs (P–1: the nature of the political universe, I–1: 
direction of strategy) and the other eight operational codes are numerical indices, 
calculated from the speech acts according to the VICS coding scheme. 
 
The VICS follows several other content analysis systems––such as events datasets––as it 
too focuses on the properties of verbs in speech acts (Schafer and Walker 2006a: 29–32; 
Walker, Schafer, Young 1998, 2003).  In addition, based on its foundations on 
understanding power relationships between self and other, the VICS method also takes 
the context (political environment) into consideration as operational code indices are 
calculated.  Essentially, the argument is that the use of verbs in speech acts indicates 
different intensities of the exercise of power between self and other.  Specifically, there 
are deeds (such as “aid” and “attack”) that denote positive or negative actions in the 
exercise of power and words (such as “promise” and “threaten”) that represent the 
exercise of power in relatively lower forms of (positive or negative) intensity.   
 
The VICS indices are calculated according to the self–other designation and the levels of 
intensity.  The former is decided by the grammatical subject of the verb since the subject 
would either talk about self or about others in the political universe.  As to the latter, 
there are three levels of intensity––either negative or positive––in the VICS: (1) low 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The label “master belief” comes from Holsti’s (1977) reconfiguration of the operational code 
construct.  The ensuing operational code literature adopted this approach.  For a brief discussion, 
see Picucci (2008: 121).  
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intensity, words, (2) medium intensity, words, and (3) high intensity, deeds.  For instance, 
once the self or other designation is made, then the tense of the verb and whether the verb 
is cooperative or conflictual are decided.  Then, the intensity of a verb corresponds to the 
following six categories: positive deeds become Rewards (+3), and negative deeds 
Punishments (–3).  Likewise, positive words can take a value of Promise (+2) or 
Appeal/Support (+1) and negative words Threat (–2) or Oppose/Resist (–1).  When verbs 
do not fit into any of these categories or have no political relevance, they are coded 
Neutral (0) and do not affect the calculation of operational code.  All in all, the VICS 
method records entries for six characteristics for each verb and its context: subject, verb 
category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context (Walker, 
Schafer, and Young 2003: 224).  These six steps are illustrated below in Table 2.8.  The 
calculation of operational code indices are derived from the records for each and every 
verbs used in a speech act.   
 
The following discussion explains the calculation of each philosophical and instrumental 
belief according the VICS.  The letters P and I in the ensuing discussion correspond to 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs, respectively; each belief matches with the 
question number in George (1969).  A short descriptor follows each belief index, which is 
borrowed from Schafer and Walker (2006a).  First, I explain the philosophical indices, 
which stand for how the leader perceives the world and his or her role within that world.  
Then, the discussion shifts to the instrumental beliefs in operational code; instrumental 
beliefs assess the leader’s choices in achieving his or her political objectives.   
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Table 2.8 VICS Steps in Coding A Verb  
 
 
Source: Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998: 183) 
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P–1: The nature of the political universe  
 
This index explains a leader’s beliefs about how other actors in the political universe 
approach and define their goals.  The P–1 index is a subtraction of the percentage of 
negative verbs from the percentage of positive verbs in the speech act, which are 
attributed to other.  The index varies between –1 and +1, a conflictual/hostile view of the 
political universe and a cooperative/friendly view.  As Schafer and Walker (2006a: 33) 
note, this index captures a broad, general measure of the leader’s views of other actors in 
the political universe.  It is assumed, for instance, that when a leader has a cooperative 
understanding of the nature of the political universe, the cooperative attributions to others 
in their speech acts will be higher (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998: 178).  The P–1 
index can be interpreted according the range of possible values associated with it; indeed, 
Walker, Schafer, and Young (2003: 227) propose the following continuum of possible 
scores for the P–1 index: 
 
HOSTILE         FRIENDLY 
Extremely    Very    Definitely  Somewhat     Mixed    Somewhat  Definitely  Very  Extremely 
 –1.0  –.75   –.50     –.25  0.0 +.25    +.50      +.75     +1.0 
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P–2: Prospects for realizing fundamental values  
 
The P–2 index, and the other remaining philosophical beliefs, relate at least partly with 
the master philosophical index, P–1 (the nature of the political universe).  The index for 
realization of fundamental political values (P–2) represents a leader’s prospects for 
success in that regard.  A leader’s optimism or pessimism about realizing his or her 
fundamental political values rests on their beliefs about the persistence of conflict––if it 
is temporary or permanent––in the political universe (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998: 
178).  The P–2 index is calculated by first adding the weights (according to their intensity 
values, –3 to +3) of every verb attributed to the other and then dividing this result with 
the total number verbs attributed to the other.  This would be divided by three, in order to 
make the P–2 index range from –1 to +1.  As such, optimism is associated with a positive 
mean intensity score.  For instance, one would expect that an optimistic leader’s net 
intensity of attributions to others be less negative and more positive (Walker, Schafer, 
and Young 1998: 178).  The P–2 index can be interpreted according to the following 
scale: 
 
PESSIMISTIC                    OPTIMISTIC 
Extremely    Very   Definitely   Somewhat    Mixed    Somewhat      Definitely   Very     Extremely 
         –1.0    –.75  –.50        –.25        0.0 +.25      +.50       +.75 +1.0 
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P–3: Predictability of the political universe 
 
This index measures self’s view of consistency and predictability in other’s actions.  The 
P–3 index is calculated by using a dispersion measure––the Index of Qualitative 
Variation, IQV (Watson and McGaw1980: 88)––of the distribution of observations 
across the six verb categories attributed to the other.  The assumption here is that when 
there is a higher variation in the positive and negative verbs attributed to the other, the 
predictability of the political actions of the other will be lower (Walker, Schafer, and 
Young 1998: 179).  The index is calculated by subtracting the IQV from one, and the 
score ranges from 0 to 1.  Low scores indicate lower predictability in the political 
universe, and higher scores more predictability.   
 
PREDICTABILITY             PREDICTABILITY 
Very Low Low  Medium  High  Very High 
  0.0      .25                   .50       .75   1.0 
 
 
P–4: Control over historical development10  
 
The P–4a index is unique in that it includes verbs attributed to both self and other; as 
such, it is a balance between self and other attributions.  This index is a measure of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This index can be calculated for the self’s and the other’s control over historical development; 
often the former is reported in the literature and is called the P–4a index.  The latter, P–4b, is in 
fact 1 minus P–4a and indicates the other’s control over historical developments.   
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leader’s view of how much he or she controls historical developments or political 
outcomes.  This perception depends on who the self thinks is taking the most action, 
which indicates the locus of control in the political universe according to the self.  For 
example, if a leader is attributing more actions to others, then s/he thinks that others 
control political outcomes and not the subject.  The P–4a index is the ratio of self-
attributed verbs to the sum of self and other attributed verbs.  The P–4a score varies 
between 0 and 1.  Low scores mean others are the locus of control according the subject, 
higher scores indicate the subject is in control of shaping historical developments or 
political outcomes. 
 
CONTROL        CONTROL 
Very Low          Low  Medium  High  Very High 
 0.0         .25              .50             .75  1.0 
 
 
P–5: Role of chance  
 
The P–5 index relates with P–3 and P–4 indices; logically, if a leader believes that others’ 
actions are predictable (a high P–3 score) and s/he is the locus of control in the political 
universe (a high P–4 score), then there would not be much role of chance in the political 
universe.  The index for the role of chance is calculated by 1 minus the product of the P–
3 index times the P–4 index; this P–5 figure can range from 0 to 1. 
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CHANCE       CHANCE 
Very Low Low  Medium  High  Very High 
  0.0      .25               .50                   .75   1.0 
 
 
I–1: Direction of strategy  
 
The first instrumental belief index, I–1, is also a master belief––like the P–1 index.  The 
I–1 index is a leader’s strategic approach to political goals; specifically, it is a measure of 
self’s beliefs about the best strategic direction for actions, either cooperative or 
conflictual.  It is assumed that when the subject talks more about cooperation, his or her 
direction of strategy will be more cooperative––or, vice versa.  It is important to note that 
the I–1 index does not necessarily tell anything about how self chooses his or her strategy 
but merely identifies it (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998: 179).  This index is calculated 
by subtracting the percentage of self–attributed conflictual (–) utterances from that of 
self–attributed cooperative (+) utterances.  The I–1 index varies from –1 to +1.   
 
CONFLICT           COOPERATION 
Extremely         Very      Definitely   Somewhat    Mixed    Somewhat   Definitely      Very       Extremely 
    –1.0  –.75   –.50        –.25 0.0 +.25    +.50        +.75 +1.0 
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I–2: Intensity of tactics 
 
The I–2 index is about a leader’s beliefs regarding the intensity of tactics as s/he pursues 
his or her strategy (the I–1).  Similar to the calculations of the P–2 index, the I–2 is 
calculated by first adding the weights (according to their intensity values, –3 to +3) of 
every verb attributed to the self and then dividing this result with the total number verbs 
attributed to the self.  The P–2 index likewise, this output would be divided by three, in 
order to make the I–2 index range from –1 to +1.   
 
CONFLICT           COOPERATION 
Extremely     Very      Definitely   Somewhat    Mixed    Somewhat   Definitely  Very       Extremely 
 –1.0    –.75   –.50        –.25 0.0 +.25    +.50      +.75 +1.0 
 
 
I–3: Risk orientation  
 
This index measures self’s level of risk averseness or acceptance.  In one way, the I–3 
index indicates the diversity in self’s choice of tactics, because it is assumed that an 
assorted portfolio of actions reduce risks associated with each one action individually 
(Schafer and Walker 2006a: 36).  The assessment of diversity in choice of tactics is 
measured with the help of the IQV too.  Distinct from the calculation of P–3 index, here 
in calculating the I–3 the distribution of observations across the six verb categories 
attributed to the self matters.  The I–3 index is calculated by subtracting the IQV from 
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one, and the score ranges from 0 to 1.  Low scores indicate––low tactical diversity and 
hence––self’s risk averseness, and higher scores mean higher levels of risk acceptance.   
 
RISK AVERSE       RISK ACCEPTANT 
Very Low Low  Medium  High  Very High 
  0.0  .25        .50       .75   1.0 
 
 
I–4: Importance of timing of actions 
 
The I–4 index is in fact composed of two indices: these indices derive from a 
continuation of interest in the diversity of tactics employed by self (I–3), but in the I–4 
index there is a focus specifically on the flexibility of actions.  As such, I–4a is a measure 
of flexibility of tactics between cooperation and conflict, and I–4b is a measure of 
flexibility of tactics between words and deeds.  The formula for I–4a is “one minus the 
absolute value of [the percentage of cooperative self utterances minus the percentage of 
conflictual self utterances]” and the formula for I–4b is “one minus the absolute value of 
[the percentage of word self utterances minus the percentage of deed self utterances]” 
(Schafer and Walker 2006a: 36; italics in original).  The two I–4 indices vary from 0 to 1; 
low scores indicate low flexibility levels, and vice versa.     
 
FLEXIBILITY       FLEXIBILITY 
Very Low Low  Medium  High  Very High 
  0.0  .25        .50       .75   1.0 
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I–5: Utility of Means 
 
The I–5 index corresponds to George’s (1969) last question regarding the instrumental 
beliefs, and measures how a leader perceives the values of different tactics in their use of 
political power.  There are six indices (a: Reward, b: Promise, c: Appeal/Support, d: 
Oppose/Resist, e: Threaten, and f: Punish), which indeed reflect the six verb categories in 
the VICS.  These indices are calculated by a ratio of each verb category to the total verbs; 
each index range from 0 to 1.  Higher scores mean more utility for each tactic; note the 
difference in the scale here compared to other indices. 
 
UTILITY       UTILITY 
Very Low Low  Medium  High  Very High 
  0.0       .08               .16       .24   .32 
 
 
A Review of the Operational Code Literature 
 
Research on operational code goes back to Leites’s (1951, 1953) works on Lenin’s belief 
system and the Bolshevik revolution.  Operational code analysis was later further 
developed by George (1969) as he refined the concept into a belief system comprising 
five philosophical beliefs and five instrumental beliefs.  As such, George’s work very 
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much shaped the extant literature on operational code analysis.  In addition, Holsti (1970, 
1977) and Walker (1977) also made significant contributions to this research.  More 
specifically, Holsti (1977) led to the way to systematize the operational code analysis by 
constructing a coding manual.  However, all operational code (and all at–a–distance) 
research then was based on hand–coding and hence was time consuming.  Holsti’s (1970) 
own contribution about John F. Dulles, and Walker’s (1977) analysis of U.S. Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger alike, were all based on each author’s review of verbal or written 
material of the leader profiled.  For a review of the earlier operational code literature, see 
Walker (1990).   
 
After the foundational studies of operational code analysis, Walker, Schafer, and Young’s 
(1998) systematization of the operational code analysis and their introduction of the 
Verbs in Context System (VICS) has led to a proliferation of research employing 
operational code analysis.  As such, recent works on operational code have been quite 
influential as well and have led to an increased interest in this research tradition (among 
others, Bzostek and Robison 2008; Malici 2008; Malici and Malici 2005; Renshon 2009).  
The re–emergence of the operational code analysis owes mainly to Walker’s individual 
and collaborative research on the method over the two past decades so (see among others, 
Walker 1983, 1990; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998, 1999, 2003; Schafer and Walker 
2006c).  Most notably, the VICS method has been a milestone in operational code 
research and it shapes the literature since its introduction in 1998.   
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Operational codes of many world leaders are constructed with Verbs in Context System 
(VICS), including U.S. presidents Carter (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998), Clinton 
(Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), George W. Bush (Renshon 2008), George H. W. 
Bush (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), Kennedy (Renshon 2009); Israeli prime 
ministers Peres and Rabin (Crichlow 1998); Russian leaders Gorbachev (Malici 2008) 
and Putin (Schafer and Walker forthcoming); Cuban president Castro (Malici and Malici 
2005); Chinese leaders Hu Jintao  (Feng 2006) and Mao Zeodong (Feng 2005); 
Taiwanese leader Chen Shuibian (Feng 2006);  North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung (Malici 
and Malici 2005), British prime minister Tony Blair (Schafer and Walker 2006b), Syrian 
president Bashar al–Asad (Malici and Buckner 2008), and Iranian president Ahmadinejad 
(Malici and Buckner 2008).11  In addition to drawing a broad profile of leaders’ 
operational code beliefs, the literature has explored a variety of topics such as analyzing 
operational codes through public and private statements (Renshon 2009), how leaders 
adapt to changing circumstances in the international system (Malici and Malici 2005) and 
learn (Renshon 2008). 
 
For instance, Renshon (2008) looks at changes in U.S. president George W. Bush’s 
(GWB) belief systems.  Specifically, Renshon analyzes GWB’s core beliefs in four 
different phases of his political career: Phase 1 from governor to president (1998 to 
2001), Phase 2 pre-September 11th presidency (eight months), Phase 3 post-September 
11th presidency (six months), and Phase 4 to the end of his second term in office.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 This list does not include operational code profiles before the introduction of VICS (Verbs In 
Context System) in Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998). 
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Transitions from one phase to another mark different effects on GWB’s beliefs: the 
effects of role change (1 to 2), exogenous shock (2 to 3), and learning in office (3 to 4).  
According to the results, there are significant shifts in GWB’s operational code from 
Phase 2 to Phase 3.  His view of the nature of universe (P-1) drops to .21 (somewhat 
friendly) from .51 (definitely friendly) in Phase 2.  This shows that traumatic shocks lead 
to fundamental changes in individual’s belief systems.  While GWB viewed the world as 
friendly and cooperative before 9/11, those views became significantly more conflictual 
and hostile after 9/11.  Renshon finds that only the first three philosophical indices 
change significantly between Phase 2 and 3, suggesting that Bush’s overall operational 
code was relatively stable.   Yet, this still illustrates the importance of these indices as 
they are at the heart of how the individual views the political universe.  When Renshon 
extends the six-month period to eighteen months (Phase 3 till March 11, 2003), his 
reanalysis suggest that traumatic events can permanently change belief systems.  He 
finds, for instance, that P-1 index (view of the nature of universe) rebounds to .27 for the 
extended Phase 3.  Renshon (2008) argues that while in the short term a severe reversal 
of key indices is possible over a longer period of time severe changes become slightly 
attenuated as the new belief system is consolidated.  Unlike changes in GWB’s belief 
system, according to Malici and Malici (2005) there were no learning effects on Fidel 
Castro’s and Kim Il Sung’s belief systems but changes in Cuban and North Korean 
foreign policies, respectively, were rather due to the changing circumstances of the 
international order in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
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Operational code analysis is one vibrant field of research; in addition to the literature 
cited above, Schafer and Walker (2006c) collection of essays is an indispensible source in 
this area.  This edited volume illustrates the diversity of operational code research.12  For 
instance, in her contribution to this book, Feng (2006) looks at the relationship between 
China’s and Taiwan’s leaders.  Others (Drury 2006; Stevenson 2006; Thies 2006) 
illustrate how operational code construct can be applied to topics in international political 
economy.  Also noteworthy is Picucci’s (2008) dissertation research; his work is 
significant in that he takes the concept back to its original application at the group–level 
(i.e., Leites’s discussion of the Soviet belief system) and looks at belief systems of 
terrorist organizations––specifically, al–Qaeda and Hamas.   
 
 
Discussion:  
Linking Leadership Traits and Operational Code to Foreign Policy Behavior 
 
Both leadership traits analysis and operational code analysis have advanced on many 
fronts and have expanded our knowledge about foreign policy decision making.  
However, as Schafer (2000) argued, the broader inquiry into the effects of cognition on 
international relations remains a relatively young research agenda and much is still left to 
do.  The leading scholars in Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 For a recent review, see Walker and Schafer (2010). 
 
 
!
51 
suggest various avenues for further research.  For instance, there is an agreement that 
both literatures can be expanded and linked with large event datasets (Mahdasian 2002; 
Renfro 2009; Young and Schafer 1998).  In addition, there is a relative dearth of research 
in non-Western contexts (some exceptions can be found in an edited volume by Feldman 
and Valenty, 2001; also see Malici 2008; Malici and Buckner 2008).  Indeed, that is one 
reason behind the call for studying “leaders in dyads with different political cultures and 
institutions” (Schafer and Walker, 2006b: 580).  This section discusses how there is more 
to benefit from LTA and operational code research as I discuss how this study fits in to 
these literatures.  
 
One of the contentious points in the literature has been the type of materials (spontaneous 
vs. scripted, or private vs. public texts) used in assessing political leaders (see Dille 2000; 
Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009; Renshon 2009).  This indeed has been one of the 
differences between leadership traits and operational code techniques covered in this 
dissertation.  Hermann in her own research made an exclusive preference for the use of 
spontaneous verbal statements only in profiling political leaders.  The operational code 
literature, on the other hand, tends to rely on leaders’ speeches.  While there is a lack of 
agreement as to what type of material is more appropriate to use, recent calls for utilizing 
both are noteworthy and also hint at where there can be some gains (Renfro 2009).  The 
comparison between spontaneous and scripted materials has been one area of expansion 
in the LTA literature and also in the broader literature about personality effects on foreign 
policy behavior.  Research in LTA follow Hermann’s example; this notwithstanding 
some recent studies in LTA have compared leaders’ profiles derived from spontaneous 
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and scripted verbal statements (Dille 2000; Dille and Young 2000; Mahdasian 2002; 
Renfro 2009; Shannon and Keller 2007).  As Mahdasian (2002) notes, there exists 
conflicting accounts of profiling political leaders with spontaneous or scripted texts (also 
see, Renfro 2009).  On the one hand, Dille (2000) finds that operational code indices vary 
depending on the spontaneity of the variable but the conceptual complexity trait does not.  
On the other hand, Dille and Young (2000) find variation in the latter.  Like Hermann, 
Mahdasian concludes in favor of using spontaneous material.  Recently, Renfro (2009: 
218) argues that using both spontaneous and scripted is useful, and they can be 
complementary of each other in at–a–distance assessment of political leaders. 
 
In the operational code analysis the preference is in favor of using scripted texts and 
hence it constitutes one of the differences between LTA and operational code analysis 
research.  Despite different preferences in using scripted or spontaneous materials, the 
gist of the matter is that public statements are important and valid indicators of leaders’ 
psychological characteristics (see Rosati 1984: 163; Schafer and Walker 2006a: 47).  In 
addition, leaders’ speeches, whomever the author of speech might be, are considered as 
the leader’s own words (Winter et al. 1991: 218–219).  Moreover, there are definitely 
other differences, as well as similarities, between the two literatures. 
 
In the existing literatures of leadership traits analysis (LTA) and operational code 
analysis, scholars use these two measures of leader personality traits and belief systems 
independent of each other and do not benefit from the potential insights from utilizing 
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both LTA and operational code analysis at the same time.13  One possible reason is that 
one can expect correlations between the LTA scores and operational code analysis 
indices (see, Young and Shafer 2005).  Although some LTA and operational code 
analysis measurements would relate with each other, this is no reason to ignore their 
distinct input to foreign policy analysis.  I argue that there is a lot to benefit from utilizing 
a leader’s personality traits and belief systems together in the same research design.  
Before any further discussion, first I summarize the major conclusions, strengths, and 
weaknesses of both literatures.  
 
Margaret Hermann’s Leadership Traits Analysis (LTA), along with many other works 
using this method, now established that leaders indeed have different norms and 
principles that guide them in their dealing with other leaders, their constituents and 
advisers (Hermann 2003a: 181).  Among others, Preston (1996, 2001) shows that 
presidents differ in their relationship with their advisers (also, see Hermann and Preston 
1994).  Preston uses two personality traits from LTA and given a president’s level of 
expertise he proposes that there are sixteen different leader–advisor relationship models 
possible.  Kaarbo and Hermann (1998) illustrate that European prime ministers have 
distinct leadership styles and hence this method can explain political leadership in other 
countries.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The only exceptions known to this author are Dille (2000) and Lazarevska, Sholl, and Young 
(2006).  Dille uses only the Conceptual Complexity trait along with all the operational code 
indices.  This work remains limited in scope as it looks at a small sample of Reagan’s and Bush’s 
statements about the U.S.–Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War.  Lazarevska, Sholl, and 
Young also discuss only selected LTA and operational code variables of terrorist leaders. 
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LTA is criticized for its ability to capture the leader’s personality as a snapshot at a 
certain moment.  This was the criticism of Rasler, Thompson, and Chester (1980), in the 
same issue of International Studies Quarterly Hermann’s article was published.  
Hermann responded to their criticism in the very same issue (Hermann 1980b), made 
clear that personality can be contextually dependent and this can be determined by 
studying diverse material.  Since then, many leader profiles that were assessed using LTA 
technique correspond with the image of those leaders in the eyes of other leaders, 
advisers, and journalists (Hermann 2003a: 211).  These works show that a leader’s 
general profile can be assessed with a certain number of word count and a variety of 
issues covered across time and space.  Nonetheless, other studies, and particularly 
Mahdasian (2002), also discuss how the LTA scores would become less stable when they 
are calculated at smaller units of time, or across different issues.  Finally, a challenge still 
ahead is to expand this method of analysis in profiling leadership in other countries.  
Much published work still remains within the Western context (for instance, Dyson 2006; 
Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009). 
 
As reviewed earlier, the operational code analysis dates back to Leites’s (1951, 1953) 
works and George (1969), Holsti (1977), and Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998) are the 
major milestones in this line of research.  Compared to LTA, operational code appears to 
be a more vibrant area of study, with applications to various other topics than foreign 
policy (see, earlier discussion in this chapter).  One significant difference between LTA 
and operational code analysis has been that the latter has produced more work as to the 
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stability of belief systems across time and issues.  In addition, some operational code 
research was based on the sequential games model of Theory of Moves (Brams 1994) by 
assessing preference orderings from the master indices of operational code (for instance, 
see Marfleet and Walker 2006; Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003).   
 
One criticism against this line of research, Picucci observes, was that it had not made a 
serious effort in linking belief systems to behavior (Cottam 1986; Sjoblom 1982 –both 
cited in Picucci 2008:125).  Recent operational code analysis indeed attempts to remedy 
that with introducing the Theory of Moves and utilizing events data in its analyses.  Two 
criticisms leveled against LTA are not valid in the case of operational code analysis. 
Unlike LTA, this literature has investigated the changes in leaders’ beliefs in response to 
various contextual factors (issue, time, authorship, etc.).  Moreover, arguably, operational 
code technique has been applied to leadership from many different countries such as 
China, Iran, Russia, and Syria.   
 
In addition to their strengths and weakness as individual methods of personality 
assessment at–a–distance, both LTA and operational code analysis face with shared 
criticism as well as challenges.  The first and foremost is the skepticism against the 
analysis at the individual–level.  As discussed in Chapter 1, this rather originates from a 
structural understanding of international politics.  LTA, operational code, and many other 
approaches to the role of individuals in international politics have successfully shown that 
such skepticism is baseless.  Alas, power politics in its many forms––security, economic, 
or cultural––continue to lure many.  As to the challenges at–a–distance methods had 
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faced when they were introduced (time, replication issues, etc.), most are remedied by the 
introduction of automated coding.  These notwithstanding, both LTA and operational 
code analysis can make more strides in explaining personality effects on world politics. 
 
One step forward in LTA and operational code research can be benefiting from each 
other’s achievements and strengths, and utilizing both in at–a–distance assessment of 
leaders worldwide.  As explained earlier, LTA and operational code analysis employ 
different measures and hence they produce leader profiles with different criteria.  That is 
indeed why I argue for a combination of the two in assessing the impact of leadership on 
foreign policy making, and I utilize both in the following pages.  As a theoretical goal, 
the present study aims to tackle this question of a possible integration––or, at the least, 
bridging––of LTA and operational code analysis to understand idiosyncratic effects on 
foreign policy behavior.  What more can LTA and operational code analysis tell when 
they are used simultaneously?  The existing literatures provide some hints at potential 
answers to this question.  Separate LTA and operational code analysis profiles for some 
world leaders exist in their respective literatures, and these can illustrate the benefits of 
combining LTA and operational code analysis.  For instance, Dyson (2006) and Schafer 
and Walker (2001) both study British Prime Minister Tony Blair, respectively Blair’s 
leadership traits and operational code.14   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Dyson (2006) use automated–coding.  Schafer and Walker (2001), on the other hand, hand–
code Blair’s speeches.  The reason for selecting these particular studies is that both study reports 
a general profile of Blair.   
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According to Dyson’s (2006) analysis, Tony Blair has a high Belief in Ability to Control 
Events (BACE), a low Conceptual Complexity (CC), and a high Need for Power (PWR) 
compared to all 12 British prime ministers in the post-1945 era.15  First, Blair’s 
significantly higher BACE score suggests that Blair strongly believes in his ability to 
control events in the political environment and he perceives Britain as an influential actor 
in world politics.  Second, a low CC score––as discussed earlier in this chapter––signals a 
worldview of binary categories such as good vs. evil and us vs. them.  Blair’s CC score, 
which is one standard deviation below other British prime ministers, indicates that he 
would have a decisive decision making style where other significant factors outside his 
black–and–white view are not evaluated properly or may go unnoticed.  Lastly, Dyson 
shows that Blair is high in the Need for Power trait hence would be actively involved in 
policy formulation and work with small groups of hand–picked individuals.  In addition, 
a combined high BACE and high PWR score suggests that Blair would likely challenge 
constraints in the international system.   
 
Major conclusions from Schafer and Walker’s (2001) general operational code profile of 
Blair are that Blair views the political universe mixed between cooperation and conflict 
and is slightly pessimistic on the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals.  In 
addition, Blair sees the political future as very unpredictable and ascribes a huge role to 
chance in international politics.  An important characteristic of Blair’s operational code 
profile is that he believes that he has a high degree of control over historical 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Dyson reports scores for all seven personality traits, however in his discussion focuses 
exclusively on these three traits. 
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developments.  Blair has a clear preference for cooperative strategies and tactics.  
Furthermore, he diversifies his choice of tactics more so between words and deeds than 
between cooperation and conflict.  Rhetorical tactics (of appeal/support and oppose/resist, 
for cooperation and conflict respectively) serve more utility to Blair.  Also, it is 
noteworthy that Schafer and Walker find Blair being more cooperative towards 
democratic states than non–democracies.16   
 
The conformity between Blair’s personality traits in Dyson’s work and his operational 
code profile in Schafer and Walker is significant.  Both LTA and operational code 
analysis find Blair in believing his efficacy in controlling events.  Notwithstanding these, 
a high BACE score on the one hand, and slight pessimism in realizing fundamental 
values (P–2) and high belief in the role of chance in the political universe (P–5) on the 
other hand do not necessarily go together.  Likewise, Blair’s LTA suggests that he would 
be challenging constraints yet his operational code shows that he is rather a risk–averse 
leader.  Conclusions from these two studies, or for matter from LTA and operational code 
analysis profiles of the same leader, would not necessarily be the same.  Moreover, this is 
yet to be seen since there have been few attempts in that regard (for an early attempt see 
Winter et al. 1991; for a quantitative analysis see Young and Shafer 2005; also, Post 
2003).  Beyond such comparisons, though, I argue that taken together LTA and 
operational code analysis are rather complementary of each other.  While LTA rather 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 For a follow–up regarding this issue, see Schafer and Walker (2006) where the authors present 
further evidence that both Blair and Clinton had a more cooperative attitude towards democracies 
and acted accordingly. 
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focuses on how leaders may involve in and shape decision making processes with their 
different styles, operational code analysis indices signal their preferences in pursuing 
different strategies and tactics.  Of course, what is missing in Blair’s profile in Dyson 
(2006) and Schafer and Walker (2001) is that in neither one matches personality 
characteristics with systematically measured behavior of Britain under Blair’s rule.   
 
At first glance, the main distinction between LTA and operational code analysis is that 
the former’s focus is rather on more stable personality characteristics and the latter is 
more apt to change with situation.  This notwithstanding, Hermann (2003a) recognizes 
that there can be contextual effects on leadership style and encourages exploring those.  
Still, though, Hermann expects a more or less stable leadership style.  When leadership 
style differs under changing circumstances (across time, audiences, issues, etc.), 
Hermann argues that it would help understand how leaders adapt to contextual cues and 
what changes their behavior.  The operational code literature, on the other hand, is more 
open to the idea that leaders’ belief systems are apt to change; indeed, Renshon (2008) 
proves that.  Renshon also shows that as the effects of such changes diminish in the long 
run, leaders can acquire a newly defined belief system (Renshon 2008).  As such, while a 
leader’s belief system can be expected to be stable to some extent, this certainly does not 
translate to a total rejection of potential shifts.   
 
As I investigate how personality, beliefs and events match with each other, the 
motivation behind this study is the assumption that leader personality traits and beliefs 
can shift over time.  Specifically, I expect to link these shifts with foreign policy behavior 
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of the state that each leader represents.  Such expectation, though, never really was the 
idea behind any LTA project––Hermann (1980a) is an exception.  Despite the calls for 
linking traits scores with foreign policy behavior, such an undertaking does not exist.  
While some work in operational code analysis––such as Walker, Schafer, and Young 
(1999)––explored this, the extant operational code analysis literature too lacks such 
investigations.  Neither the LTA nor operational code analysis literature has any work 
that focuses on how these idiosyncratic characteristics may explain what states do while 
both their dependent and independent variables are measured at matching intervals.   
 
Such opportunities certainly do not go unrecognized in the literature.  One can find 
various suggestions for open venues of inquiry in this strand of, LTA and operational 
code analysis, research.  One of the calls has been to benefit from other quantitative 
research in international relations research, specifically events data (Mahdasian 2002; 
Young and Schafer 1998).  In addition, with the increased availability of public 
documentation of leaders’ interviews and speeches, it is possible to expand the systematic 
analysis of leadership beyond the leadership of Western societies.  As Renfro (2009: 27) 
aptly notes, with many leaders around the world leaving plenty of media records, 
“scholars may analyze previously unthinkable amounts of data.”  Moreover, meeting 
other calls, these data can be linked with the events datasets that already exist.  This 
dissertation places itself right at that point; using the advantages of automation in creating 
leader personality profiles and mapping their belief systems, it takes these idiosyncratic 
factors as its independent variables and puts foreign policy behavior––measured by 
Kansas Events Data System––on the left side of the equation as its dependent variable.  
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This research also expands the geographical coverage of extant literature by looking at 
the impact of political leadership in Israel and Turkey, key allies of the United States in 
the Middle East, on their foreign policy behavior in general and towards the United States 
specifically.  How well do personality traits and beliefs explain foreign policy behavior?  
What more can LTA and operational code analysis tell when they are used 
simultaneously?  The following chapter outlines the research design of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
 
This study is based on the assumptions that (a) political leadership matters in foreign 
policy decision making, and (b) the chief executive reflects the “cognition of the state” 
(Schafer 2000).  In a nutshell, I attempt here to investigate the relationship between a 
state’s political leadership and its foreign policy behavior.  As such, I propose a study 
that would systematically seek answers to the following questions:  
(1) How do leadership traits and operational codes correspond to state foreign 
policy behavior?  
(2) What benefit, if any, is there to using leadership traits and operational code 
analyses together in explaining foreign policy?   
 
I use automated text analysis software to create data in seeking answers to these 
questions.  ProfilerPlus (Social Science Automation 2008) is a program that profiles an 
individual's personality traits and operational code based on his/her use of words.  
TABARI (Schrodt 2009), on the other hand, creates a data set of international interactions 
for state and non-state actors from newswire reports.  As discussed later, data used in this 
study are from Israel and Turkey; hence, other additional questions are implied: 
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(3) How do Israeli prime ministers’ leadership traits and operational codes differ 
among themselves? What do these tell about Israel’s foreign policy? 
(4) How do Turkish prime ministers’ leadership traits and operational codes differ 
among themselves? What do these tell about Turkey’s foreign policy? 
 
In this chapter, I outline the research design and methodological approach of this project.  
First, the dependent variable––foreign policy behavior––and its measurement are 
explained.  Then, I discuss the data collection for leadership traits analysis (LTA) and 
operational code analysis variables, which are the independent variables of this study.  
This is followed by the methods employed for data analysis.  Finally, the hypotheses are 
covered, and the significance of this research design for the LTA and operational code 
analysis literatures is discussed. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior 
 
The dependent variable in this study is state behavior as it is captured by an event dataset.  
Specifically, the data are based on the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations 
(CAMEO) coding scheme (Gerner et al. 2002; Schrodt and Yilmaz 2009), and are taken 
from Kansas Event Data System (KEDS).1 CAMEO events are comprehensive in that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 While KEDS acquired its name from the research of Philip Schrodt and Deborah Gerner at the 
University of Kansas, now it is renamed the Penn State Event Data System after Schrodt’s move 
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they include almost all political, economic and military types of events and range from 
mere verbal behavior to the simplest and most extreme types of behavior.  Most recently, 
CAMEO is being used in the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) project 
(see O’Brien 2010 for a discussion).   
 
Table 3.1 shows an abbreviated list of CAMEO events.2  Following the CAMEO coding 
scheme, events are aggregated into verbal and material forms of conflict and cooperation.  
There are multiple advantages to aggregating events to these four event types (Schrodt 
and Gerner 2004: 315).  First, by doing so rather than working with distinct event 
categories that may occur rarely (see the full list of CAMEO events in the appendix), this 
categorizes events to a manageable number in statistical analyses.  Then, this approach 
minimizes some likely coding errors at the tertiary event categories since events are 
aggregated to a higher level.  Table 3.2 shows the four groups of aggregation that are 
used here in this dissertation.  
 
The Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) is a collection of various event datasets (for 
Central Asia, the Balkans, the Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, Turkey, 
and West Africa) and associated computer programs to generate––and edit––the data.  
The KEDS is a fully–automated research program, and represents a new generation of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
to the Pennsylvania State University in January 2010.  The project website can be accessed at 
<eventdata.psu.edu>.   
 
2 A full list of event observation categories in the CAMEO coding scheme is in the Appendix. 
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event data research.3  TABARI, Text Analysis of Augmented Replacement Instructions, 
generates event data in the current KEDS.  With automated–coding of English language 
news reports from Reuters and/or Agence France Presse, TABARI creates a data set of 
foreign policy behavior (of both state and non-state actors).  Besides Schrodt’s––and 
Gerner’s––own publications, the KEDS data have been used in various publications (for 
instance, Bzostek and Robison 2008; Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Pevehouse and 
Goldstein 1999; Robison 2005; Schafer and Walker 2006b).  Leading scholars of foreign 
policy analysis praised KEDS for its success in creating reliable and systematically–
generated datasets for foreign policy behavior (Breuning 2007; Hudson 2005, 2007).   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For a review of the history of KEDS, and broadly events data research, see Schrodt (2006). 
 
!
66 
 
Table 3.1 CAMEO (0.9b5) Event Codes 
 
01: MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT 
02: APPEAL 
03: EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE 
04: CONSULT 
05: ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION 
06: ENGAGE IN MATERIAL COOPERATION 
07: PROVIDE AID 
08: YIELD 
09: INVESTIGATE 
10: DEMAND 
11: DISAPPROVE 
12: REJECT 
13: THREATEN 
14: PROTEST 
15: EXHIBIT FORCE POSTURE 
16: REDUCE RELATIONS 
17: COERCE 
18: ASSAULT 
19: FIGHT 
20: USE UNCONVENTIONAL MASS VIOLENCE 
 
 
Table 3.2 Aggregation of CAMEO Categories 
Type of Event CAMEO Categories 
Verbal cooperation  01 to 05 
Material cooperation 06 to 09 
Verbal conflict 10 to 14 
Material conflict 15 to 20 
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Presently, KEDS is the best tool available to quantitatively measure foreign policy 
behavior.  Given the history of Schrodt’s and Gerner’s research interest in the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, KEDS has developed a particular strength in the Levant area 
(Schrodt 2006, 2010).  In addition, a well–developed dataset for Turkey emerged out of 
the KEDS as Omur Yilmaz (who served as a research assistant for Schrodt and Gerner 
during the development of CAMEO coding scheme) and others devoted their time 
towards this purpose.  The Levant and Turkey datasets, hence, are the highest quality data 
available in the Kansas Event Data System.   
 
The KEDS data serve very well towards this project; the Levant and Turkey datasets 
provide rich and systematically–generated measures of foreign policy behavior of various 
states in the Middle East.  Here, I look at the Israeli and Turkish foreign policy behavior 
as the dependent variables of this research.  These two countries selected for the fact that 
compared to the other countries covered in the datasets, they are the only ones that have 
had democratic and competitive elections, peaceful change in the executive branch, and 
many alternations in the post of the head of government.  The chief executive in both 
Israel and Turkey is the prime minister––discussed below. 
 
While the data for Israel go back to 1979, the KEDS Turkey dataset starts in November 
1991.  Hence, the latter date marks the temporal domain for this study.  November 1991, 
coincidentally, corresponds to the disintegration of the Soviet Union; as such, this study 
looks at the leadership effects on the foreign policy behavior of Israel and Turkey in the 
post–Cold War era.  The Levant dataset uses Reuters as its primary news source; the 
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Turkey dataset, on the other hand, codes Agence France Presse news stories.  For the 
purposes of this study, both datasets are updated until the end of 2009. 
 
Once TABARI generates the data, another KEDS utility program is used before events 
are aggregated.  In order to avoid multiple counts of the same event, Schrodt developed 
the “One_A_Day_Filter” program.  This filtering program processes both the Levant and 
Turkey data; once the filtering program clears the data off from any replications, events 
are aggregated by month.  This aggregation is essentially a numerical count of all the 
events (or any particular event types) initiated by and targeted towards the country under 
investigation.4  Here, I aggregate the events by groups mentioned earlier (see, Table 3.2).  
When the aggregation processes are complete, the dependent variable can be tested 
against the independent variables.  The discussion now shifts to the independent variables 
utilized in this study.   
 
 
Independent Variables: Leader Personality Traits and Operational Codes 
 
The independent variables of interest are the personality traits and operational codes of 
Israel’s and Turkey’s prime ministers in the post–Cold War era.  In order to measure 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"!Event count is advantageous over scaling events (the standard in this vein of research has been 
the Goldstein scale, see Goldstein 1992) for it is sensitive to event frequency.  Moreover, because 
when scaled events are used cumulatively, totaling positive (cooperative) and negative 
(conflictual) events to “Net Cooperation,” they tend to miss the magnitude of events. 
!
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these variables, I collected all the spontaneous foreign policy remarks of Israeli and 
Turkish prime ministers under investigation here.  The independent variables are then 
generated by automated–coding of these materials.  I use the software designed 
specifically for this purpose: the ProfilerPlus program (Social Science Automation 2008).  
In this section, building upon the relevant discussion in the previous chapter, I explain the 
data collection procedures for the independent variables used here. 
 
By selecting the spontaneous foreign policy utterances of leaders’, this study follows 
Hermann’s principle.  This is also necessary given the contradictory conclusions about 
the utility of scripted (prepared) and spontaneous statements in profiling leaders (see 
Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009).  In addition, given the aim of this study to match state 
behavior with leader characteristics, it is appropriate to analyze political leaders’ foreign 
policy statements only during their tenure in office and not for the entirety of their 
political careers.5  With these principles in mind, I collected spontaneous foreign policy 
remarks by Israeli and Turkish prime ministers from 1991 to 2009 (Table 3.3 lists the 
individuals who occupied this office in Israel and Turkey).  I aimed at collecting the 
whole universe of readily available, spontaneous foreign policy statements made by 
Israel’s and Turkey’s prime ministers during this time period. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 An approach also adopted by Crichlow (1998) and Astroff (2008); though, both collected only a 
sample of leaders’ speeches or interviews.   
 
!
70 
 Table 3.3 Israel’s and Turkey’s Prime Ministers, 1991 to 2009 
 
Israel 
Yitzhak Shamir   October 20, 1986–July 13, 1992  
Yitzhak Rabin   July 13, 1992–November 4, 1995  
Shimon Peres    November 4, 1995–June 18, 1996  
Benjamin Netanyahu   June 18, 1996–July 6, 1999   
Ehud Barak    July 6, 1999–March 7, 2001   
Ariel Sharon6    March 7, 2001–April 14, 2006   
Ehud Olmert    April 14, 2006–March 31, 2009  
Benjamin Netanyahu   March 31, 2009–Present   
 
Turkey 
Suleyman Demirel   November 20, 1991–May 16, 1993   
Erdal Inonu (acting)7   May 16, 1993–June 25, 1993   
Tansu Ciller    June 25, 1993–March 6, 1996   
Mesut Yilmaz   March 6, 1996–June 28, 1996   
Necmettin Erbakan   June 28, 1996–June 30, 1997   
Mesut Yilmaz   June 30, 1997–January 11, 1999   
Bulent Ecevit    January 11, 1999–November 18, 2002  
Abdullah Gul    November 18, 2002–March 14, 2003  
Recep Tayyip Erdogan  March 14, 2003–Present   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Since Ariel Sharon was incapacitated on January 4th, 2006 and Ehud Olmert functioned as the 
acting prime minister until the elections were held, Olmert’s spontaneous remarks were coded 
from January 2006 to until he leaves in March 2009. 
 
7 Given his very short term in office, Erdal Inonu is not profiled for his leadership traits or 
operational code.  For the month that Inonu was the prime minister, though, LTA scores and op 
code indices are calculated with Inonu’s own foreign policy statements. 
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Spontaneity here means that these statements were made either in an interview or in a 
press conference setting where the leader responded to the questions from the media 
members.8  The texts of these statements were accessed from various databases such as 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Foreign Broadcasting and Information System.  In addition, 
some online documentation was readily available for analysis.  For instance, the Charlie 
Rose Show of the Public Broadcasting Service provided a transcript of its interviews.  
Hence, only those “readily available” materials are incorporated in this study.  It is, 
however, assumed that most if not all spontaneous foreign policy statements (as defined 
here) Israel’s and Turkey’s leaders made were accessed.  These texts required only minor 
editing as they were prepared for processing in ProfilerPlus.  All the text was already 
translated into English, or sometimes the leader already spoke in English.9   
 
For Israeli and Turkish prime ministers studied here, each leader’s statements are 
aggregated monthly; ProfilerPlus, using its Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational 
Code Analysis schemes, then codes these verbal outputs.  Because LTA and operational 
code require different criteria for a meaningful analysis, there was some further 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Because opening statements in press conferences are often prepared remarks, these are omitted 
from the analysis.  Only the “Q and A” parts of press conferences are coded. 
 
9 While it is possible that some content may be lost in translation, earlier studies indicate that 
translation was not an issue in profiling leaders.  Hermann (1987) reports that there was a high 
degree of correlation between the profiles of a leader coded in the original and translated 
languages.   
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aggregation when these criteria were not met.  For LTA, a response/record of at least 100 
words is expected to produce a meaningful result––granted that it would be 
complemented with other materials that bring up the total number of words to at least 
5000 words.  An accurate LTA profile requires at least 5000 words analyzed, which is 
met for all the leaders studied here.  For operational code analysis, the criteria proposed 
by Schafer and Walker (2006a: 34-36) is that there would be 15–20 verbs coded per 
speech act.  In this study, for traits analysis it was rarely the case that 100 words per 
month was not available for any leader; however, when assessing leaders’ operational 
codes some monthly aggregations did not match up to the at least 15 verbs criterion.  
When that was the case, I merged a leader’s spontaneous foreign policy statements from 
the following month or two.  I used the resulting operational code indices calculated from 
the merged documents for all the months that verbal material come from.10  The appendix 
displays all the data used in this dissertation. 
 
ProfilerPlus generates the LTA scores and operational code indices following the coding 
procedures discussed in the preceding chapter.  Instead of an individual reading the text 
line by line and coding himself/herself, the program concludes the coding based on the 
grammatical and coding rules, as well as the vocabularies it is given.  For LTA, 
ProfilerPlus recognizes the words associated with measuring each trait; for operational 
code, ProfilerPlus follows the “author” for each text and makes the self–other assessment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The total number of months under investigation is 218 months (from November 1991 to 
December 2009).  For Israel’s prime ministers, there were LTA scores for all 218 months and 
operational code indices for 208 data points, “months.”  For the Turkish prime ministers, there 
were LTA scores for 216 months and operational code indices calculated for 170 months. 
 
!
73 
based on that.  The programming details of ProfilerPlus are beyond the focus and interest 
of the present study (see, Young 2001 for a discussion); as discussed earlier, the LTA and 
operational code schemes for ProfilerPlus program are developed––in collaboration with 
Margaret Hermann and Stephen Walker––specifically for this sort of research. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This dissertation employs multiple methods to assess political leadership and foreign 
policy behavior of leadership in Israel and Turkey since the end of the Cold War.  First, I 
present each leader’s personal background and brief political career particularly as these 
pertain to their personalities.  This qualitative assessment derives from factual 
information about leaders’ personal life and then from extant (albeit few) studies about 
their personalities or styles, beliefs.  A review of all political leaders personal 
backgrounds and their political career precedes the presentation of findings in this 
dissertation, and it constitutes a basis of comparison for the latter. 
 
Second, I use the results of LTA and operational code to profile Israel’s and Turkey’s 
leaders according to these respective techniques.  I discuss these before I present an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression test of the relationship between foreign policy 
behavior and leaders characteristics in both countries.  I run separate tests with traits 
scores and operational code indices as independent variables, and repeat these for four 
models where the dependent variable is the number of verbal cooperative, verbal 
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conflictual, material cooperative, and material conflictual event counts.  Following Achen 
(2000) and Keele and Kelly (2006), I do not use any other lagged independent variables.  
As such, I treat the traits scores and operational code indices as numbers and explore their 
effects on foreign policy behavior in the form of event counts.  The test results for LTA 
and operational code are interpreted both individually and together in Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively about Israel and Turkey.  As discussed earlier, it is expected that there is 
more to explain if one to utilize both LTA and operational code analysis.   
 
One concern with this particular design can be the circularity problem (see Rosati 1984; 
also Kaarbo 1997).  Because both event data and leaders personality assessment depend 
on similar or perhaps sometimes even the same sources, this circularity issue becomes a 
concern.  The newswire stories used to create event data often are also used to profile 
leaders.  However, a major distinction between the text that are used for psychological 
assessment and event data creation will be that the former will use the full text of an 
interview/speech/statement and the latter will be generated––in the KEDS, for sure––by 
the lead sentences of news reports in Reuters or Agence France Presse.  In addition, the 
sources of event data are the statements and actions of various actors––civilian and 
military leaders, various branches of the government, non–governmental associations, 
etc.––as these are reported in the news stories rather than one, single individual that is 
profiled only by his/her utterances.  Hence, the overlap between the sources used for the 
analysis here cannot be significant.   
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In order to address these issues and also explore relationships between leadership traits 
and operational code variables, I assess correlations among them––following Young and 
Shaffer (2005).  Given the non–normality of several indicators, like Young and Shaffer 
instead of Pearson’s r, I too report Spearman’s rho in this study.  Correlations are 
reported in the concluding chapter of this dissertation, where I discuss how the following 
hypotheses fare with the results drawn from the analyses of political leadership and 
foreign policy of Israel and Turkey. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The foundational texts in both LTA and operational code analysis literatures already 
suggest plenty of hypotheses, which can be tested with the data available here.  
Moreover, these can be supplemented with findings and suggestions for future 
investigations in most recent literature.  The uniqueness of this research design is that it 
matches Israel’s and Turkey’s prime ministers’ personality characteristics with their 
foreign policy behavior, all systematically generated and aggregated monthly.   
 
Given the research questions here, first it is hypothesized that LTA and operational code 
analysis as independent variables will explain variation in foreign policy behavior in 
material and verbal forms of cooperation and conflict.   
 
Hypothesis 1a: LTA scores explain foreign policy behavior. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Operational code indices explain foreign policy behavior. 
 
Given their theoretical constructs, discussed in Chapter 2, I expect that LTA and 
operational code variables would have the following relationships with the four types of 
foreign policy behavior here:   
 
Hypothesis 2a: Distrust of Others (DIS) score positively correlates with 
conflictual foreign policy behavior. 
Hypothesis 2b: Need for Power (PWR) score positively correlates with 
conflictual foreign policy behavior. 
Hypothesis 3: P–1 (nature of the political universe) index positively correlates 
with cooperative foreign policy behavior. 
 
I also expect that such patterns between independent variables (of LTA and operational 
code) and foreign policy behavior would mirror each other.  As such, some LTA and 
operational code variables will be related to each other (also see Young and Shaffer 
2005).   
Hypothesis 4: Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) and P-4a (belief in 
ability to control historical development) positively correlate with each 
other. 
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Conclusion 
 
Like others (Rosati 1984: 161; Walker 1977: 155) in this vein of research, this study does 
not claim that any match between beliefs and behavior will explain all foreign policy 
decisions.  Indeed, any direct translation from individual level variables to foreign policy 
is difficult (Kaarbo 1997: 577).  Political leadership literature, however, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, has already established that leaders matter in foreign policy 
analysis.  This particular research design makes a number of contributions to the existing 
literature.  It is a first in combining personality data with large–N event data.  In addition, 
with its focus on Israel and Turkey, it expands the geographical coverage of the political 
leadership literature.  As such, this dissertation presents analysis of systematically 
generated personality and event data in a different political context.   
!
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Chapter 4 
Prime Ministers and Foreign Policy of Israel, 1991-2009 
 
 
“Prime ministers have been pivotal throughout Israel’s history…”  
(Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002: 35). 
 
 
Political leaders in Israel have been of paramount importance to its foreign policy since 
Israel’s pre–independence era.  Such prominent prime ministers like David Ben-Gurion, 
Menachem Begin, and Yitzhak Rabin left their marks not only on the Israeli society but 
also on the region, as well as on the world.  Since Israel declared its independence in 
1948, its prime ministers have dealt with a vicious conflict with the Palestinians and also 
its Arab neighbors, which the world has followed closely from the early 20th century until 
the present day.  The policies of Israeli prime ministers as such have had direct 
implications within and beyond Israel’s borders.   
 
To put it succinctly, as Arian, Nachmias, and Amir argue, “[p]rime ministers are the 
central political actors in Israel” (2002: 35).  The centrality of individual leaders to Israel 
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and its politics were even more prevalent as the Israeli electorate directly elected its chief 
executive from 1996 to 2001 for three elections.1  Arian, Nachmias, and Amir write: 
“While they may share power with party allies and coalition partners, or be 
stymied by these same actors at critical moments, the agenda is there to be set by 
prime ministers, and the pace of events is theirs to attempt to control.  A prime 
minister is more likely to be overwhelmed by the power of office than restrained 
by the checks and balances on it.  Prime ministers have been pivotal throughout 
Israel’s history, and the electoral reform [of 1996] only fortified this reality” 
(2002: 35).   
 
This was not simply confined to the era of the direct of election of prime minister; Arian, 
Nachmias, Amir (2002) also claim that when the law of the direct election of the prime 
minister was repealed immediately after the February 2001 elections, this did not 
necessarily lead to significant decrease in the prime minister’s powers.  All the Israeli 
prime ministers functioned under certain domestic and institutional restrictions.  These 
constraints and challenges or the repeal of the law of the direct election of the prime 
minister notwithstanding, the Israeli prime minister has traditionally hold significant 
influence and control over Israel’s politics and foreign policy.  This is not to 
underestimate the significance of such domestic and institutional constraints (such as, 
power sharing implications of coalition cabinets, see Kaarbo, 1996); however, in the end, 
the prime minister could still make necessary arrangements to hold or even improve 
his/her own and his/her party’s relative power to others’ in one way or another.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 On this institutional feature of Israeli political system from 1996 until its repeal in 2001, see 
Arian, Nachmias, Amir 2002 (especially Chapter 1), and Susser, Bernard (1989). “Parliadential 
Politics: A Proposed Constitution for Israel.” Parliamentary Affairs 42(1): 112-122. 
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With such prominence in the policy world, Israeli prime ministers have been subject to 
journalistic and scholarly attention as well.  Much like other countries, there are 
journalistic accounts of Israel’s prime ministers (for instance, see Caspit and Kfir 1999 on 
Netanyahu; and Hefez and Bloom 2006 on Sharon).  In addition, and distinct from the 
Turkish prime ministers studied here, Israel’s prime ministers themselves engaged in 
writing and wrote their own autobiographies or memoirs (for instance Sharon 2001).  
Such literature is a significant aid for the purposes of similar research.  Even more 
significant is an extant studies of Israeli prime ministers and their foreign policy within 
the broader political psychology research (e.g. Grosbard 2004) and a few works 
specifically in the Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis.  Hence, 
unlike the following chapter on Turkey, this study builds upon and improves an existing 
literature specifically within the two at–a–distance techniques employed here.  However, 
in this literature, with the exception of Crichlow (1998), others do not engage with LTA 
or op code directly (Aronoff 2001; Astroff 2008; Ziv 2008).  Also, in parallel with the 
broader trend in the study of political leadership, this literature about Israel’s leaders and 
their foreign policy does not make use of events data either.   
 
Beyond these specific literatures, this study is a significant contribution to understanding 
political leadership in Israel and the role of prime ministers in Israel’s foreign policy.  
Often Israeli politics and its foreign and security policies are interpreted through a simple 
dichotomy between the so-called “hawks” and “doves.”  More systematic analyses of 
Israel’s leadership asked how those hawks turned into doves.  This dissertation, hence, is 
 
!
81 
related to such interest in contemporary political leadership in Israel.  Are these reflected 
onto foreign policy leadership traits and styles, and operational codes of “hawks” and 
“doves” in Israel? 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows; first, I provide a brief personal and political career 
background for all seven Israeli prime ministers in the post–Cold War era.  Then, I 
present the LTA and operational code profiles of each leader derived from all their 
spontaneous foreign policy statements during the time of their tenure as prime minister.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the personality variables match with 
events data in the statistical tests.   
 
 
Israeli Prime Ministers: Personal Backgrounds and Political Careers2 
 
All the prime ministers of Israel in the post–Cold War era assumed this office either after 
long careers in party–related political work (for instance, Peres and Olmert) or after 
distinguished military service (specifically, Barak, Sharon, and Rabin).  Since 1991, 
seven different leaders held the office.  Among them, only Peres became the prime 
minister without an election as he assumed office after Rabin’s assassination in 
November 1995.  Olmert served as interim prime minister after Sharon was incapacitated 
in January 2006 but was elected prime minister in April 2006.  Recently, in March 2009, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This section benefits from Aronoff (2001), Astroff (2008), Ziv (2008), and the Internet pages of 
the Prime Minister’s Office of Israel (2010) and the Knesset (2010). 
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a decade after his electoral loss to Barak, Netanyahu made a comeback.  Here, in this 
section, I review such details in personal and political lives of all prime ministers of Israel 
since 1991. 
 
Yitzhak Shamir 
 
Shamir was born in Poland on November 3, 1915.  Growing up, Shamir was attracted to 
the Revisionist Zionist movement led by Vladimir Jabotinsky and eventually his Zionism 
led Shamir to move to Palestine (under the British rule) in 1935.3  This move also ended 
Shamir’s studies towards a law degree at the University of Warsaw, which he started in 
1932.  According to his autobiography, in his new home Shamir worked as a construction 
worker and bookkeeper.  He was enrolled at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; yet, in 
short time, Shamir left school as he was drawn into politics.  Shamir’s attraction was to 
more extremist paramilitary groups and he joined the Irgun Zvai Leumi (“National 
Military Organization”) in 1937.  The main ideas behind the political movements or 
ideologies Shamir was attracted to were that they defended immediate statehood for the 
Jewish people and then–––more specifically Irgun––– aimed to deter Arabs from further 
violence by responding to Arab attacks with more violence.  As differences of opinion 
and the outbreak of the World War II led to a division of the Irgun, Shamir stayed with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In this dissertation, I strive to use neutral terminology as much as possible and make sure of 
historical accuracy (as in this case, one must talk about the Palestine under the British mandate 
and not Israel). Likewise, for instance, the October War refers to the Yom Kippur or Ramadan 
War.  Similarly, West Bank and Gaza refers to Judea and Samaria or the occupied territories. 
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“the Stern Gang” (or, Lohamei Herut Yisrael, LHI, “Fighters for the Freedom of Israel”).  
Eventually, as the British executed LHI’s leader in 1942, Shamir assumed a leadership 
position by reorganizing the movement.  According to Astroff (2008: 287), under Shamir 
LHI undertook “meticulous, disciplined operations,” such as the assassination of the 
British Minister Resident in the Middle East, Lord Moyne in 1944.  Shamir’s early 
political activism, hence, was marked by his involvement in underground, violent 
political movements into the establishment of modern day state of Israel in 1948.   
 
Once Israel became independent, former members of the Irgun or LHI were treated as 
pariahs (Astroff 2008: 288).  Shamir was no exception to this, and he too did not have a 
chance to assume a role in politics.  In 1955, about seven years after Israel’s 
independence, Israeli intelligence agency Mossad recruited Shamir and he worked as a 
mid-level manager in the organization’s European operations (Astroff 2008: 289).  
Shamir’s way into active politics was made possible by Israel’s turn to the right in the 
aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967.  Menachem Begin, the leader of Herut 
(“Freedom”) Party, was Shamir’s associate from the Irgun.  In 1973, as right wing 
political parties merged and created the Likud (“Union”), Shamir elected to the Knesset.  
Later, Shamir served as the Speaker of the Knesset from 1977 to 1980.  In October 1980, 
Shamir assumed the post of Foreign Minister under the Begin government.  Three–years 
later in October 1983, Shamir became the prime minister after Begin’s resignation.  In the 
1984 elections, Shamir led the Likud; in the aftermath, a “national unity cabinet” under 
Shimon Peres’s (of Labor Party) leadership was formed, where Shamir became the 
deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.  In 1986, Peres and Shamir 
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exchanged posts within the government.  Together Shamir and Peres led Israel through an 
unsuccessful bid to reach peace with Jordan, which brought about the Intifada in 
December 1987.  Despite their disagreements, Shamir’s Likud and Peres’s Labor 
remained in the coalition after the 1988 elections.  Since Likud earned the edge in the 
elections, Shamir hold the post of prime minister until Peres left the government in 
March 1990 and in its aftermath Shamir had to leave his post as its government failed to 
gain a vote of confidence in the Knesset.  While Peres was unable to form a new 
government, Shamir then once again became the prime minister in a coalition 
government with the three other far-right parties.  Shamir stayed in office until Labor’s 
Yitzhak Rabin assumed office the office after the 1992 Knesset elections.  He resigned 
from Likud’s leadership but remained in the Knesset.  In 1996, Shamir retired from active 
politics.   
 
Scholarship on Shamir and his leadership style talks about Shamir as a rigid, dogmatic 
personality and someone with “an extremely narrow, undifferentiated worldview” (Ziv 
2008: 84).  Sasley (2010: 695) notes that Shamir is an ideological individual and this 
derives from “a very basic source: his Zionism.”  As a person, Shamir is portrayed as 
stubborn both by his “friends and foes” (Ziv 2008: 78).  For instance, Shamir is credited 
for allowing his aides and bureaucrats to freely present contradicting viewpoints but this 
did not translate him changing his positions.  Others mention how Rabin’s lack of 
pragmatism was one of the factors–––along with economic problems such as 
unemployment–––that led to an unsuccessful Madrid Conference and brought about the 
end of the end of Shamir government in 1992 (Astroff 2008: 282–303).  Sasley also 
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reaches a similar conclusion; he argues that Shamir was not able to adjust his policies in 
light of changing world in the later 1980s into early 1990s.  In similar vein, Ziv (2008) 
argues that Shamir would be “the least cognitively open and complex” among the other 
Israeli prime ministers that he studied (Peres, Rabin, and Begin).  Shamir’s world is 
shaped by a “chronic mistrust of others” (Ziv 2008: 83), a “black and white” 
understanding of alternative political ideologies (Ziv 2008: 82), an international system 
that is insecure for the Jews and Israel and “at best indifferent, at worst anti-Semitic” 
(Sasley 2010: 696).  Lastly, Shamir, in Ziv’s portrayal, was a self-assured person and 
denied the appearance of ambiguity (2008: 80).   
 
Yitzhak Rabin 
 
Rabin was born in Jerusalem on March 1, 1922 to a family very active in the (Labor) 
Zionist movement.  Growing up Rabin attended the Workers’ School and later the 
Agricultural School.  During the World War II, Rabin was recruited to Palmach (an elite 
commando unit of the Haganah–––the predecessor to the Israeli Defense Forces).  Much 
like Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin was also involved in underground extremist 
organizations of the pre–independence Israel.  However, Rabin was rather recognized as 
an ideologue in the Palmach.  After Israel gained its independence, Rabin stayed with the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF).  He was among the Israeli delegation in Rhodes, Greece in 
the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian disarmament negotiations as a military representative.  Rabin’s 
promotion to major-general came after he spend a year at the Royal Staff College at 
Camberley in Great Britain; in 1964, Rabin became chief of staff of the Israeli army.  As 
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the commander of the IDF, Rabin shined during the 1967 Six Day War.  A year later 
when he retired from the army, Rabin was appointed as Israel’s ambassador to the United 
States.  Returning to Israel in 1973 Rabin got involved in politics and in Golda Meir’s 
short-lived cabinet he was Minister of Labor.  Upon Meir’s resignation, Rabin won a 
party contest against Shimon Peres and became the prime minister in June 1974.4  During 
his tenure as prime minister for three years, Rabin led Israel through such significant 
events like visiting West Germany on an official trip, meeting with King Hussein of 
Jordan, the oil embargo of 1973, negotiating a new disengagement plan with Egypt 
(hence, paving the way to the Camp David Accords), and the hostages operation in 
Entebbe, Uganda (Astroff 2008: 311).  Rabin’s tenure as prime minister ended due to a 
scandal broke out in 1977: against the Israel foreign currency law, (Rabin and) his wife 
was keeping a bank account in the United States after they moved back to Israel.  Rabin 
resigned as Labor chairman and prime minister, but continued to serve in the Knesset.  In 
the ‘national unity’ governments of 1984 and 1988, Rabin served as Minister of Defense 
until he and Peres (then Labor’s chairman) left the coalition led by Shamir due to 
disagreements regarding talks with the Palestinians.  Rabin’s return to the office of prime 
minister required overcoming Peres in the party primary and convincing the Israeli 
electorate to vote against Shamir; in 1992, Rabin accomplished both and became prime 
minister for a second and last time to lead Israel to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and a peace 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Hence, Rabin became the youngest and first native–born prime minister. 
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agreement with Jordan in 1994.5  An extremist Israeli citizen later assassinated Rabin on 
November 4, 1995.   
 
Rabin’s personal characteristics helped him advance early on during the pre–
independence years.  For instance, in the Palmach, Rabin was recognized for “his keen 
mind, his love of detail, his emphasis on training and his willingness to obey orders” 
(Astroff 2008: 306).  Rabin as a political persona did not emerge quickly; according to 
Arian, Nachmias, and Amir (2002), it took awhile for him to learn “the political skills of 
backslapping, negotiation, bargaining, compromise, and inclusion” (122).  His 
background in underground political organizations of pre–1948 Israel and later in the 
military left their mark on Rabin in that he was a tough person but was pragmatic too.6  
“More than any other politician [Rabin] occupied the middle ground where most Israelis 
stood” (Astroff 2008: 313).  Rabin was open to new information from the environment 
and was flexible to amend his position depending on the conditions (Ziv 2008: 93–94).  
This was a cautious openness, though.  Rabin, as Ziv argues, was not as open or complex 
individual as Peres was; yet Rabin was definitely more so than Shamir.  Accounts of 
Rabin’s personality are, without an exception, supporting this conclusion.  For instance, 
Crichlow (1998) claims that Rabin’s cautiousness was apparent in his own rather 
skeptical view of the Oslo peace process in the beginning.  This, however, was nothing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The Oslo Accords gained Rabin, along with his Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres and 
Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority, the 1994 Nobel Peace Award.   
6 Rabin was tough such that he was appointed as Minister of Defense in the Likud –led national 
unity governments of 1984–1990 (Crichlow 1998).  Also, Rabin had this image that Ariel Sharon 
once described Rabin “a carnivorous dove” (in Astroff 2008: 313). 
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like how Shamir viewed the world or Israel and the Jews in the international system 
(Sasley 2010: 698).  Rabin was committed to the Land of Israel–––like Shamir, yet Rabin 
was also prioritizing among many other issues; a secure Israel was Rabin’s objective and 
to realize it he was open to consider different ideas (Sasley 2010: 697).  Otherwise, Rabin 
was a reserved person and lacked openness to other individuals (Arian, Nachmias, Amir 
2002: 122; Ziv 2008: 93).  This in turn affected Rabin’s decision making style; Rabin 
consulted fewer people (Ziv 2008: 92) and compared to Peres was less successful in 
brining in people from different background in decision making processes (Arian, 
Nachmias, Amir 2002: 125).  Notwithstanding Rabin’s ability to comprehend complex 
situations and his openness to new information, he had “a tendency to dichotomize 
people” and had a corresponding “binary view of the world” where he would 
compartmentalize people into good v. bad guys (Ziv 2008: 94–96).  Finally, Kissinger 
wrote about Rabin that he “hated ambiguity.”7   
 
Shimon Peres 
 
Peres was born in Poland on August 2, 1923 in a small village (Vishneva) with a 
homogenous Jewish population.  In 1934, Peres and the family immigrated to Palestine 
and started living in the kibbutz.  Peres’s skills in leadership as administrator and 
organizer, and in communication emerged during his work with the Hanoar Haoved 
(“Working Youth”).  Through this organization, Peres met with such leading figures in 
Israel like David Ben–Gurion and Levi Eshkol.  Then, Peres joined Mapai and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Quoted in Ziv (2008: 94). 
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represented it as a delegate at the World Zionist Congress in 1946, in Basel, Switzerland.  
Upon independence, Peres was appointed as secretary of the navy; in 1949, Ben–Gurion 
granted his request to study abroad and Peres lived in the United States from 1950 to 
early 1952.  In the United States, Peres took classes at the New School for Social 
Research and also at Harvard University.  In the United States, Peres made contacts with 
private donors to raise financial support for Israel and its clandestine purchases in the 
international weapons market (Astroff 2008: 321).  When Peres returned to Israel in 
1952, as one of Ben–Gurion’s ‘Young Mapai’ protégés Peres continued to raise in the 
ranks and in less than a year he became director-general of the defense ministry.  In 
office, Peres played a key role in establishing relationship with France as Israel’s primary 
weapons supplier.  In 1959, Peres elected to the Knesset and then appointed as deputy 
defense minister in Ben–Gurion’s cabinet.  As Ben-Gurion’s Mapai divided, Peres 
initially sided with Ben–Gurion; however, in the aftermath of a failed elections campaign 
in 1965, in December 1967 Mapai, Ben-Gurion’s “Rafi,” and Ahdut Haavodah merged to 
create Labor Party.  Peres became the deputy secretary-general of Labor.  After the 
elections of 1969 and 1973, Peres assumed different positions in the cabinet but not 
prominent ones like ministry of defense or foreign affairs.  The primary reason for this 
was that Golda Meir kept her distance to Peres other “Young Mapai” leaders; once Meir 
resigned, Peres contested for party leadership.  As discussed earlier, while it was a close 
race, Peres had to bow to the winner: Rabin.  Given his prominence in the party, Peres 
was appointed as minister of defense in the Rabin government.  Peres later assumed party 
leadership as Rabin resigned amid a scandal.  Labor, however, lost the elections in 1977 
and for 15 years Likud dominant cabinets ensued thereafter.  Initially, Peres and his 
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Labor served as the main opposition.  Then, with electoral gains in the elections of 1984 
Labor joined Likud in government.8  In 1984, Peres started as the prime minister in the 
“national unity” cabinet, which according to the agreement between Likud and Labor he 
turned over to Shamir in October 1986.  As prime minister, Peres met with King Hassan 
II of Morocco and with President Mubarak of Egypt, and improved Israel’s relations with 
the United States.  Peres also proved effective in dealing with Israel’s financial crisis.  In 
the aftermath of 1988 elections, because Likud gained an edge in the elections, Shamir 
stayed as prime minister and Peres became vice premier and minister of finance.  Later, 
Peres remained as the second–man in Labor and under Rabin’s leadership Labor won the 
1992 elections.  Since both Rabin and Peres held significant power in the party, neither 
man had the luxury to avoid the other and despite their decades-long rivalry they had to 
work with each other.  Peres served as Rabin’s minister of foreign affairs and he was 
crucial in concluding the Oslo Accords of 1993.  After Rabin’s assassination in 
November 1995, Peres assumed his position but lost the elections to Likud’s Netanyahu 
in May 1996.  Later, Peres remained active in politics.  Backed by the then prime 
minister Ehud Barak Peres ran for presidency in 2000, but he lost the Knesset elections 
rather unexpectedly despite One Israel’s majority.  In 2005, Peres left Labor to join 
Sharon in support of his efforts of “disengagement.”  In June 2007, Peres was elected 
President of Israel. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 After the 1984 elections, Peres received the mandate to form a government.  However, due to 
the distribution of seats in the Knesset, he was unable to do so. After losing votes in the 1988 
elections, Labor stayed in the new coalition–––yet, this time without the rotation of prime 
minister. 
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In his research, Ziv finds that references to Peres are that he is open, pragmatic, and 
adaptable (2008: 98).  Peres emerges in others’ portrayals of himself as a receptive, good 
listener leader who seeks ideas and encourages challenges from his advisers (Ziv 2008: 
101).  For Ziv, Peres is ““a paradigmatic case of a cognitively open individual” (2008: 
97). According to people who worked with Peres closely, Peres strives to avoid thinking 
about in terms of simple dichotomies; instead, he expects, and pushes his aides, that a 
third, hidden alternative be found (Ziv 2008: 103).  This, Ziv notes, becomes a 
characteristic that Peres is criticized for being detached from reality.  Crichlow (1998: 
686), on the other hand, claims that it is Peres’s “daring, imagination, and general 
optimism” that overrides what sometimes pushes Peres to see the world as an inherently 
conflictual place and makes him skeptical of success.  In other accounts of Peres’s 
personality, Arian, Nachmias, and Amir (2002) describe Peres as a “patient, tireless, and 
a skillful bargainer” (107). 
 
Binyamin Netanyahu 
 
Unlike any other Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu was born in the independent state of 
Israel on October 21, 1949.  In addition, Netanyahu had a relatively elite upbringing: his 
father was a professor of Jewish history and grandfather was a rabbi who migrated from 
Lithuania to Palestine in 1920.  Netanyahu’s father decided to move the family to the 
United States in 1963 and they settled in Philadelphia; hence, Binyamin Netanyahu spent 
his teenage life and studied in the United States.  In June 1967, Netanyahu returned to 
Israel during the Six Day War and waited two months to be eligible to join the army.  
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Netanyahu was recruited to the army’s elite unit Sayeret Matkal and took part in 
important military operations (Astroff 2008: 338).  In 1972, Netanyahu came back to the 
United States and enrolled at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he earned 
degrees in architecture (B.A.) and business management (M.Sc.).  During his education, 
he went back to Israel and served in the October War in 1972.  The turning point in 
Netanyahu’s life was the death of his older brother during Operation Thunderbolt in 
Entebbe, Uganda.  Following this personal tragedy, Binyamin Netanyahu decided to 
move back to Israel and founded the Jonathan Institute (named after his late brother) for 
the study of terrorism.  At the institute, Netanyahu made important contacts in both 
policy and academia and he edited a book titled “Terrorism: How the West Can Win.”  In 
1982, Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Moshe Arens appointed Netanyahu as the 
deputy chief of mission at the embassy.  In two-years time Netanyahu became Israel’s 
permanent representative to the United Nations.  His service at the U.N. coincided with 
the national unity governments in Israel, and occasionally Netanyahu had open 
disagreements with the Labor wing of the government.  After Netanyahu resigned from 
his position at the U.N. in 1988, he ran for a seat in the Knesset and made an entry to 
active politics as deputy foreign minister thanks to his success at the Likud party primary.  
As a deputy foreign minister who is fluent in English, Netanyahu made many 
appearances in press meetings and was a frequent guest at interviews with the foreign 
press.  After Likud lost the 1992 elections and Shamir left party leadership, Netanyahu 
elected as the new chairperson of Likud in its March 1993 primary.  Netanyahu’s first 
task was to rebuild the Likud, and as the opposition leader he also fiercely opposed the 
Oslo process led by the Labor government.  In Israel’s first direct elections for prime 
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minister on May 29, 1996, Netanyahu defeated Peres by only with a margin of about 
29,000 votes.  Three years in the office, Netanyahu’s government fell down after failing 
to get 1999 budget approved by the Knesset.  The most memorable events of 
Netanyahu’s term in office were the Wye River Memorandum of 1998 and the Bar-On 
affair.  Netanyahu lost the 1999 elections to Ehud Barak of Labor.  In the aftermath, he 
resigned from politics temporarily and became Likud’s chairman in 2007.  Recently, in 
March 2009, Netanyahu won elections over Kadima’s Olmert and since is Israel’s prime 
minister for a second time.   
 
According to Leon Grossier, the dean of students at M.I.T. at the time Netanyahu was a 
student there, Netanyahu was the most ambitious student to Grossier’s experience: 
“[Netanyahu] would focus on an objective and lock himself on it.  When he decides he 
wants something, there’s nothing he can’t achieve” (Caspit and Kfir 1999: 70; also 
referenced in Astroff 2008: 339, fn. 16).  Indeed, according to Kimhi (2001: 153), 
ambition and determination are most likely Netanyahu’s most significant character traits; 
and, Kimhi argues, these have a lot to do with Netahyahu’s upbringing.  Kimhi’s work on 
Netanyahu presents a comprehensive psychological profile of Netanyahu.9  Following 
conclusions are drawn from Kimhi’s (2001) portrayal of Netanyahu: 
• Netanyahu is egocentric, and has a tendency to megalomania–––he thinks about 
his personal fate connected with the national one (161).  His personal 
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9 Kimhi (2001) expects that “Netanyahu is not likely to change dramatically” (163).  
Notwithstanding his claim, my initial findings here comparing Netanyahu’s first and second 
terms in office suggest considerable differences in his personality traits and operational code 
beliefs.  Though, these are not reported in this study. 
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relationships tend to be instrumental (155), and likewise he is self-centered with 
his close advisers and aides (154). 
• Generally speaking, Netanyahu is closed and withdrawn, and has very limited 
ability to empathize (155).  
• Netanyahu believes that he is more perceptive of the world and historical/political 
processes than others are.  As such, anyone who is in disagreement with 
Netanyahu does not have a correct assessment of the world (153). 
• Netanyahu is considered to be untrustworthy since many public figures portray 
him as making (and even signing) promises that he eventually did not keep (155).   
• Netanyahu’s suspiciousness borders a paranoid tendency (162).  The world as 
such is a cruel place where is no altruism or true friendship, and there is a 
continuous struggle for survival.  These feelings have increased since Netanyahu 
entered political life (156).   
• For Netanyahu, personal success is very important and he strives for it (153).   
• Finally, Netanyahu tends to work alone and exclude others, and has a desire to 
control everything.  He assigns various tasks to his aides but demands frequent 
reports and rules with an iron hand (158). 
 
Ehud Barak 
 
Ehud Barak was born to a settler family from Eastern Europe on February 12, 1942 in 
Kibbutz Mishmar Hasharon.  Barak’s career within the IDF started early in 1959 as he 
joined the army at the age of 17.  He was in the Sayeret Matkal unit and in 1970 became 
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the head of it.  Barak had an impressive career in the military, earned its highest honors, 
and was the youngest in IDF to become a general in 1982.  At the apex of his military 
career, Barak was the chief of staff from April 1991 to January 1995.  During his time 
with the IDF, Barak also earned a degree in physics (from the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem in 1968) and a master’s degree in economic engineering systems (from 
Stanford University in 1978).  Barak was a close associate of prime minister Rabin, who 
he shared a similar military career with.  Upon his retirement from the military, Barak 
temporarily worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, 
D.C. and in a few months was offered a position by Rabin in his cabinet.  Barak became 
Rabin’s minister of the interior in July 1995.  After Rabin’s assassination, Peres kept 
Barak in the cabinet and appointed him as minister of foreign affairs in November 1995.  
After Labor’s tenure in government ended, Barak ran for party leadership and won the 
party primary in June 1997 to become its chair.  Before the 1999 elections, Barak 
transformed the Labor in reaching out a broader electoral audience and created “One 
Israel” a coalition among Labor, Gesher, and Meimad.  One Israel won the elections and 
was the senior member of the coalition.  After losing the elections in February 2001 to 
Sharon’s Likud, Barak stayed out of active politics until 2007.  Then, he re-assumed 
Labor’s leadership in June 2007 and in a few days following the Labor primary Barak 
joined the Olmert cabinet as minister of defense.  After the 2009 elections, in the new 
Netanyahu cabinet, Barak remained in his post and currently still serves as minister of 
defense. 
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Barak talks about himself as a “shy, small sized” boy and is also known as someone 
lacking discipline–––who indeed dropped out of high school because he was bored with 
it.  Some of these may have stayed with Barak, as Astroff (2008: 353) mentions Barak’s 
abrupt decision making style, where for instance he fired a large number of ministry staff 
without consulting anyone.  Barak is also considered to have a high-handed, centralizing 
style (Astroff 2008; Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002).  There are also accounts of 
Barak’s arrogance, particularly during his time in the army.10  Barak, much like Rabin, is 
considered to be a tough but pragmatic leader. 
 
Ariel Sharon 
 
Sharon was born in 1928 in Palestine under the British control.  His military career 
started early when he joined the Haganah in 1942.  Sharon fought in the Israeli War of 
Independence in1948 and continued his service in the IDF in the following years.  He 
spent a year at the Staff College in the United Kingdom.  In 1952 Sharon was enrolled at 
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem but was unable to complete his studies when he was 
recalled to full service military duty.  Later in 1962 he completed his studies and received 
an LLB from the Hebrew University.  In 1966 Sharon was promoted to the rank of major 
general and in July 1973 he retired from the IDF.  However, in October of the same year 
he was recalled again due to the outbreak of the October War.  In 1974 Sharon was 
elected to the Knesset, however later that year he resigned so that he would keep his 
position as commander of an armored reserved corps and returned to his family farm in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Astroff (2008: 353) notes that in the army Barak was called “Napo” for Napoleon.   
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the Negev.  Sharon political life did not end though: in 1975 Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin appointed Sharon as security adviser and in 1977 Menachem Begin appointed 
Sharon minister of agriculture and in 1981 minister of defense.  In the 1980s Sharon also 
served in Shamir’s cabinets first as minister of industry and trade (1984–1990) and then 
as minister of housing and construction (1990–1992).  When Likud came back to power 
in 1996 under Netanyahu’s leadership, Sharon was appointed minister of national 
infrastructures.  Later, in 1997, Netanyahu appointed Sharon minister of foreign affairs 
and served in that capacity until the government collapsed.  In the aftermath of 1999 
elections, which Likud lost, Sharon became Likud’s chairperson in September.  Sharon’s 
comeback to power following the elections February 2001 was as prime minister and he 
led Israel until his health precluded him to do in January 2006.   
 
Ehud Olmert 
 
Ehud Olmert was born on September 30, 1945 in Palestine.  Olmert’s parents were active 
in the Betar movement, and his father Mordechai Olmert was a member of the Knesset 
from 1955 to 1961 representing the Herut Party.  Ehud Olmert earned a degree in 
psychology from the Hebrew University in 1968; at college he stepped into politics in the 
Herut Party student organization.  Olmert was the secretary of the Free Center faction in 
the Knesset for a while, but then went back to school to study law.  In 1973, Olmert 
completed his studies and later practiced as an attorney for a number of years.  In the 
meantime, Olmert elected to the Knesset in 1973 as a representative of the Free Center 
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faction within the Likud Party.11  During his service in the Knesset, Olmert was a 
member of various committees and in 1988 Shamir appointed Olmert as a minister 
without portfolio, charged with minority affairs.  Later in 1990, Olmert was picked to 
serve as the Minister of Health.  Then, in late 1992 Olmert announced his candidacy of 
Jerusalem’s mayor and won the mayoral elections in 1993.  Olmert was mayor of 
Jerusalem for the following ten years.  During the electoral campaign in 2003, Olmert 
was the head of Likud elections headquarters and in the aftermath Sharon appointed him 
vice prime minister and minister of industry, trade, and labor.  In August 2005, Sharon 
appointed Olmert minister of finance.  When Sharon became incapacitated in January 
2006 Olmert assumed Sharon’s duties as interim prime minister; then in April 2006, 
Olmert and the Kadima Party won the parliamentary elections and Olmert became prime 
minister.  During his tenure, the Lebanon war of 2006 and the Annapolis Conference 
were the most remarkable events.  Olmert’s leadership came under great pressure due to 
the administration of these two events and his personal role in decision making.  It was, 
however, a scandalous event that brought about the end of Olmert’s public service.  By 
mid-2008, it was revealed that Olmert was under investigation for bribery.  As the 
investigation unfolded and facing serious contest to his leadership from within Kadima, 
he announced his resignation as prime minister and as leader of Kadima in July 2008 but 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Israel’s laws allow Members of Knesset to practice their profession with certain restrictions. 
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continued to serve prime minister until Netanyahu won the elections in February 2009 
despite the fact that he lost support within Kadima.12   
 
According to Ziv, Ehud Olmert is “the archetypal hawk” (2008: 275).  However, Olmert–
––much like Sharon–––takes a dovish turn in his views.  Ziv explains the reasons for 
Olmert’s change of perspective in his family life.  For instance, his wife Aliza once told 
that she always voted for parties of the left until Olmert became Kadima’s leader and led 
it in the March 2006 elections.  Moreover, Ziv notes that one of their sons is affiliated 
with a group of soldiers [Yesh Gvul] supporting peace and refusing to serve in the 
“occupied territories” and one of their daughters volunteers for Machsom Watch.  Ziv 
argues these may have influenced Olmert along with a changing public opinion in favor 
of Labor’s position regarding the Palestinian issue (2008: 275–276).  In his analysis Ziv 
(2008: 275) does not study Olmert, yet he expects that Olmert would be more cognitively 
open and complex than Netanyahu.   
 
 
Leadership Traits and Operational Code Profiles 
 
In this section, based on earlier review of the relevant literature and results from 
ProfilerPlus, I present leadership traits and operational code profiles of each Israeli prime 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Livni, who was minister of foreign affairs at the time, challenged Olmert during this process 
and became Kadima’s leader.  However, she was unable to form a new cabinet and hence Olmert 
stayed in office as a “lame-duck” prime minister. 
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minister.  First, leaders’ LTA scores and then operational code indices are presented.  
Then, in ensuing discussion, I attempt to make connections between the two profiles for 
each leader and in general so as to illustrate what benefits, if any, there are to utilizing 
both in assessing leader personalities.   
 
Table 4.1 shows the average LTA scores for all prime ministers of Israel in the post–Cold 
War era and also an average profile (as well as deviations from the average score) 
calculated from all scores assessed between November 1991 and December 2009.  
Israel’s prime ministers exhibit different leadership styles; before I sum up overall 
differences among them, first I discuss how Israeli prime ministers differ in terms of their 
responsiveness to constraints, openness to information, motivation for seeking office, and 
motivation toward the world.  
 
Within the LTA framework, Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) and Need for 
Power (PWR) interpreted together tell about leaders’ responsiveness to constraints.  In 
terms of their BACE scores, Olmert and Shamir have the highest and lowest scores, 
respectively.  In the PWR trait, Sharon and Netanyahu (in order) score the highest, and 
Rabin has the lowest scores in this category.  According to their scores, among the prime 
ministers of Israel studied here, Shamir and Rabin respect constraints and all others 
(Barak, Olmert, Peres, Sharon, and Netanyahu) challenge constraints.   
 
A leader’s openness to information, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2, is inferred from the 
relationship between his/her Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Self–Confidence (SC) 
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scores.  According to the results in Table 4.1, all–––but one (Shamir)–––Israeli prime 
minister would be open to new information.  When the distance between these two scores 
are calculated, Barak would be the leader who is most open to new information (the 
highest CC, and the lowest SC scores).  Likewise, Rabin, who scores high in both traits, 
would be expected to open to new information.  Shamir is the only leader who would be 
close to new information; while Shamir has the highest SC score, he ends up with the 
lowest score in CC.  Other differences can be inferred from if one is to consider that 
whereas Sharon has a higher CC score than his SC, they are so close that one has to 
attend to the specific circumstances Sharon works in as he may very well be close to new 
information.  Similarly, Olmert’s scores suggest that he would be open to new 
information; however, within the Israeli prime ministers norming group, Olmert ranks 
low both in CC and SC, which would classify him as closed to information.  
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These become so important that would place Sharon and Olmert in different leadership 
styles depending on how they are categorized in terms of their openness to information.  
–––Such variations may indeed relate with Ziv’s (2008) argument about how ‘hawks 
become doves.’ 
 
Task Focus (TASK) in the LTA measures a leader’s motivation for seeking office.  
According to their TASK scores, Barak has the highest score (which is one standard 
deviation above from the average)–––meaning that Barak is a problem–focused leader.  
Peres, on the other hand, scores one standard deviation from the average and hence is a 
relationship–focused leader.  Other leaders’ motivations, who are above the average 
(Shamir, Sharon, and Rabin) and are below (Netanyahu and Olmert), would be context–
specific.  They may focus on problem or relationships depending on contextual factors.  
Because their average scores are considerably away from the general mean score, I 
interpret their scores as high and low, respectively. 
 
Finally, Israeli prime ministers end up in different quartiles of Table 2.5 (page 24), which 
displays a leader’s motivation toward the world.  As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, this is 
assessed with Distrust of Others (DIS) and In-Group Bias (IGB) scores.  With high scores 
in both, Netanyahu, Peres, and Sharon focus on eliminating potential threats and 
problems.  As such, they think that the world is centered around adversaries and they 
strive to spread their power at the expense of others.  Hermann (2003a: 200) expects that 
such leaders would take risks and engage in highly aggressive and assertive behavior.  
Arguably, Netanyahu and Sharon would fit in this assessment, yet Peres may be 
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questionable.  One can speculate that while such a motivation toward the world pushes 
Netanyahu and Sharon in the direction expected, it motivates Peres to take measures to 
the contrary.  Peres also confronts Israel’s adversaries as expected, but not simply in 
terms of power but rather on the negotiating table.  In contrast to these three prime 
ministers, Barak has low scores in both DIS and IGB.  Hence, Barak would be expected 
to focus on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships.  Shamir, on the other 
hand, has a high DIS but low IGB score; this suggests that Shamir perceives the world as 
a conflict–prone and hence remains vigilant.  Finally, Olmert and Rabin have low DIS 
but high IGB scores.  Accordingly, they think about the international system as a zero–
sum game but one that is bound by a set of international norms.  They believe that 
adversaries are inherently threatening but work to limit the threat and enhance their 
relative capabilities and status. 
 
When these are all interpreted together so as to assess leadership styles of Israel’s prime 
ministers in the post–Cold War era, since some of the Israeli prime ministers do not score 
one standard deviation above or below the average but rather cluster around it, it becomes 
difficult to associate them with one single leadership style.  One can safely assume that as 
such those leaders (for instance, Sharon) would be alternating between different 
leadership styles depending on the issue, time, and other contextual factors.  All together, 
the LTA scores for Israel’s post–Cold War prime ministers suggest different leadership 
styles (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2 Leadership Styles of Israel’s Prime Ministers 
Prime Minister Leadership Style 
Shamir incremental 
Rabin opportunistic 
Peres directive 
Netanyahu directive 
Barak actively independent 
Sharon expansionistic/actively independent 
Olmert evangelistic/directive 
 
 
According to Hermann (2003a), leaders with an incremental leadership style ‘focus their 
attention on improving state’s economy and/or security in incremental steps while 
avoiding the obstacles that will inevitably arise along the way’ (emphasis added).  Shamir 
is categorized as such, and his statement after he left the office that he ‘would have 
wanted the negotiations with the Palestinians last 10 years’ is a good example of his 
motivation to avoid dealing with the ongoing conflict.13  In contrast, Rabin is an 
opportunistic leader.  Sharon’s case is worth further elaboration too.  When Aronoff’s 
(2001) and Ziv’s (2008) arguments about hawks becoming doves are considered, the two 
leadership styles that Sharon falls into are perhaps the perfect matches to explain such a 
transformation.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Shamir’s remarks in an interview with the Maariv, after he lost the 1992 elections; see 
Haberman (June 27, 1992). 
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Turning onto the operational code profiles of Israel’s prime minister, Table 4.3 (above) 
summarizes the averages for operational code indices for each prime minister, as well as 
an average profile.  The latter is a good starting point for this discussion about Israeli 
prime ministers’ belief systems.  The indices for philosophical beliefs (P’s) summarize 
the individual’s preferences in achieving his or her political objectives and corresponding 
choice of strategies and tactics.  According to their philosophical beliefs, the general 
profile of a prime minister of Israel has a somewhat friendly view of the political 
universe (P–1), is somewhat optimistic to mixed/neutral about realizing political goals 
(P–2), believes that the predictability of political future (P–3) is low or very low, 
perceives that s/he has low control over historical development (P–4a), and the role of 
chance (P–5) for them is very high.   
 
The indices for instrumental beliefs (I’s) summarize the individual’s preferences in 
achieving his or her political objectives and corresponding choice of strategies and 
tactics.  The average Israeli prime minister, according to their instrumental beliefs, has a 
definitely cooperative direction of strategy (I–1), his/her intensity of tactics (I–2) are 
somewhat cooperative, is low risk acceptant (I–3), has a medium flexibility between 
cooperative and conflictual tactics (I–4a) and also between words and deeds (I4b).  As far 
as the utility of means (I–5) indices are concerned, the least intensity words in 
cooperative and conflictual tactics (Appeal and Oppose, respectively) are the most 
preferred means for an average Israeli prime minister.  Other means are also utilized; 
Reward is a medium utility for cooperation for an Israeli prime minister, but is preferred 
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more than Promise.  Likewise, on the conflictual side, the highest intensity Punish is 
more preferred than Threaten.   
 
In addition to interpreting the results in Table 4.3 according to the VICS scale, for 
comparison among Israel’s prime ministers, here I utilize Hermann’s technique of 
evaluating each leader according to his or her deviation from the average indexes of an 
Israeli prime minister.14  First of all, how do the seven prime ministers of Israel rank 
among themselves according to their indices for master beliefs, P–1 and I–1?  According 
their beliefs about the nature of the political universe (P–1), Shamir has the highest value, 
well–above one standard deviation from the average score and the second–highest score 
of Barak.  Accordingly, then, Shamir has an almost definitely friendly view of the world.  
On the other end, Sharon and Olmert score the lowest and second from last (respectively) 
and they fall well–below one standard deviation away from the average.  According the 
VICS scale, Sharon and Olmert still view of the political universe as somewhat friendly.  
As far as the master instrumental belief, directionality of strategy (I–1) goes, again 
Shamir ranks atop and above the average plus one standard deviation mark.  Shamir has a 
very cooperative leaning in his strategy.  Netanyahu comes second, above the average but 
not significantly above it.  Then come the Labor leaders, in order: Rabin, Peres, and 
Barak.  Once again, Olmert and Sharon are at the end of this rank-order scale of I-1 
index.  Specifically, Olmert remains above one standard deviation away from the average 
but has the second lowest index in I-1.  Sharon’s average index of I-1 puts him to the end, 
which indicates that he has somewhat cooperative direction of strategy.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See Table 7.4 and 7.5 in Chapter 7. 
 
!
109 
 
What differences, if any, are there among Israeli prime ministers in the other OPC 
indices?  Three prime ministers, Shamir, Barak, and Netanyahu are close to being 
somewhat optimistic about their beliefs regarding realization of their political values, P–2 
index, (in rank–order: Shamir, Barak, and Netanyahu).  Others are somewhat optimistic 
or rather mixed (neither pessimistic nor optimistic) views about it (from the lowest: 
Olmert, Sharon, Rabin, and Peres).   
 
The seven leaders here share a somewhat similar view about the predictability of political 
future; the P–3 index here ranges from 0.233 (Shamir) to 0.132 (Netanyahu), with an 
average of 0.157 score.  In terms of the range of this index, there is a similar distribution 
found among the Turkish prime ministers (next chapter). 
 
Israel’s prime ministers believe that they have low to medium control over historical 
development (P–4a); the average 0.330 puts Shamir (the highest index), Barak, Sharon, 
and Peres above, on the one hand, and Rabin (the lowest index), Olmert, and Netanyahu 
below it.  Those below do not deviate a lot from the average score.  –––However, it is 
noteworthy that Netanyahu’s P-4a score in his second term in office falls significantly 
below the average index.   
 
The role of chance in the political universe (P–5) is very high for all Israeli prime 
ministers.  The average score of 0.947 ranks close to those reported in other studies, and 
that of (0.948) among the Turkish prime ministers in this study.  Peres’s P-5 score is 
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below but very close to the average.  Only Shamir is below one standard deviation away 
from the average.   
 
The I–1 index for Israeli prime ministers is already discussed briefly above; overall, 
Israel’s prime ministers in the post-Cold War era share a definitely cooperative strategy 
but there is some noticeable variation among the seven leaders.  A gap of 0.25 points 
exists between the highest (Shamir) and lowest (Sharon) scores.  The I–2 index for the 
intensity of tactics draws a somewhat contradictory picture in that the gap between the 
highest (Shamir) and lowest (Sharon) scores is much narrower, a 0.121.  As a whole the 
Israeli prime ministers cluster between somewhat cooperative and mixed categories as far 
as the intensity of their tactics is concerned.   
 
In terms their risk orientation (I-3), the most risk acceptant Israeli prime minister is 
Shamir (0.389) and the most risk averse is Barak (0.202).  The average index and most 
leaders are low risk acceptant according to the VICS scale.   
 
The I–4 indices tell about the individual’s flexibility of tactics between cooperation and 
conflict (I–4a) and between words and deeds (I–4b).  Overall, Israeli prime ministers 
have a medium level of flexibility between cooperative and conflictual tactics.  In terms 
of I-4a index, the lowest score belongs to Shamir (0.375) well–below one standard 
deviation below the average.  Otherwise, the rest have a medium level flexibility between 
cooperation and conflict.  As to the I–4b index, the leader who has the most flexibility 
between words and deeds is Netanyahu (0.467)–––just above a standard deviation of the 
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average.  Barak also has a high score of 0.460.  On the other end, Peres has the lowest 
index with a score of 0.364 and hence is below one standard deviation of the average.  
Finally, other prime ministers remain close to the average score for the index. 
 
As to the indices of utility of means (I–5a through I–5f), according to the results in Table 
4.3, among the Israel’s prime ministers since November 1991, Appeal is the most 
preferred means of action.  The individual scores range from Shamir’s score of 0.629 and 
Barak’s 0.481–––which are well above the “very high” mark of 0.32 according to the 
VICS scale.  Against an expectation that there would a dichotomy between the hawks and 
doves, there is no such distribution in any of the utility of mean indices.  Reward, the 
highest form of cooperation, is the second most preferred means of utility with an 
average of 0.127.  Oppose and Punish come next with averages of 0.116 and 0.091, 
respectively.  The medium intensity cooperative and conflictual means of utility, Promise 
and Threaten, are the lowest preferred means of utility for the average Israeli prime 
minister.  This possibly very well reflects the reality of Israeli foreign policy where the 
cooperative and conflictual actions can be either high in intensity or low and not 
necessarily in between.   
 
As mentioned earlier, there exists some work in the operational code literature on some 
of Israel’s leaders; hence, it is only appropriate to devote some place to compare 
Crichlow’s (1998) operational code index scores for Rabin and Peres with those here.  
Following discussion is based on two leaders’ mean scores for the 1990s.  In terms of the 
master beliefs, Crichlow finds that Rabin has a .04 index score and Peres has a negative 
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.06 for the P-1 nature of political universe; then, the I-1 approach to goals index is .53 
and .68 respectively for Rabin and Peres.  Compared to the scores here, Crichlow’s 
results are significantly lower in P-1 and notably higher in I-1.  Moreover, the 
relationship between the two leaders’ scores is the opposite of that in the findings 
displayed in Table 4.3: Peres’s P-1 is slightly higher than Rabin’s and his I-1 is slightly 
lower than Rabin’s.  Among other indices, the most significant differences between 
Crichlow and this work are in P-4 (control over historical development) and in the utility 
of means indices.  For instance, Crichlow finds very high scores for both Rabin and Peres 
in the belief in ability to control historical development index.  Their scores, .72 and .66 
respectively, are significantly higher than the average score found here, which is .33 for 
this index.  Then, Rabin has an average score of .30 and Peres has a .338 according to the 
results here.  These differences between Crichlow’s and this study’s findings are most 
likely due to important differences between the two.  First, Crichlow’s sample is hand-
coded and this research utilizes automated coding.  Then, Crichlow uses a quite limited 
sample since he codes only four and three speeches for Rabin and Peres, respectively.  
These differences, as one would expect, lead to such noticeable differences between the 
two results.   
 
How do the LTA and operational code profiles of Israel’s prime ministers match with 
each other?  What else, if anything, can one learn from combining portrayals of their 
personality traits and operational codes?  As argued earlier, LTA and operational code 
analysis do not necessarily measure the same qualities or beliefs of an individual but 
some particular measurements are rather similar to each other–––for instance, belief in 
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ability to control events (BACE) and control over historical development (P–4a) can be 
expected to reveal somewhat similar conclusions about each leader’s views about his or 
her ability to control historical developments.  Notwithstanding this, leadership traits and 
operational code scores of Israel’s post-Cold War prime ministers exhibit some 
differences.  Specifically, Shamir has the lowest Belief in Ability to Control Events 
(BACE) score but highest operational code index in control over historical development 
(P–4a).  Likewise, Olmert ranks on different sides of his average scores in both.  As the 
P-1 index about the nature of the political universe reveals, the so-called “hawks” of 
Israel with the major exception of Shamir share conflictual view of the world.  Shamir, 
by contrast, has the highest index among all the seven prime ministers.  The “hawks” also 
have the highest scores of Distrust of Others (DIS), where Olmert (and Peres) rank closer 
with their political opponents.  In the Need for Power (PWR), once again, one can 
observe a distinction between the so-called “hawks” and “doves,” where the former 
exhibit higher scores.   
 
 
Personality Profiles and Events: Results  
 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5, below, respectively display the OLS results with the LTA and 
operational code data as independent variables and the events data as its dependent 
variable.  As explained in Chapter 3, all data are aggregated monthly.  The dependent 
variable is measured as four different types of foreign policy events: verbal cooperation, 
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material cooperation, verbal cooperation, and verbal conflict.  Hence, with the LTA and 
operational code data, four different models are tested.   
 
According to Table 4.4 (next page), the OLS tests with the LTA variables reveal that 
higher scores in Distrust of Others (DIS) variable lead to higher number of conflictual 
events, both verbal and material.  The statistical significance is stronger for explaining 
the verbal conflict model, at the 0.01 level.  Therefore, Distrust of Others can explain the 
level of conflict in Israeli foreign policy.  More specifically, one percent increase in the 
DIS variable leads to 7.1 more verbal conflict events and 1.8 material conflict events.  
The results also reveal that the constant is significant at the 0.01 level in the verbal 
cooperation and verbal conflict models.  This may suggest that lower (i.e. verbal) forms 
of cooperation and conflict are ever–present in Israel foreign policy, no matter who the 
prime minister is.  Finally, the results indicate that LTA variables together account for 
less than 10 percent of variation in the dependent variable.  Notably, the highest R-square 
values are in the conflict models. 
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 Table 4.4 Israel: Events and LTA  
 
 
 
 
 Signif. codes:   0  ‘***’ 0.001  ‘**’ 0.01  ‘*’ 0.05  ‘.’ 0.1   ‘ ’ 1 
 
 verbcoop matcoop verbconf matconf 
Belief in 
Ability to 
Control Events 
(BACE) 
5.1733 
(10.2572) 
0.2572 
(0.9510) 
0.25 
(3.1075) 
1.5525 
(1.1788) 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
(CC) 
0.6472 
(12.0393) 
0.6826 
(1.1162) 
-5.7278 
(3.6474) 
-1.2455 
(1.3836) 
Distrust of 
Others  
(DIS) 
5.1513 
(7.8712) 
0.8663 
(0.7298) 
7.1289 ** 
(2.3847) 
1.8098 * 
(0.9046) 
In-group Bias 
(IGB) 
-5.3795 
(12.1145) 
-0.4126 
(1.1232) 
-0.5788 
(3.6702) 
-0.8 
(1.3922) 
Need for Power 
(PWR) 
-0.7291 
(12.8688) 
0.9128 
(1.1931) 
-0.5305 
(3.8987) 
1.1205 
(1.4789) 
Self-
Confidence 
(SC) 
-7.9829 
(6.3337) 
0.6076 
(0.5872) 
-1.8062 
(1.9189) 
-0.1496 
(0.7279) 
Task Focus 
(TASK) 
-9.7364 
(9.6323) 
0.476 
(0.8930) 
-0.7705 
(2.9182) 
-1.2263 
(1.107) 
cons 31.8772 ** 
(11.2495) 
-0.2256 
(1.043) 
9.0588 ** 
(3.4081) 
2.1303 
(1.2928) 
N 
R-square 
adj. R-square 
Prob 
RMSE 
215 
0.0149 
-0.01839 
0.8708 
14.61 
215 
0.01965 
-0.0135 
0.7615 
1.354 
215 
0.06453 
0.0329 
0.05166 
4.426 
215 
0.05352 
0.02151 
0.1174 
1.679 
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Table 4.5 displays the OLS test results with the operational code indices as its 
independent variables.  According to the results, there is only some marginal statistical 
significance between the op code indices of Israel’s prime ministers and Israel’s foreign 
policy behavior as measured by the Levant dataset in the Kansas Events Data System.  In 
the material cooperation model, the I–2 (pursuit of goals, direction of strategy) index is 
significant at the 0.1 level, with a negative effect on the dependent variable.  In the 
material conflict model, the P–2 (prospects for the realization of political values) index 
and the P–4 (belief in ability to control historical development) index are also significant 
at the 0.1 level.  While the P–2 has a negative effect on the number of material conflict, 
the P–4 has a positive effect.  This may suggest that Israel’s prime ministers are less 
prone to material conflict if they are optimistic about the prospects of their values but 
they are more likely initiate such events if they believe they can control events.  Finally, 
the results with the op code variables indicate that together they account for more 
variation in the dependent variables than LTA variables did.  Once again, though, the 
highest R-square values are in the conflict models.   
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Table 4.5 Israel: Events and Operational Code 
 
 verbcoop matcoop verbconf matconf 
P-1 Nature of the political 
universe 
19.405 
(16.457) 
-0.8364 
(1.5359) 
1.2887 
(4.9049) 
2.1622 
(1.8720) 
P-2 prospects for realization of 
political values  
-26.553 
(20.524) 
-0.0169 
(1.9155) 
-6.4637 
(6.1170) 
-4.0870 . 
(2.3346) 
P-3 predictability of political 
universe 
8.664 
(64.525) 
6.3869 
(6.0220) 
7.5930 
(19.2314) 
7.2074 
(7.3399) 
P-4 belief in ability to control 
historical development 
28.190 
(31.458)  
3.5379 
(2.9359) 
8.9193 
(9.3759) 
6.7009 . 
(3.5784) 
P-5 role of chance 141.701 
(183.144)  
19.7602 
(17.0926) 
35.7643 
(54.5854) 
30.1660 
(20.8333) 
I-1 approach to goals (direction 
of strategy) 
-300.722 
(408.222) 
37.5491 
(38.0990) 
-71.8560 
(121.6693) 
27.5558 
(46.4368) 
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of 
tactics) 
-463.897 
(346.747) 
-62.0921 . 
(32.3616) 
-56.6218 
(103.3468) 
43.9266 
(39.4438) 
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of 
tactics) 
16.657 
(17.534) 
0.4234 
(1.6364) 
0.5164 
(5.2259) 
1.8824 
(1.9945) 
I-4 timing of action: flexibility 
of: 
    
I-4a cooperative/conflictual 
tactics 
2.597 
(11.746) 
-0.1422 
(1.0962) 
2.0499 
(3.5008) 
1.3333 
(1.3361) 
I-4b word/deed tactics 9.364 
(10.301) 
0.5616 
(0.9614) 
1.4908 
(3.0702) 
0.8178 
(1.1718) 
I-5 utility of means     
I-5a. Reward 1516.720 
(1579.076)  
96.7171 
(147.3736)  
395.7122 
(470.6384) 
-47.5440 
(179.6257) 
I-5b. Promise 1374.492 
(1551.738)  
78.3095 
(144.8221)  
376.8896 
(462.4903)  
-35.1144 
(176.5159) 
I-5c. Appeal 1211.481 
(1531.720)  
55.1887 
(142.9538)  
361.6850 
(456.5240) 
-19.8374 
(174.2388) 
I-5d. Oppose 303.778 
(1550.826)  
90.3546 
(144.7370)  
182.1928 
(462.2184) 
65.1275 
(176.4121) 
I-5e. Threaten 167.054 
(1549.761)  
69.2183 
(144.6376)  
170.9845 
(461.9010) 
82.5533 
(176.2910) 
I-5f. Punish -29.722 
(1557.729) 
47.7363 
(145.3812)  
133.2213 
(464.2759) 
91.0975 
(177.1974) 
cons -889.464 
(1491.747)  
-484.276 
(339.7266) 
-304.2232 
(444.6102) 
-54.5341 
(169.6917) 
N 
R-square 
adj. R-square 
Prob 
RMSE 
217 
0.05372 
-0.02161 
0.779 
14.53 
217 
0.05983 
-0.01501 
0.6854 
1.356 
217 
0.1346 
-0.06568 
0.01778 
4.332 
217 
0.1143 
0.04383 
0.06571 
1.653 
Signif. codes:   0  ‘***’ 0.001  ‘**’ 0.01  ‘*’ 0.05  ‘.’ 0.1   ‘ ’ 1 
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Conclusion 
 
Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis of Israel’s post –Cold War 
prime ministers suggest distinct leadership styles and operational code profiles.  
However, the statistical tests between personality variables and Israel’s foreign policy 
behavior appear to explain less than expected.  In the tests with LTA variables, Distrust 
of Others emerges as an important variable to explain conflictual behavior.  While none 
of the operational code indices came up with strong statistical significance, the 
independent variables accounted for more variation in the dependent variable in all four 
models than the models with the LTA variables.  It is noteworthy that more variation in 
the verbal and material conflict models (than either form of cooperation) was explained 
using either LTA or op code variables. 
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Chapter 5!
Prime Ministers and Foreign Policy of Turkey, 1991-2009 
 
 
“From the inception of the Republic in 1923, political leaders in Turkey 
have dominated politics.  They came to have an iron rule over their parties. 
Politics revolved around political leaders” (Heper and Sayari 2002:vii). 
 
 
 
As this quote from two reputable scholars of Turkish politics well summarizes the 
argument, leaders have historically enjoyed significant powers in Turkish politics; they 
decide who is going to make the party list in general elections, who is going to run for 
office in local elections, who will participate in the decision making bodies of their party, 
etc.  Indeed, Yavuz (2009) argues that in Turkey “personalities are always more 
important than party programs or institutions” (98).  In other words, Turkish politics has 
always been “a stage for leader–based politics” (Yavuz and Ozcan 2007).  Once in power 
Turkish leaders continue to exert similar, if not more, control over politics.  Despite this 
overtly agreed phenomenon, scholars of Turkish politics and foreign policy rarely, if 
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ever, attended to systematically studying Turkey’s contemporary leadership and tracing 
their potential effects on foreign (as well as domestic) policy.1 
 
Arguably, the primary reason for the lack of attention on the role of political leaders in 
Turkish foreign policy is that Turkey has not been a major actor in world politics itself.  
As such, rather than individuals shaping Turkish foreign policy, systemic factors would 
condition Turkey’s place in world politics.  Accordingly, its membership in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), alliance with the United States, and historically 
Western–oriented policies hint at Turkey’s close relationships and its dependence on 
these factors in its foreign policy.  This understanding of Turkish foreign policy has 
served well during and after the cold war.  Before, Turkey sided with the United States in 
the ideological battle between “the West” and the Soviet Union; Turkey was aspiring to 
be a democracy, rejecting a communist political system.  In the meantime, as a 
developing country it was vulnerable to and dependent on the economic and political 
support of the West.  Under those circumstances, it was of no necessity to talk about any 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Excluding works on Turkey’s founder Kemal Ataturk (for instance, Vamik and Itzkowitz 1984), 
two separate edited volumes by Heper and Sayari (2002) and Demir (2007) would be the 
exceptions here.  The Heper and Sayari volume is a very informative study of Turkish leaders and 
their contributions to Turkey’s democratization; although it has rather limited references to 
foreign policy issues, the book provides valuable information about leader personalities as each 
chapter has a section on leader personality.  The Demir text focuses exclusively on foreign policy 
and leadership, and is most likely the only such study in Turkish foreign policy.  However, this 
book does not cover all major political actors (i.e. prime ministers in the past two decades); 
specifically, there is no studies about Tansu Ciller, Mesut Yilmaz, Abdullah Gul, and Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan. 
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other potential effects than systemic factors on Turkey’s foreign policy.  With the end of 
the cold war, presumably there were no significant changes.  The 1990s and early 2000s 
were rather marked by political and economic instability in Turkey, and much like the 
cold war era by Turkey’s continued attachment––as well as attraction––to the Western 
political institutions (NATO and the European Union) and ideals (democracy). 
 
Notwithstanding these perceptions clouded by systemic effects on foreign policy, many 
would agree that leaders such as Turgut Ozal (particularly during his presidency) and 
Necmettin Erbakan (during his short one–year tenure in government) did have significant 
influence over Turkish foreign policy.  Likewise, the present Turkish prime minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has put his own mark on Turkey’s foreign policy since coming to 
power in November 2002.  Erdogan led Turkey in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war, 
openly collided with Israel over its Palestine policy, and recently sided with Brazil 
against the rest of the United Nations Security Council as more sanctions are placed on 
Iran.  This study is based on the premise that effects of leadership personalities on 
Turkish foreign policy can be found in the post-cold war era.  Such influences are not 
confined to one or a few Turkish leaders, explaining Turkish prime ministers’ individual 
characteristics help understand foreign policy behavior of Turkey.  This chapter explores 
this argument at length with both quantitative and qualitative approaches.   
 
It is, then, beyond doubt that political leaders are of vital importance in Turkey.  
However, the perceptions of their influence in foreign policy can be skewed at times.  For 
example, as this manuscript is being written in the fall of 2010, the Turkish and world 
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media often portrays the existing leadership and government in Turkey as “Islamic.”  
While these perceptions derive from the political history of the country and personal 
backgrounds of leaders concerned, much like the case with the Israeli prime ministers, it 
is controversial that the label “religious” by itself would explain these leaders’ approach 
to the world or their foreign policy motivations.  Religion may very well be an important 
factor for some leaders than others; then, a plausible question is if there would be any 
differences among the so-called “religious” and “secular” prime ministers of Turkey, and 
their foreign policies.  The findings here can have answers in that regard. 
 
First, I outline personal backgrounds of all Turkish prime ministers in the era under 
investigation.  This is followed by their leadership traits and operational code profiles.  
Following the design as outlined in the previous chapter, then I present the results for 
OLS regression of events and personality profiles.   
 
 
Turkish Prime Ministers: Personal Backgrounds and Political Careers 
 
In the post-cold war period, seven different prime ministers ruled Turkey.2  Many of 
these leaders were in and out of government as coalition cabinets governed Turkey from 
November 1991 to November 2002.  Hence, such limitations as coalition cabinet politics 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This excludes Erdal Inonu, who led government for about a month as Demirel moved to the 
president’s office and Ciller replaced him leader of the True Path Party (center–right)––the senior 
partner of the coalition cabinet.  Ciller became the prime minister as soon as the transition was 
completed.   
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where prime ministers perform need to be recognized in this study as well.  This study 
does not reject them, but rather places the individual within the context s/he operates in.  
Before presenting any results of personality assessment or statistical tests and discussing 
a particular decision making context, first I briefly introduce each leader and their 
personal background.  The order of presentation is chronological. 
 
Suleyman Demirel 
 
Suleyman Demirel took an interesting journey in his life from the small village of 
Islamkoy to the highest posts in Turkey.  Growing up in a peasant family, the key to 
Demirel’s upward mobility was his education (Arat 2002: 88).  Demirel studied at 
Islamkoy’s elementary school, then at the provincial capital city, and finally in civil 
engineering at Istanbul Technical University.  His college education had a significant 
impact in Demirel’s life; there he met other future leaders of Turkey (most notably, 
Necmettin Erbakan, Turgut Ozal, and Alparslan Turkes) and upon graduation in 1949 
Demirel took a position in a state agency that introduced him to the ranks of Turkish 
bureaucracy and eventually led Demirel into politics.  The 1960 coup d’état cost Demirel 
his position; he worked temporarily for the US-based Morrison-Knudsen.  Demirel lived 
abroad in the United States, twice for short stays of about a year or so each.  In 1962, 
Demirel became a member of the Justice Party (center–right); the same year, Demirel 
was elected to the General Administrative Council of the party at its annual convention.  
Only two years later, Demirel became the leader the Justice Party and in 1965 won a 
landslide victory in the general elections.  Since then, Demirel has the reputation in 
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Turkish politics to leave the prime minister’s office six times (twice due to the military) 
and come back seven times––the seventh as Turkey’s president from 1993 to 2000.  
Demirel has been a prominent figure in Turkish politics since the 1960s, and is known as 
Baba (Father).  Arat (2002: 87) cites Demirel’s own description of this title: “benevolent, 
one who protects and listens to everyone, fair, one you go to when in trouble.”   
 
Ambitious, a team-worker, hardworking, realistic, and cautious are the words Arat (2002) 
uses to describe Demirel’s personality.  According to Arat, Demirel’s quick accession to 
power in the Justice Party, his vie for and accession to leading Turkey after his first 
general elections as party leader, and his capability to build coalition governments with 
various other political parties stand out as exemplars of Demirel’s personal 
characteristics.  In addition, Arat argues that Demirel was “not a romantic who was led 
by impulsive and emotional reaction to critical political events” (91).  This is indeed 
supported by other politicians’ accounts of Demirel, for instance Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil 
(cited in Arat).  Demirel is also known for his inconsistency; as Arat aptly notes, Demirel 
is often ridiculed for his infamous quote: “Yesterday is yesterday, today is today.”  
Throughout his political career, Demirel did not hesitate to use this repeatedly to describe 
his policy reversals.  Overall, this also supports the claim that “Demirel’s political style 
and leadership have varied over time” (Arat 2002: 94).  According to this perception, 
Demirel in the 1970s was a confrontational leader and Demirel as president from 1993 to 
2000 was a conciliatory and moderating leader.  However, one can argue that this 
statement is based on a faulty premise in that it compares Demirel as prime minister in 
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the 1970s with Demirel as president in the 1990s––in two different offices and under 
different historical circumstances.   
 
Tansu Ciller 
 
Tansu Ciller, daughter of a bureaucrat, was born and raised in Istanbul.  Ciller studied at 
English-medium schools from her early school years and after earning a degree in 
economics from Robert College (present day Bosporus University), Ciller completed her 
doctoral studies at the University of Connecticut.  Ciller came back to Turkey in 1974 
and taught at Bosporus University’s Department of Economics until she became actively 
involved in politics.  Ciller was a “technocrat” and served as minister of state responsible 
for the economy from 1991 to 1993.  Upon Demirel’s election to presidency, Ciller 
assumed the post of party leadership and also became the prime minister as her True Path 
Party (center–right) and Social Democratic People’s Party (center–left) agreed to keep 
the coalition government.  Ciller stayed in government with brief interruptions as other 
coalition cabinets alternated in power and served as deputy prime minister and minister 
of foreign affairs during the 1990s.  As Ciller’s reputation gradually eroded due to 
various scandals and electoral defeats, she finally retired from politics after the 
November 2002 elections.  Ciller’s tenure in politics lasted about a decade yet as 
Turkey’s first female leader and prime minister Ciller definitely marked her stamp on 
Turkey’s political history.    
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According to Cizre (2002), Ciller did never hesitate to use her gender to gain political 
advantage.3  However, Cizre claims that Ciller’s own description of her personality 
characteristics rather emphasized “such man-like attributes as courage, endurance, 
determination, and militarism” (207).  In addition, Cizre (2002) notes that Ciller’s record 
in office indicates how she was “motivated for power, egoistical interests, aggression, 
clientialism, and political intrigues.”  Quoting Ciller’s aides and colleagues, Cizre 
portrays Ciller as an authoritarian leader, who lacked self-confidence was not a good 
team player (206).   
 
Mesut Yilmaz 
 
Mesut Yilmaz grew up in Istanbul and studied at prestigious public schools.  His 
extended family members from the Black Sea province of Rize were prominent political 
figures.  Yilmaz himself was actively involved in student politics during his college 
education at the Faculty of Political Studies of Ankara University.  Later, Yilmaz earned 
his graduate degree from Cologne University in Germany.  Although he was quite 
interested in politics, upon his return from Germany in 1974 Yilmaz was not attracted to 
any political party (Cinar and Ozbudun 2002).  After working at various administrative 
positions in the private sector, in 1983 Turgut Ozal invited Yilmaz to join and become a 
founding member of Motherland Party (ANAP; center–right).  As Ozal led his party to a 
number of electoral victories, Yilmaz elected a member of parliament representing Rize 
and served as a member of cabinet during the ANAP governments.  From 1983 until Ozal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Tansu Ciller’s self-made titles were Ana (Mother) and Baci (Sister). 
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became the president in 1989, Yilmaz gradually raised his status in the cabinet mainly 
thanks to Ozal’s support and at the end was Ozal’s minister of foreign affairs.  However, 
as Ozal moved on to assume the president’s office, Ozal’s choice for party leadership was 
not Mesut Yilmaz but then the speaker of the parliament Yildirim Akbulut.  Yilmaz only 
temporarily ceded power to Akbulut; after serving as minister of foreign affairs in the 
Akbulut cabinet for about a year, Yilmaz resigned from his post and challenged Akbulut 
for party leadership in the party convention.  In June 1991, Mesut Yilmaz became ANAP 
chairman and led the ANAP government until the general elections of October 1991.  
ANAP came second in the elections, and Yilmaz became the leader of the opposition.  
Later, Mesut Yilmaz led various coalition cabinets in the mid-1990s and served under 
different capacities.  Yilmaz was a deputy prime minister in the last coalition cabinet that 
ruled Turkey; in the aftermath of November 2002 elections, Yilmaz decided to retire 
from politics as ANAP did poorly in the elections.  He was accused of corruption during 
his tenure as prime minister but then acquitted by the Supreme Court in 2006.  Later, 
Yilmaz decided to run for office again and was elected from Rize as an independent 
member of the parliament in July 2007. 
 
Cinar and Ozbudun (2002) draw two different profiles of Mesut Yilmaz, one that Yilmaz 
is known publicly and the other that he is known among close friends.  According to the 
former, Yilmaz is “a cold, calculating person with a stern expression that was taken as a 
lack of humor and compassion” (Cinar and Ozbudun 2002: 186).  Cinar and Ozbudun 
relate this with Yilmaz’s lack of self-confidence due to his relative inexperience and self-
doubt about replacing Ozal as a leader.  Notwithstanding this public image, Cinar and 
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Ozbudun talk about a passionate and talkative Mesut Yilmaz in private life.  According to 
this, Yilmaz values loyalty in his friendships, is a good listener (of his friends, associates 
and advisors alike), and has a resolute personality (Cinar and Ozbudun 2002: 187).  Cinar 
and Ozbudun (2002) add “the ability to maneuver” in politics to Yilmaz’s personality and 
skills (188).   
 
Necmettin Erbakan 
 
Due to his father’s appointments, Necmettin Erbakan travelled across Turkey as he was 
growing up.  Eventually the family of eight located to Istanbul, where Erbakan studied at 
prestigious schools.  Necmettin Erbakan’s political career started after longer than two 
decades in the academia––hence, the name Hoca (Instructor or Professor).4  Erbakan 
earned his college degree from Istanbul Technical University and his Ph.D. from Aachen 
Technical University in Germany in 1953.  Before his political career started, Erbakan 
was a professor of mechanical engineering and was actively involved with the business 
world.  Even before he became a politically renowned figure, Erbakan was elected the 
president of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Stock Exchanges (TOBB) in 1969.  
Erbakan’s contacts with the businessmen and the Anatolian merchants helped him earn 
this position.  However, after a confrontation with the government (led by Suleyman 
Demirel), Erbakan had to leave his post as the president of TOBB.  Then, Erbakan ran for 
a seat and elected in the parliament as an independent from central Anatolian city of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The word “Hoca” also has a religious connation, meaning the prayer–leader.  In reference to 
Erbakan, most likely both are meant. 
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Konya in the 1969 general elections.  In January 1970, Erbakan founded the National 
Order Party (MNP; extreme–right).  This started a line of political parties that were 
closed either following a coup d’état or by the Constitutional Court: the Constitutional 
Court closed MNP in 1971, the National Salvation Party (MSP; extreme–right) was 
among the victims of the 1980 coup d’etat, the Court later closed the Welfare Party (RP; 
extreme–right) in 1998 and the Virtue Party (FP; extreme–right) in 2001.  Erbakan was 
banned from politics in 1998 and his close associates continued Erbakan’s political 
ideals; the Felicity Party (SP; extreme–right), established in 2002, represents the final 
political party related with Erbakan.  During his political career, the highest political 
offices Erbakan held were three times as deputy prime minister in the 1970s and as prime 
minister from June 1996 to June 1997.   
 
Erbakan is a deeply religious person, and was affiliated with the Nakshibendi Order and 
its pious way of life (Ozdalga 2002).  Throughout his political career, Erbakan invented 
many humorous concepts and used them to attract masses but also to criticize his 
opponents.5  Erbakan’s discourse and policies suggest that he had “a pronounced 
disposition toward politically risky behavior” (Ozdalga 2002: 137), which expressed 
itself in his overt statements and strong preference for conservatism also his policy 
preferences such as aligning Turkey closely with the Muslim world.  Erbakan exerted 
strong control over his political parties, yet it is also noteworthy that he never had to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Erbakan referred to most other politicians in Turkey as “imitators of the West” and their 
thinking as “imitator mentality.”  Ozdalga (2002: 141) cites one of Erbakan’s speeches where he 
calls upon all Muslims to join Welfare Party’s mission and argues that those who don’t belong to 
the “religion of potatoes.”   
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compete against alternative leadership (Ozdalga 2002: 137).  Necmettin Erbakan 
emphasized “moral development, nationalism, economic growth, and social justice” 
(Ozdalga 2002: 138) throughout his political career. 
 
Bulent Ecevit 
 
The single child of a professor and a painter, Ecevit came from an elite and political 
family background––his father served as a member of the Turkish parliament from 1943 
to 1950 (Tachau 2002: 107).  During his education Bulent Ecevit grew an interest in 
poetry and journalism.  Indeed, he pursued both even during his political career.  Ecevit 
started his political career at the Republican People’s Party (CHP; center–left) in late 
1950s and assumed various positions within the party until its closure after the 1980 coup 
d’état.  Then, Ecevit founded Democratic Leftist Party (DSP; center–left) and was the 
leader of DSP until 2004.  Ecevit’s political career are marked by his accession to the 
CHP chairmanship in 1972 (third after Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu), his decision to 
intervene in Cyprus in 1974, his imprisonment and suspension from politics following the 
1980 coup, and the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan (the head of PKK terrorist organization) in 
1999 while he was the prime minister.  It is also noteworthy that Ecevit led the longest 
tenured coalition government in Turkish history from May 1999 to November 2002 and 
initiated significant reforms such as the abolition of death penalty.   
 
As a political leader Ecevit was known for his strong adherence to democratic principles.  
Indeed, Ecevit’s rise within the CHP was due to a disagreement over supporting the 
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military–installed government of Nihat Erim in 1971.  Then the secretary–general of the 
party, Ecevit resigned from his post protesting the party’s decision to support the 
government.  This notwithstanding, Ecevit was also known for exerting a strong control 
over his party.  As Kiniklioglu (2000: 12) puts it, “[p]ower was vested almost exclusively 
in Ecevit and his wife.”  Tachau (2002) argues that this was due to his concern about an 
infiltration of extreme leftists to the DSP.  Mainly due to his decision to intervene in 
Cyprus in 1974, Ecevit became to be regarded as a brave and patriotic leader.  The 
Cyprus intervention/invasion led to a common perception that Ecevit was a leader who 
can and would act decisively and boldly.  Throughout his political career, Ecevit (and his 
wife) lived a modest life and was known as an uncorrupted leader.  Hence, for the 
Turkish people, Ecevit was their Karaoglan: a heroic folk figure representing social 
justice (Tachau 2002: 115).   
 
Abdullah Gul 
 
Like Mesut Yilmaz, Tansu Ciller, or Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul represents a 
younger generation of leadership in Turkish politics.  Gul was born in the middle of the 
country, in Kayseri, a city known for its entrepreneurship.  Gul left his hometown for his 
university education and studied in Istanbul University where he earned his 
undergraduate and graduate degrees in economics; Gul also studied abroad in Great 
Britain (between 1976 and 1978) as he worked towards his doctoral degree.  Later, 
Abdullah Gul worked at Sakarya University and taught economics until he took a 
position at the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.  Gul and his family 
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lived there from 1981 to 1991.  When Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party recruited Gul 
to run for a seat in the parliament, Gul left Saudi Arabia once he was elected a member of 
parliament from his hometown province Kayseri in the 1991 parliamentary election.  
Once elected, Gul served as a Deputy Chairman in the Welfare Party, responsible for 
international affairs; then, he became a Minister of State in the Welfare–True Path 
coalition cabinet and was spokesman of the government.  Beyond his educational and 
work experience abroad, Abdullah Gul served in various international institutions (the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1991–2001 and the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly, 2001–2002) representing Turkey. 
 
Gul assumed leadership positions in conservative student organizations while he was at 
Istanbul University, yet his most significant leadership was during the break up of the 
Virtue Party in 2001.  With Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul led the reformist 
movement and established the Justice and Development Party (AKP; center–right) that 
became the governing party after the November 2002 elections.  Gul became the prime 
minister until Erdogan was elected to office following a by–election in March 2003.  
Later, Abdulah Gul served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Erdogan cabinet and was 
selected as president by the Turkish parliament in August 2007. 
 
According to Yavuz (2009), “Gul, as a politician, is very pragmatic and his actions are 
more shaped by the prevailing economic and political forces” (135).  Yavuz’s later 
remarks about Gul are important and focus on the influence of Necip Fazil Kisakurek on 
Gul.  Yavuz writes:  
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“Gul never became the creator of ideas or the producer of new policies but rather 
remained a consumer of ideas and policies.  This very much reflects his cautious and 
conservative character.  In short, he always remained a man with “part-time identities and 
ideologies,” with the goal of maintaining his power through domestic and international 
connections with the minimum risk.  The fear of making mistakes molded his personality 
as one loath to take any major initiatives.  During his period as prime minister an foreign 
minister, Gul hardly initiated a policy or came up with new ideas” (Yavuz 2009: 139). 
 
Arguably, this assessment about Gul is questionable at best; while Gul was not the 
ideologue of Turkish foreign policy during his short–tenured prime ministry or later 
during the four–years as the head of Turkish foreign affairs, Gul was one of the most 
ardent proponents of change in major policy issues like Cyprus.6  As to the argument that 
Gul is a risk–averse leader, it is certain that Gul acts more cautious, for instance, in 
comparison to Erdogan.  However, in contrast to Yavuz’s argument, Gul cannot be 
characterized as fearful.  Gul’s decision to support his wife’s case against Turkey in the 
European Court of Human Rights regarding the headscarf ban shows that he takes such 
risky steps.  This being said, it is also important note that the Gul family took the case off 
from the court in early 2004.7  Overall, Yavuz’s book puts more emphasis on Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan than Abdullah Gul.   
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The ideologue would be Ahmet Davutoglu, who was serving as the major foreign policy adviser 
to the prime minister both during Gul’s and Erdogan’s term in office.   
 
7 Hayrünisa Gül davasını çekti. (March 2, 2004).  
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Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
 
Erdogan’s life experience stands in stark contrast to that of many other leaders covered 
here.  Born to a family of modest economic status, in a province on the Black Sea coast 
of Turkey, Erdogan was the youngest of five children; his father worked as a ferry 
captain.  Erdogan did not study at prestigious schools nor was ever fluent in any foreign 
language nor lived abroad at any point in his life.  Instead, Erdogan was educated in an 
Imam Hatip (prayer–leader and preacher) school, and then at Marmara University earning 
a BA in business management.  Erdogan was active in sports, and played professional 
soccer for a while.  While he became a businessman, Erdogan was actively involved in 
local politics of Istanbul as a member of the National Salvation Party of Erbakan.  
Gradually rising within the parties of National Outlook Movement, Erdogan became the 
mayor of Istanbul in 1994.  Because of his relative success as mayor, he became more 
visible in politics.  Erdogan’s political career was halted temporarily after a speech he 
gave in Siirt.8  He was imprisoned for ten (served only four) months and banned from 
politics until a constitutional amendment also changed his status.  While Erdogan was 
arguably behind the scenes leader of the government, he assumed the premiership of the 
party only after he was elected to parliament after a by-election ironically in Siirt. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Erdogan read a poem of Ziya Gokalp: 
 the mosques are our barracks 
 the domes our helmets 
 the minarets our bayonets 
 and the faithful our soldiers. 
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Yavuz (2009) argues that the Turkish populace perceives Erdogan as a kabadayi and a 
mazlum.  In essence, a kabadayi is a figure of reputation, authority, honor, and someone 
with a role of “neighborhood disciplinarian.” A mazlum, on the other hand, refers to 
someone who was wronged.  According to Yavuz, “Erdogan’s personality is shaped by 
four institutions of socialization: the Kasimpasa neighborhood, the religio-conservative 
Imam Hatip school system, the ethno-religious (MTTB [National Turkish Student 
Union]) student union, and the National Outlook Movement of Erbakan” (2009: 121).  
Moreover, Yavuz claims that Erdogan represents “a split identity, torn between his 
Islamic identity and the politics that he is obliged to pursue in order to stay in 
government. He has to play a dual role: one for his traditional Islamic supporters, and one 
for his secularist domestic and international audience” (2009: 121).  
 
Furthermore, Yavuz (2009) claims, Erdogan’s worldview is primarily shaped by his 
religion.  This is to such an extent that Erdogan does not place much emphasis on notions 
of a nation and nationalism, according to Yavuz.  “This does not mean that he is not 
patriotic, but it does signal that his worldview is shaped by his religious upbringing, 
which supersedes his ethnic or regional origins” (Yavuz 2009: 131).  Erdogan’s 
understanding of secularism resembles that of Suleyman Demirel; for both, “secularism 
should not be interpreted as hostility to religion: the state could be secular, but not 
individuals” (Yavuz 2009: 133).  In short, Yavuz’s (2009) profile of Erdogan as an 
individual is that he is a pious but a pragmatic leader.  Erdogan places a lot of importance 
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on authority, honor, and loyalty.  Like Ecevit and Erbakan, Erdogan also has significant 
control over the party organization.9 
 
Yavuz argues that Erdogan “enjoys public rallies wherein he ignites hopes and raises the 
people’s expectations and emotions” (2009: 81); though he adds, in a footnote, that 
“[Erdogan] is not very convincing in one–and–one interviews where people can question 
his comments.  Thus, one would argue that Erdogan is a man of mass rallies rather than 
deliberative democracy.”   
 
 
Leadership Traits and Operational Code Profiles 
 
When one follows the discussion about leadership styles in Chapter 2, Turkish prime 
ministers their leadership styles differ according to Table 2.6 (page 26).  It is worth 
noting that the average profiles of Turkish prime ministers were calculated from their 
monthly scores, likewise the average profile of a Turkish prime minister was calculated 
from all available scores for 218 months.  As one would expect, when leaders speeches 
are aggregated to a single document and their profile is assessed from this document, 
there might be some differences in their leadership styles compared to the method used 
here.  For instance, Erbakan’s Self–Confidence (SC) score drops from .502 to .261 when 
all his foreign policy relevant speeches are aggregated and a single score is calculated for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 In 2005, Mehmet Sait Armagan an AKP member of the parliament resigned from the party 
complaining about “the anti–democratic and authoritarian nature of Erdogan” (Yavuz 2009:101).  
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him.  As discussed earlier, for the purposes of the present inquiry it is essential that any 
possible variances in personality measures be matched with foreign policy behavior on a 
monthly basis.  Hence, instead of working with an average profile and associated scores 
for each leader, this study looks at every individual leader’s scores on a monthly basis.   
 
Table 5.1 displays the averages for all Turkish prime ministers under investigation here.  
According to the results of their traits analysis (Table 5.2, below), Turkish prime 
ministers display different leadership styles.  Among them, Erbakan stands out as a 
unique leader.  First, Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) and Need for Power 
(PWR) scores for Turkish prime ministers indicate that Ciller, Ecevit, Gul, and Yilmaz 
respect constraints and Demirel, Erdogan, and Erbakan challenge constraints.   
 
Second, all Turkish prime ministers have higher Conceptual Complexity (CC) scores than 
their (Self–Confidence) SC score; hence, they all are open to information.  However, a 
rank–order of the difference between CC and SC reveals that there are significant 
differences among the leaders in this regard.  Specifically, Erbakan’s CC and SC scores 
are only .02 points apart from each other and questions the confidence in the judgment 
that he is open to information.  It is probably safe to argue that his openness to 
information would depend on the context.  This also shows the rather difficult nature of 
interpreting a trait score when it is not easily distinguishable from compared to the mean 
or has questionable conclusions.   
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Turkish prime ministers also differ among themselves as to their motivation for seeking 
office.  With the highest TASK (Task Focus) score, Gul is definitely a problem–focused 
leader; Demirel and Erbakan are rather relationship–focused leaders according their 
TASK scores in comparison to others.  Yilmaz, Erdogan, and Ecevit remain above the 
mean for Turkish prime ministers but are not one standard deviation away from it; 
likewise, in the reverse direction, Ciller is below the mean but has a higher TASK score 
the low mark.  The motivations of these four leaders, according to Table 2.4 (page 23), 
would be context–specific.  They might have a problem or relationship focus depending 
on contextual factors. 
 
Regarding their motivation toward the world (Distrust of Others, DIS, and In–Group 
Bias, IGB, scores), the majority of Turkish prime ministers (Ecevit, Erdogan, Gul, and 
Yilmaz) perceive the world as not a threatening place and they rather focus on taking 
advantage of opportunities and relationships.  These leaders have low scores of DIS and 
IGB compared to the average Turkish prime minister profile.  Ciller and Erbakan, 
however, have high scores in both DIS and IGB; according to Table 2.5 (page 24), their 
focus is on eliminating potential threats and problems.  These leaders perceive the world 
to be centered around adversaries and they intend on spreading their power.  Moreover, 
such leaders are expected to take risks because they think it is a moral imperative to 
challenge those adversaries––a profile that might very well fit to Erbakan’s view of the 
world.  Lastly, Demirel has a low (close to the mean) DIS score but a high IGB score.  
Demirel, then, would perceive the world as a zero–sum game that has a set of 
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international norms but also ongoing confrontations with adversaries.  His focus would 
be on dealing with threats and solving problems. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Leadership Styles of Turkey’s Prime Ministers 
Prime Minister Leadership Style 
Demirel directive 
Ciller collegial 
Yilmaz opportunistic/collegial 
Erbakan directive/evangelistic 
Ecevit opportunistic/collegial 
Gul opportunistic 
Erdogan actively independent  
 
 
Turkish prime ministers’ leadership styles as a function of responsiveness to constraints, 
openness to information, and motivation (Table 2.6) suggest significant differences 
among them.  The results fit very well with broad foreign policy orientations of the 
Turkish prime ministers.  For instance, when Erbakan’s openness to information is 
categorized as “closed” then an evangelistic leadership style definitely explains 
Erbakan’s foreign policy.  The “Islamic” international organizations such as a Muslim 
NATO or a Muslim United Nations desired by Erbakan were indeed his attempts to 
mobilize other Muslim nations around a mission.  Erbakan’s two major visits abroad to 
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the East and then to Africa were based on similar motivations to persuade other Muslim 
nations like Pakistan, Indonesia, Libya, and Nigeria to come together and work closely 
with Turkey––and certainly under Erbakan’s guidance and vision.  Likewise, Erdogan 
can legitimately be considered an actively independent leader.  The “zero problems 
policy” and “strategic depth” doctrine initiated by the Justice and Development Party 
governments indeed is very much based on increasing Turkey’s maneuverability and 
status in its region and in the world.10  Erdogan’s policies and leadership mirror these 
principles.   
 
One of the premises of this present inquiry is that one can benefit from using the LTA 
and operational code profiles in conjunction with each other.  Before I start looking at the 
LTA and operational code profiles of Turkish prime ministers together, first a summary 
of their operational codes is in order.  Table 5.3 (below) displays the average operational 
code indices for each prime minister, as well as an average profile of a Turkish prime 
minister.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See, Davutoglu (2008, 2010). 
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According to their philosophical beliefs, the average Turkish prime minister has a 
somewhat friendly view of the political universe (P–1), is somewhat optimistic to 
mixed/neutral about realizing political goals (P–2), believes that the predictability of 
political future (P–3) is low, perceives that s/he has low to medium control over historical 
development (P–4a), and the role of chance (P–5) for them is very high.  The indices for 
instrumental beliefs summarize the individual’s preferences in achieving his or her 
political objectives and corresponding choice of strategies and tactics.  The average 
Turkish prime minister, according to their instrumental beliefs, has a definitely 
cooperative direction of strategy (I–1), his/her intensity of tactics (I–2) are somewhat 
cooperative, is low to medium risk acceptant (I–3), has a medium flexibility between 
cooperative and conflictual tactics (I–4a) and also between words and deeds (I4b).  As far 
as the utility of means (I–5) indices are concerned, the least intensity words in 
cooperative and conflictual tactics (Appeal and Oppose, respectively) are the most 
preferred means for an average Turkish prime minister.  Other means are also utilized, 
which can be followed from Table 5.3, yet there are significant differences among the 
Turkish prime ministers in that regard. 
 
The VICS already comes up with a scale of its own for each index; however, for 
comparison purposes, Hermann’s technique of evaluating each leader according to his or 
her deviation from a norming group is useful.  Here, I will follow this approach 
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interpreting the operational code profiles of Turkish prime ministers.11  First of all, how 
do the seven Turkish prime ministers rank among themselves according to their indices 
for master beliefs, P–1 and I–1?  With regard to their beliefs about the nature of the 
political universe (P–1), Ciller and Gul have the highest values and share an almost 
definitely friendly view of the world.  Ciller and Gul are more than a standard deviation 
above the average for all Turkish prime ministers.  Yilmaz and Demirel score the lowest 
here; according the VICS scale, their view of the political universe is somewhat friendly.  
As far as the directionality of strategy (I–1) goes, Gul has a definitely cooperative leaning 
and is more than one standard deviation above the average Turkish prime minister.  
Erdogan and Ecevit are also above the average; the lowest I–1 index is Demirel’s, which 
is more than one standard deviation away from the mean.  Still, though, all Turkish prime 
ministers have definitely cooperative direction of strategy. 
 
Other differences in the operational code analysis indices are also worth exploring.  Most 
Turkish prime ministers under investigation here rather close to being somewhat 
optimistic about their beliefs regarding realization of their political values, P–2 index, (in 
rank–order: Ciller, Erbakan, Ecevit, and Erdogan).  Others have mixed (neither 
pessimistic nor optimistic) views about it (from the lowest: Demirel, Gul, and Yilmaz).   
 
The seven leaders here share a somewhat similar view about the predictability of political 
future; the P–3 index here ranges from 0.232 (Gul) to 0.134 (Erbakan), with an average 
of 0.169 score.  Turkish prime ministers have a rather low belief in their control over 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See Table 7.4 and 7.5 in Chapter 7. 
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historical development (P–4a); the average 0.306 puts Gul, Erdogan, and Ciller above, on 
the one hand, and Erbakan (the lowest index), Demirel, Ecevit, and Yilmaz below it.  
This suggests that Turkish prime ministers rather think that “others” have more control 
over historical development.  Finally, the role of chance in the political universe (P–5) is 
very high for Turkish prime ministers as a group.  The average score of 0.948 ranks close 
to those reported in other studies.   
 
The I–1 index for Turkish prime ministers is already discussed briefly above; overall, 
they share a definitely cooperative strategy and there is not much difference among the 
seven individuals.  The I–2 index for the intensity of tactics reveals somewhat similar 
results, which indicate that Erbakan has the highest index of 0.322 here––hence, has the 
most cooperative tactics compared to the other Turkish prime ministers.  Ciller, once 
Erbakan’s coalition partner, comes last with a score of 0.211.  As a whole the Turkish 
prime ministers cluster around “somewhat cooperative” category as far as the intensity of 
their tactics is concerned.   
 
The most risk acceptant Turkish prime minister is Gul (0.423) and the most risk averse is 
Yilmaz (0.261).  The results for the I–3 index are fairly surprising, however, as Erdogan 
and Erbakan come right after Yilmaz (second and third, respectively) and are below the 
average for the index.  Given Erdogan’s active and reformist foreign policy since he 
came to power and the controversial nature of Erbakan’s many policies during his one 
year in government, these are rather unexpected.   
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The I–4 indices tell about the individual’s flexibility of tactics between cooperation and 
conflict (I–4a) and between words and deeds (I–4b).  Overall, Turkish prime ministers 
have a medium level of flexibility between cooperative and conflictual tactics.  Demirel 
and Ciller have the highest two scores here, which suggests that compared to other 
Turkish prime ministers they are more likely to go between the tactics.  As to the I–4b 
index, the leader who has the most flexibility between words and deeds is Erdogan––
more than a standard deviation away from the average.  Erdogan’s predecessor, Gul ranks 
the lowest here with a 0.275 index.  Other prime ministers remain close to the average 
score for the index. 
 
Appeal is the most preferred means of action for all Turkish prime ministers; their 
individual scores (with the exception of Erbakan) and the average are well above the 
“very high” mark of 0.32 according to the VICS scale.  Erbakan has a 0.354 I–5c index, 
yet is distinct from all others where the closest is Demirel with a score of 0.502.  Appeal, 
however, still is the most prefered form of action for Erbakan too.  Staying with Erbakan, 
his next two most preferred means of action are at the extreme ends of both cooperative 
and conflictual means––Reward and Punish, respectively.  Erbakan is the only leader 
with more than one standard deviation away from the average index in both categories.12  
There are relatively low levels of variation in most utility of means indices, particularly 
in the conflict means (Oppose, Threaten, Punish).   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 This is the same for Promise (I–5b) category; Erbakan is the only leader who is more than one 
standard deviation away from the average.   
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How do the LTA and operational code profiles of Turkish prime ministers match with 
each other?  What else, if anything, can one learn from combining portrayals of their 
personality traits and operational codes?  As argued earlier, LTA and operational code 
analysis do not necessarily measure the same qualities or beliefs of an individual but 
some particular measurements are rather similar to each other–––for instance, belief in 
ability to control events (BACE) and control over historical development (P–4a) can be 
expected to reveal somewhat similar conclusions about each leader’s views about his or 
her ability to control historical developments.  One can expect differences as well; for 
instance, Demirel ranks first in BACE scores but is second from the last in P–4a.  While 
operational code indices of direction of strategy (I–1) and tactics (I–2) can not very well 
distinguish Erbakan from other prime ministers, LTA’s Distrust of Others (DIS) trait puts 
Erbakan well above others.  This is descriptive of Erbakan’s foreign policy discourse, 
which emphasizes his conspiracy theories about the West’s policies and actions against 
Turkey and the Muslim world.  As discussed earlier, Erbakan’s motivation toward the 
world then matches with this description.  The operational code analysis indices of utility 
of means (I–5a to I–5f) complement this by placing Erbakan’s preferences in this regard.  
Such a picture cannot be captured by the LTA profile unless a thorough, in–depth 
analysis of leader’s discourse is conducted.  Hence, such similarities and differences in 
the LTA and operational code analysis assessments can very well be used to complement 
a leader’s profile.  Overall, LTA eventually helps draw a complete leadership style 
profile for a leader and operational code analysis can complement this by providing 
further insights into leaders’ approach to cooperative and conflictual means of actions. 
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Personality Profiles and Events: Results 
 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5, below, respectively display the OLS results with the LTA and 
operational code data as independent variables and the events data as its dependent 
variable.  As explained in Chapter 3, all data are aggregated monthly.  The dependent 
variable is measured as four different types of foreign policy events: verbal cooperation, 
material cooperation, verbal cooperation, and verbal conflict.  Hence, with the LTA and 
operational code data, four different models are tested.   
 
According to Table 5.4, the OLS tests reveal marginally significant results with the LTA 
variables explaining four models of foreign policy behavior.  In the verbal cooperation 
and verbal conflict models, Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Task Focus (TASK) 
variables are statistically significant; each variable at the 0.1 and 0.05 levels, respectively 
with the model.  In the material conflict model, Distrust of Others (DIS) and Task Focus 
(TASK) variables are significant at the 0.1 level.  The constant, on the other hand, is 
significant at in the verbal cooperation, material cooperation, and verbal conflict models–
–at the 0.01 level in the first, and then at the 0.05 level in others.  Further tests with some 
control variables (inflation, public opinion, and reciprocity) do not reveal significantly 
different results (see Appendix for results).  
 
Table 5.5 displays the OLS test results with the operational code indices as its 
independent variables.  According to the results, there is no statistical significance 
between the op code indices of Turkish prime ministers and Turkey’s foreign policy 
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behavior as measured in the Kansas Events Data System.  Operational code indices 
accounted for more variation in the dependent variable in all four models than the models 
with the LTA variables.  Further tests with some control variables (inflation, public 
opinion, and reciprocity) do not reveal significantly different results (see Appendix). 
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Table 5.4 Turkey: Events and LTA 
 
Signif. codes:    0  ‘***’ 0.001  ‘**’ 0.01  ‘*’ 0.05  ‘.’ 0.1   ‘ ’ 1 
 
 verbcoop matcoop verbconf matconf 
Belief in 
Ability to 
Control Events 
(BACE) 
-3.679 
(8.726) 
-2.012 
(1.526) 
-2.7947 
(2.998) 
1.677 
(3.338) 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
(CC) 
-21.2323 . 
(11.907) 
-1.8926 
(2.082) 
-9.5571 * 
(4.091) 
-1.819 
(4.555) 
Distrust of 
Others  
(DIS) 
.1609 
(10.098) 
.6565 
(1.765) 
4.3464 
(3.467) 
7.609 . 
(3.86) 
In-group Bias 
(IGB) 
-.2744 
(12.274) 
.4511 
(2.147) 
-3.9488 
(4.218) 
-3.03 
(4.696) 
Need for Power 
(PWR) 
-13.493 
(10.011) 
.282 
(1.751) 
1.6378 
(3.440) 
-2.987 
(3.83) 
Self-
Confidence 
(SC) 
6.8666 
(4.299) 
.6646 
(.752) 
1.8526 
(1.477) 
.6127 
(1.645) 
Task Focus 
(TASK) 
16.274 . 
(8.778) 
.5068 
(1.535) 
6.7334 * 
(3.016) 
5.871 . 
(3.358) 
cons 27.272 ** 
(10.148) 
3.72 * 
(1.775) 
7.5977 * 
(3.487) 
5.18 
(3.882) 
N 
R-square 
adj. R-square 
Prob 
RMSE 
201 
0.056 
0.021 
0.1273 
14.858 
201 
0.0174 
-0.0182 
0.8418 
2.599 
201 
0.0657 
0.0318 
0.0657 
5.1059 
201 
0.0452 
0.0106 
0.2498 
5.6847 
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Table 5.5 Turkey: Events and Operational Code 
 
 verbcoop matcoop verbconf matconf 
P-1 nature of the political 
universe 
7.739 
(13.475) 
-2.0605 
(2.3139) 
1.8857 
(4.5975) 
-.4378 
(4.9529) 
P-2 prospects for realization of 
political values  
-13.406 
(18.002) 
3.1656 
(3.0911) 
-5.3452 
(6.1417) 
1.4455 
(6.6164) 
P-3 predictability of political 
universe 
12.668 
(40.886) 
-1.9936 
(7.0206) 
-5.1012 
(13.9492) 
5.4046 
(15.0275) 
P-4 belief in ability to control 
historical development 
17.968 
(22.282)  
-2.3503 
(3.8261) 
2.1832 
(7.6020) 
11.7396 
(8.1896) 
P-5 role of chance 74.523 
(117.269)  
-16.5429 
(20.1363) 
.5136 
(40.0088) 
25.8518 
(43.1014) 
I-1 approach to goals (direction 
of strategy) 
11.577 
(17.739) 
.3001 
(3.046) 
-5.5059 
(6.0522) 
-1.7742 
(6.5200) 
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of 
tactics) 
-11.360 
(24.074) 
.1307 
(4.1338) 
3.7029 
(8.2135) 
-3.4827 
(8.8485) 
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of 
tactics) 
-2.697 
(12.117) 
-1.7097 
(2.0807) 
-.9411 
(4.1341) 
-1.9874 
(4.4537) 
I-4 timing of action: flexibility 
of: 
    
I-4a cooperative/conflictual 
tactics 
-1.8718 
(9.361) 
-1.1647 
(1.6074 
-3.8124 
(3.1937) 
-3.1537 
(3.4406) 
I-4b word/deed tactics 12.195 
(7.90) 
.4155 
(1.3565 
.3962 
(2.6953) 
4.7679 
(2.9037) 
I-5 utility of means     
I-5a. Reward 951.2358 
(1962.978)  
503.2155 
(337.0622)  
930.7236 
(669.7062) 
-976.8671 
(721.474) 
I-5b. Promise 978.7296 
(1964.874)  
502.2192  
(337.3877)  
934.1916 
(670.3529)  
-971.0619 
(722.1707) 
I-5c. Appeal 965.0505 
(1964.394)  
504.8723  
(337.3053)  
936.2231 
(670.1891) 
-972.1212 
(721.9942) 
I-5d. Oppose 981.7826  
(1962.757)  
504.6006  
(337.0242)  
928.4948 
(669.6305) 
-975.5753 
(721.3925) 
I-5e. Threaten 999.7834  
(1967.004)  
506.0557  
(337.7534)  
942.9491 
(671.0794) 
-960.3346 
(722.9534) 
I-5f. Punish 977.7538 
(1963.426)   
507.3565  
(337.139)  
941.5401 
(669.8588) 
-970.6639 
(721.6384) 
cons -1031.144 
(1978.495)  
-484.276 
(339.7266) 
-924.6595 
(675) 
953.9063 
(727.177) 
N 
R-square 
adj. R-square 
Prob 
RMSE 
217 
0.0544 
-0.0212 
0.7722 
14.954 
217 
0.0494 
-0.267 
0.8407 
2.5677 
217 
0.0707 
-0.0037 
0.5122 
5.1017 
217 
0.1260 
0.0561 
0.0329 
5.4961 
 
Signif. codes:   0  ‘***’ 0.001  ‘**’ 0.01  ‘*’ 0.05  ‘.’ 0.1   ‘ ’ 1 
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Conclusion 
 
Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis of Turkey’s post –Cold War 
prime ministers suggest distinct leadership styles and operational code profiles.  
However, similar to the results in the previous chapter, the statistical tests between 
personality variables and Turkey’s foreign policy behavior appear to explain less than 
expected.  In the tests with LTA variables, Conceptual Complexity and Task Focus 
display statistical significance in two and three models, respectively.  Distrust of Others 
once again emerges as an important variable to explain conflictual behavior, albeit with a 
lower level of significance.  While none of the operational code indices came up with 
strong statistical significance, the independent variables accounted for more variation in 
the dependent variable in all four models than the models with the LTA variables.  It is 
noteworthy that more variation in the verbal and material conflict models (than either 
form of cooperation) was explained using either LTA or op code variables. 
!
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Chapter 6!
Home and Away: Leadership Style and Foreign Policy of Turkey’s 
Erdogan  
 
 
“So, I don’t think I will come back to Davos after this,” said Turkish prime minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and walked off the panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland on January 29, 2009.  On the stage left were Amr Mousa (Secretary General 
of the Arab League), Ban Ki–moon (Secretary General of the United Nations), Shimon 
Peres (Israel’s President), and the moderator David Ignatius (of the Washington Post).  
An emotional and upset Erdogan first confronted Peres about Israel’s operation in the 
Gaza Strip.  Later, when the moderator did not grant his request to speak for “one [more] 
minute,” Erdogan furiously stormed out of the panel in protest.  Many were simply 
shocked by this behavior; after all, it is not an everyday happening that prime ministers 
act in such a manner.  The world media found an infrequent and untraditional diplomatic 
protest in the making at the Davos meetings; the event quickly became “breaking news” 
across the globe.  The prime minister of Israel’s main ally in the Muslim world was angry 
and then absent.  In the aftermath, it was not clear whom Erdogan was protesting: the 
moderator or the Israeli President, or presumably, both.  Since, Turkish–Israeli relations 
have at best been lukewarm.   
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After Davos, Erdogan was welcomed in Turkey as the ‘conqueror of Davos’ and many 
Arab and Muslim nations celebrated him.  Even some in the West were content with 
Erdogan’s behavior at the height of Israel’s operation in Gaza.  The Davos incident was 
not the first time the Turkish prime minister left a meeting in protest.  In November 2005, 
when Erdogan was visiting Denmark, on the grounds that among the press were the 
representatives of ROJ–TV and that the Danish authorities were not asking them to leave, 
Erdogan cancelled his press meeting with the Prime Minister of Denmark Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen.1  Do such examples tell anything about Erdogan’s leadership style and his 
foreign policy?  Is it a mere coincidence that these events happened outside Turkey? 
 
Well–established research traditions in political psychology provide a means to explore if 
leaders’ personality and style differ across audiences.  However, notwithstanding the 
hints that leaders’ style can change depending on their audience (Hermann, 2003: 208), it 
remains a topic understudied at best.  Such contextual differences are worth exploring in 
assessing our leaders and the way they act in response to situational demands (Hermann 
2003).  Alas, the extant literature on leadership traits analysis in particular, and political 
leadership and foreign policy overwhelmingly but with some notable exceptions in 
operational code research (see, for instance, Malici and Malici 2005; Renshon 2008), 
follow the assumption that leader traits and beliefs rather stay stable.  There are at least 
two research programs that one can draw inferences to study this issue: “at–a–distance” 
methods of assessing leader profiles and the broader personality theory.  “At–a–distance” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Turkey claims that ROJ–TV has a direct connection with the PKK terrorist organization.  In 2010, 
Denmark agreed with Turkey and is investigating the ROJ–TV for its illegal ties. 
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techniques look at leaders’ discourse and use their “words as data.”  The literature on 
personality, on the other hand, can provide many insights on various effects on behavior.  
Here, I primarily follow the former but also refer to personality theories.  I assume that 
one way to answer if the audience leaders are talking to makes any difference in their 
leadership style is to look at how leaders respond to domestic and foreign media.   
 
The Davos incident becomes the primary impetus in looking at Turkey’s Erdogan.  In 
addition, as Turkish foreign policy activism increases and intrigues not only those who 
study Turkey but also others across the globe, the Turkish prime minister and his 
leadership style remain a puzzle to understand.  Erdogan, who is up for elections in 2011 
and whose party is also likely to govern Turkey for another term, leads a strategically 
located, predominantly Muslim, and a European Union candidate country.  Following an 
event like Davos and in fact since Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party came to 
power in November 2002, it is quite common to find arguments about Turkey’s ‘turning 
East’ or following an ‘Islamic foreign policy.’  In contrast to such extreme acts abroad as 
the Davos incident, Erdogan is considered to be a pragmatic leader at home.  Despite 
challenges from multiple domestic actors and institutions to Erdogan (on both foreign and 
domestic policy issues), one can argue that he has attempted to portray a working 
relationship within ‘the Turkish state.’   
 
The contrasting audiences Erdogan deals with in Turkey (domestic political scene and the 
actors therein) and abroad (the international clientele Erdogan addresses to regarding his 
foreign policy ambitions) in some ways suggests a two–level game in Turkey’s 
!
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contemporary foreign policy (Putnam 1988).  Are there any differences in Erdogan’s 
leadership style at home and abroad?  If so, what do they say about Turkey’s foreign 
policy under Erdogan?  As Erdogan’s term continues and he follows an active foreign 
policy agenda, conclusions of this study are significant not only for presenting a first 
profile of Recep Tayyip Erdogan but also for offering clues about the future of Turkish 
foreign policy. Beyond understanding Erdogan and Turkey’s foreign policy, this chapter 
also represents an initial attempt to understand leaders’ behavior across audiences. 
 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows; first, I briefly review the literature about at–
a–distance methods.  Then, I introduce the sources and methods used in my analysis. It 
concludes with a profile of Erdogan and a discussion about how his general personality 
profile compares with an audience–specific profile of Erdogan: at home and away.  
Indeed, there are differences in the Turkish prime minister’s trait scores derived from his 
foreign policy relevant interviews with domestic and foreign media.  Based on my 
findings, I argue that such differences may be due to the multiple domestic and 
international factors leaders are subject to influence.  In Erdogan’s case, Turkish 
domestic politics, his personal and political background, and Turkey’s institutional 
structure are important explanatory factors for two personality profiles at home and away. 
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Leaders and Audiences 
 
 
The broader personality theory literature, as well as the LTA literature, suggests that 
individuals can adjust their discourse and behavior depending on situational demands.  
For instance, Levi and Tetlock (1980: 209) remind of the importance of the social context 
in interpreting measures of content analysis.  Likewise, in an assessment of conclusions 
he draws from studying personality of political leaders at a distance, Winter (2005) 
argues that personality interacts with both the opportunities and obstacles of situational 
contexts (p. 573).  Audience is one of those contextual factors.  As to what effects 
audiences may have on leaders, Holsti (1976) notes that political discourse aims to 
"persuade, justify, threaten, cajole, manipulate, evoke sympathy and support, or 
otherwise influence the intended audience… to serve and advance practical goals of the 
moment" (also cited in Levi and Tetlock 1980: 209).   
 
Some research on personality has looked at the level of complexity in private (letters or 
diaries) and public (books, articles, or speeches) communications with respect to the 
audience effect on leaders’ discourse and style.  Dille (2000) brings in an impression 
management hypothesis as to possible audience and contextual effects on leaders, yet his 
discussion later focuses on differences in a temporal context.  Lerner and Tetlock’s 
(1999) review of accountability literature mentions audience effects in similar vein.  
Likewise, the integrative complexity literature talks about audience effects.  For instance, 
Guttieri, Wallace, and Suedfeld (1995: 605–607) examine how various studies found the 
!
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subject has high complexity when there is a lack of complete agreement with him or her 
and the audience.  They aptly warn that integrative complexity differences suggest that 
there exists an audience effect but to what degree these are reflected in policy cannot be 
concluded from those (Guttieri et al. 1995: 606).  This literature, though, is much 
concentrated on the differences between what is called the private and public words of 
leaders, and works only with the assumption that leaders’ audiences can be deducted 
from these two types of materials.  A very similar interest has long existed in the at–a–
distance scholarship.  Recently, Renshon (2009) profiled President Kennedy’s belief 
system in private and public documents.   
 
Whether the audience makes a difference to leaders’ style remains an uncharted territory 
particularly in the at–a–distance literature.  Indeed, it is one of the paths Hermann (2003) 
suggested as a venue of research but has not been studied yet.  In addition to possible 
differences across domestic and international audiences, Hermann asks if leaders’ 
personality traits scores would differ across topics and time, also if their scores would 
differ in a crisis as opposed to a noncrisis situation.  She argues: “If the changes are found 
for audience, chances are that these leaders are influenced by the people, groups, and 
organizations with whom they are interacting.  If, however, the changes occur by topic, 
then the leaders are probably attending to solving the problem at hand and tailoring their 
behavior to deal with what is happening” (2003: 208).  According to Hermann, “leaders 
of third world countries often show such differences in the way they speak at home and 
abroad.  They are much less directive, more charming, and more diplomatic in dealing 
with the governments of larger, more developed states from whom they may want 
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something than when they focus on their own countries” (2003: 208–9).  As she claims 
these leaders are more decisive and act in “authoritarian and autocratic” manner when 
they talk with the domestic audience.  This argument explains how leaders may be 
constrained by systemic factors, but fails to account for, or even recognize, if and how 
domestic limitations may affect political leaders and their style.   
 
The extant literature on political leadership has looked at differences across time (Malici 
and Malici 2005), if leaders exhibited different personalities in scripted and spontaneous 
utterances (Dille 2000; Dille and Young 2000; Renfro 2009), if they hold different beliefs 
about democracies and non–democracies (Schafer and Walker 2006a).  Shannon and 
Keller (2007) aim at tracing audience effects (along with topic and time period); they find 
differences only on the topic and report those.  Most of these studies, however, utilize 
operational code analysis.  As far as the LTA literature is concerned, arguably it has not 
kept up with the same sort of expansion in the operational code analysis literature.  For 
instance, in an analysis of U.S. president George H. W. Bush’s belief system, Renshon 
(2008) showed that our leaders are prone to adjusting the way they interpret the world in 
response to such dramatic events as the terrorist attacks of September 11th.  Even 
Renshon concedes that while leaders may change their beliefs in a dramatic way, over a 
longer period of time severe changes become slightly attenuated as the new belief system 
is consolidated.  Such studies have been undermining the assumption that leaders have 
stable personality traits or beliefs across time or issue (also see, Alker 1972).  This article 
is another attempt to challenge that assumption, and makes a unique attempt in 
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questioning the audience effect on leaders.  Moreover, the use of LTA in this study also 
adds to the literature that utilizes this technique.  
 
 
Data and Method 
 
 
This article tackles the two questions posed earlier, and attempts to reach a conclusion by 
utilizing at–a–distance methods (Hermann 1977; Post 2003; Schafer 2000; Winter et al. 
1991).  Following the great strides made within this tradition, this article takes public 
domain texts as its data–––here, the transcripts of interviews with Erdogan.  ProfilerPlus 
(Social Science Automation 2009) is used to analyze these texts.  ProfilerPlus is a 
computer software of content analysis developed by Social Science Automation.  
Analyzing text with this program guarantees uniformity in the treatment of text; hence, 
words become the data (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; Dyson and Billordo 2004).  
Under investigation is Turkey’s prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  Turkey’s 
Erdogan serves the goals of this analysis very well given the active foreign policy his 
government pursued and the availability of interviews Erdogan gave both to the domestic 
and international media on various foreign policy issues.   
 
Only the words directly spoken by the leader, Turkey’s Erdogan, are analyzed here.  
Specifically, Erdogan’s interviews with the domestic and international media on only 
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foreign policy issues are studied from March 14, 2003 (the date Erdogan became Turkish 
primer minister) until the end of 2009.  Hence, these interviews discuss various issues at 
various different times during Erdogan’s tenure in government and represent his general 
foreign policy approach.  The interviews are drawn from LexisNexis Academic, Factiva, 
and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).  In addition, a few sources, such as 
the PBS’s web site, also posted the transcripts of their interviews and hence these were 
accessed directly from the WWW.  It should be noted that as a non–English speaking 
leader, all of Erdogan’s interviews were translated, but as Hermann (1980, 1987) 
suggests, translation effects are minimal: inter–coder reliability between native speakers’ 
coding and Hermann’s coding of translated text averages 0.92 across all seven traits. 
 
One–way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of Erdogan’s leadership traits scores with 
interviews at home in Turkey and abroad as factors is employed to assess if Erdogan has 
indeed two personality styles. 
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Erdogan’s Personality and His Foreign Policy: At Home and Away 
 
 
Since coming to power in November 2002, prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has put 
his own mark on Turkey’s foreign policy.2  Erdogan led Turkey in the aftermath of the 
2003 Iraq war, openly collided with Israel over its Palestine policy, initiated accession 
talks with the European Union, and in 2010, against the rest of the United Nations 
Security Council, voted against more sanctions on Iran.  As mentioned earlier, Erdogan 
was the main actor in the most memorable event at the 2009 World Economic Forum.  Is 
it possible that Erdogan has two leadership styles, one in Turkey and another abroad?   
 
 
Table 6.1 Erdogan’s LTA Scores At Home and Away 
 Erdogan  
Away 
 
Erdogan at 
Home 
 
 
F (N=53, 
df=1) 
 
 
p* 
Belief can control events .366 .433 2.499 .120 
Conceptual complexity .574 .666 10.488 .002 
Distrust of others .109 .081 .836 .365 
In–group bias .103 .106 .016 .901 
Need for power .244 .201 2.711 .106 
Self confidence .411 .276 3.554 .065 
Task focus .623 .749 10.562 .002 
   * Two–tailed test.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 As much as Erdogan influenced Turkish foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoglu is considered to be the 
ideologue of Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy.  A professor of international relations, Davutoglu first 
served as an adviser to prime minister Abdullah Gul and worked closely with both Gul and Erdogan.  Then, 
he became Turkey’s minister of Foreign Affairs when Gul was selected president.   
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Table 2 reports mean scores for Erdogan’s leadership traits for 16 interviews he gave to 
Turkish media and 37 interviews he gave to foreign media; it also displays the one–way 
ANOVA test results.  The two profiles suggest differences between each other.  At home, 
Erdogan has a higher score in Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) but lower Need 
for Power (PWR) score than mean scores for his away profile.  Erdogan has higher 
Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Task Focus (TASK) scores at home than away; 
conversely, his Self–Confidence (SC) and Distrust of Others (DIS) are higher abroad.  
Erdogan’s In–Group Bias (IGB) scores remain about the same in both average profiles.  
According to ANOVA results, Erdogan’s CC and TASK scores significantly differ at 
home and abroad.  In addition, his SC scores at home and away are marginally different 
from each other.  According to Erdogan’s average profiles, while there is no statistical 
significance, his mean scores for BACE, PWR, and DIS are also noticeably different at 
home and away.   
 
Hermann’s discussion provides a good starting point for interpreting these results.  
However, as Hermann suggests, a close attention to the context in which individual 
leaders function provides further details and would expand our understanding of how 
leaders may indeed alter their leadership styles depending on their audience.  In 
Erdogan’s case, the examples of the World Economic Forum panel and the press 
conference in Denmark highlight the extremes of Erdogan’s style.  A quantitative 
analysis of his interviews, however, confirms that Erdogan has different leadership styles 
at home and abroad. 
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In Erdogan’s case, his behavior can be placed in context as one can compare his 
interaction with the media at home and abroad.  Erdogan’s LTA scores providing a 
general profile and his profile at home and away hold the answers to the questions above 
once these are interpreted in the context of Turkish politics.  One interpretation of these 
results is that Erdogan responds to a different environment at home in Turkey and outside 
the country as he discusses foreign policy issues.  This argument can indeed be supported 
by Erdogan’s political background and the institutional and historical dynamics of 
Turkey.  In addition, Erdogan’s approach to foreign policy would explain the differences 
in his two profiles.   
 
As argued earlier, traditionally, among other actors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Turkish military have enjoyed significant power in Turkish foreign policy.  This 
institutional structure, civilian and military, successfully excluded the political traditions 
that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party represented.  If this is to be 
interpreted a “secular” versus “Islamist” clash (Kesgin 2009), then the Ministry and 
Turkish military were the bulwarks of secularism in Turkish foreign policy and Erdogan 
has been an “Islamist” threat.  Indeed, this concern with the Justice and Development 
Party governments and its leaders that they are facing Turkey eastwards (meaning 
integrating “Islamism” into its foreign policy) has existed since November 2002.  This 
argument, to many, found support in Turkey’s political history.  Given Erdogan’s and 
many of the JDP leaderships’ political backgrounds, there has been a suspicion about 
their true intentions in power.  Erdogan and his governments, often perceived as more 
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conservative than his associate Gul who preceded him as prime minister, functioned in 
this domestic political context.  These have certainly had implications for Erdogan’s 
administration of his foreign policy agenda.  Hence, the leadership traits scores for 
Erdogan’s home and away interviews are reflections of this context.  His higher Self–
Confidence score in interviews with foreign media indicates that Erdogan is more 
confident away than home.3  One can read this such that as the chief executive of Turkey, 
Erdogan feels more in control of foreign policy agenda and is more assertive in his 
interviews away.  Possibly Erdogan is rather defensive, or somewhat restrained at home, 
and hence is careful about his foreign policy discourse.  Given his personal and political 
background (likewise the political movement he is affiliated with), he may have felt 
limited rather than free at home.   
 
While at home, Erdogan may be attempting to appear that he himself and his government 
are not in clash with other main actors in Turkey’s foreign policy establishment (i.e., the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy and the military) and have a working 
relationship with them.  Abroad, Erdogan possibly is trying to convey a message that 
emphasizes Turkey’s importance in the world and his government’s active agenda in 
world affairs (such as mediating between Israel and Syria, the United Nations’ Alliance 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 One might expect that this would be supported by a higher Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) 
scores away than home.  However, Erdogan’s average BACE score at home is higher than his away score 
and there is also no statistical significance between the two.  One possible explanation is that Erdogan 
thinks that there are systemic constraints on Turkey’s foreign policy and hence does not believe in his 
abilities to control events despite his willingness to do so.  At home, nonetheless, Erdogan has a strong 
electoral mandate and on this translates into a higher BACE score. 
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of Civilizations project, and reaching out to Iran).  This relates with the broader foreign 
policy understanding of Erdogan and his government, which may account for the 
difference in his Self–Confidence scores.  Eventually, this feeds a “can–do” mentality, 
which is a latent but very much central principle behind the recent activism in 
contemporary Turkish foreign policy. 
 
Turkey’s foreign policy under Erdogan is based on Davutoglu’s (2001) principal concept 
of strategic depth.  According to the strategic depth doctrine, due its historical depth of 
the Ottoman Empire’s legacy contemporary Turkey finds itself in a geographical depth.4  
The latter is then part of historical depth, but translates into many geographical influences 
(in Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Mediterranean) 
where the former Ottoman Empire ruled.  Davutoglu’s (2001) book Stratejik Derinlik 
(“Strategic Depth”) guides Turkey’s foreign policy with such principles as ‘zero 
problems with neighbors’ (Davutoglu 2010)–––for a review see Murinson (2006), also 
see Davutoglu (2008).  In a way, at a time of transition in the post–Cold war era where 
Huntington (1993) in his Clash of Civilizations found a “torn country” in Turkey, for its 
Ottoman past and ethnic as well as religious ties Davutoglu (2001) sees immense 
opportunities to materialize.  Hence, the strategic depth doctrine prescribes an active 
involvement in Turkey’s potential spheres of influence and assumes eventually its 
becoming of a global actor.  Erdogan’s approach to foreign policy then reflects this 
doctrine and pushes him to be more assertive; hence, Erdogan is possibly doing his best 
to look like he is in control by exhibiting a self–confident leader.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Murinson (2006) traces this approach to Ozal’s presidency and his foreign policy perspective. 
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As such, one ramification of this approach to foreign policy is that, aware of the utility of 
Turkey for the West as a dominantly Muslim, secular, democratic society, Erdogan is 
motivated to make the most of this opportunity.  Erdogan’s talk about ‘marketing Turkey’ 
corresponds to his understanding of how Turkish foreign policy should be formulated.  
This “marketing” approach also matches with Erdogan often being portrayed as a 
pragmatic leader.  In an interview with the Arabic language Al Jazeera network 
(November 16, 2005 on “Without Borders”), in response to a question about how there 
are accusations that the Turkish government is “selling Turkey to Western, Arab, and 
Israeli investors,” Erdogan says: “I am not selling, I am promoting. These people know 
nothing about the issue and do not know the meaning of marketing or promotion. We tell 
them: Learn and study management. Politics, social life, and economy are marketed and 
you have to do this.” 
 
While Erdogan’s mean scores for his Self–Confidence (SC) trait at home and away are 
only marginally significant, his Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Task–Focus (TASK) 
scores at home and away exhibit strong statistical significance.  As such, Erdogan is more 
conceptually complex and more task–focused at home than away.  The CC scores suggest 
that Erdogan is more likely to approach other people, places, policies, or ideas, etc. from 
multiple perspectives when he is discussing foreign policy issues in Turkey; likewise, 
that Erdogan has a more dichotomous, ‘black–and–white’ view of the world when 
abroad.  His TASK scores, on the other hand, indicate that in Turkey Erdogan is 
motivated about problem solving but away he is rather concerned about building 
!
!
168 
relationships.  Together these are telling of Erdogan’s behavior in the international arena.  
For instance, his high TASK score at home signals that Erdogan is making attempts to 
ascertain a working relationship with the institutions of the Turkish state–––consistent 
with the argument made earlier.5  Erdogan’s lower TASK score in his interviews abroad 
explains his attempts to establish personal relationships with such leaders as Italy’s prime 
minister Berlusconi, Greece’s Karamanlis, or Spain’s Aznar.  Erdogan often referred to 
these leaders as “my friends.”  Moreover, he even invited and hosted Berlusconi and 
Karamanlis to his son’s wedding.  Hence, relationships are possibly offering an 
explanation to Erdogan’s behavior at Davos.  In that infamous example, Erdogan’s 
affiliation with the Palestinians was causing his outburst.  However, this relationship 
focus is not necessarily only oriented towards the Muslim societies as Berlusconi, 
Karamanlis, Aznar examples suggest otherwise. 
 
Erdogan’s profiles at home and away can be more meaningful when they are interpreted 
against a norming group.  Here, I first compared Erdogan’s two profiles against each 
other.  This test suggests some statistical support to the argument made here.  Then, I also 
assess his two profiles and his general profile according to an average profile of Turkish 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Since November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments under Gul and Erdogan 
clashed, as much as they cooperated, with these institutions on both domestic and foreign policy issues.  
The JDP governments did not hesitate to take initiative and introduce major policy changes, for instance 
regarding Turkey’s Cyprus policy.  Even then, one would argue that on foreign policy issues the JDP 
governments were attempting to coordinate with the country’s foreign policy establishment; clashes 
between the two actors have been more serious on domestic issues (such as the election of Gul to the 
presidency). 
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prime ministers (Table 3) and interpret them based on Hermann’s leadership style as a 
function of responsiveness to constraints, openness to information and motivation (see 
Appendix; for a detailed discussion, see Hermann 2003).  This comparison helps situate 
Erdogan with his predecessors.  Erdogan’s general and at home profiles suggest that he 
has an actively independent leadership style.  Outside Turkey, this is more likely to 
become a directive leadership style.  The difference primarily lies in the huge discrepancy 
between Erdogan’s TASK scores at home and away.  Erdogan’s Task Focus score in his 
interviews to foreign media is significantly over Gul’s .722, which is the highest among 
other Turkish prime ministers in the post–Cold war era.   
 
Because Erdogan “challenges constraints” and then is “open to information,” Erdogan 
would alternate between actively independent and directive leadership styles (Hermann 
2003).  As argued above, Erdogan is more likely to assume the latter when he is 
discussing foreign policy away but can also alternate to the former leadership style 
depending on the circumstances.  Overall, Turkey’s Erdogan indeed has a leadership style 
that focuses on increasing maneuverability and independence (which also derives from 
the strategic depth doctrine discussed earlier).6  Erdogan’s behavior and style away from 
home such as the Davos incident, on the other hand, corresponds to a directive leadership 
style, where he attempts to maintain and improve status and acceptance by others by 
engaging in actions on the world stage that enhances the state’s reputation.  In the end, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The same conclusion was reached from Erdogan’s profile in the larger study. 
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Hermann’s method holds very well as to assessing leadership style of yet another 
political leader. 
 
 
Table 6.2 Erdogan’s General LTA Profile 
 Erdogan’s 
average profile  
 
N=53 
Average profile 
of Turkey’s 
prime ministers 
since 1991 
Belief can 
control events 
.386 Mean = .351 
Low < .319 
High > .383 
Conceptual 
complexity 
.601 Mean = .564 
Low < .527 
High > .601 
Distrust of 
others 
.101 Mean = .138 
Low < .097 
High > .179 
In–group bias .104 Mean = .142 
Low < .114 
High > .170 
Need for power .231 Mean = .287 
Low < .243 
High > .331 
Self confidence .370 Mean = .400 
Low < .320 
High > .480 
Task focus .661 Mean = .637 
Low < .572 
High > .702 
 
 
Table 6.2 presents Erdogan’s general profile in comparison to other post–Cold War 
Turkish prime ministers.  Erdogan’s scores at home are higher than his average profile 
scores and these are in turn higher than his scores away (Home > Average > Away), in all 
traits but Self–Confidence; his SC scores come up with the exact opposite relationship 
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(Away > Average > Home).  More specifically, the overall relationship implies that while 
Erdogan always falls into the “challenges constraints” category as to his responsiveness 
to constraints, the behavioral assumptions of this category should be stronger given his 
Need for Power and Belief in Ability to Control Events.  Likewise, the same holds for 
Erdogan’s openness to information (Self–Confidence and Conceptual Complexity scores) 
and motivation (Task Focus scores).  The reverse relationship in the SC trait by itself 
does not lead to any changes in assessing Erdogan’s leadership styles, but must be 
interpreted along the lines that were discussed earlier.   
 
Overall, Erdogan’s past experiences and domestic political setting may be affecting his 
foreign policy discourse in his interviews at home and away.  The question, then, is to 
explain Erdogan’s behavior in Davos or in Copenhagen.  An oft–made reference is that 
Erdogan acts emotionally or in an uncalculated manner on some occasions.  There is 
some merit to these arguments.  Indeed, Erdogan feels an emotional connection with the 
Palestinians and thinks that Europeans are not assisting Turkey’s fight against terrorism 
as much as they could.  These feelings are motivating such reactions like in Davos and in 
Copenhagen.  Leadership Traits Analysis of Erdogan’s interviews on foreign policy 
issues explains his behavior. 
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Discussion 
 
 
The two profiles of Turkey’s prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at home and away as 
measures of the audience factor are possibly not exclusive to him.  Hermann (and others) 
is right to speculate that contextual factors affect political leaders.  However, contrary to 
Hermann’s argument that the leaders of the “Third world” are more prone to exhibit 
changes in leadership style due to systemic constraints, I posit that any leader can assume 
a different leadership style over a multiplicity of concerns.  In Erdogan’s case, the 
domestic political setting may constrain him at home but he can assume a much different 
style abroad.  The constraints that exist within the Turkish context, though, may take 
other forms in other countries.  Institutions such as the legislative or public opinion may 
force leadership to attend to them in foreign policy matters.  Much like Erdogan, then the 
leader may assume a more “liberal” discourse abroad, free from such constraints that 
might exist at home.  For instance, the current U.S. administration’s policies such as an 
attempt to reach out the Islamic world or withdrawal from Iraq have been controversial at 
home but more appealing on an international scale.  It is possible that there were 
differences between Obama’s foreign policy take on such issues at home and away.  In a 
similar vein, when an Israeli leader talks about sacrifices for the peace process, he or she 
may prefer a different discourse to domestic and foreign audiences where the appeal as 
well as the criticism would be different.  Alternatively, a reverse relationship would mean 
leaders may have to “sell” certain international constraints to their domestic audiences 
and again take on a different discourse and leadership styles.   
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The present Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has put his mark on Turkey’s 
foreign policy since coming to power in November 2002.  Erdogan led Turkey in the 
aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war, openly collided with Israel over its Palestine policy, and 
recently sided with Brazil against the rest of the United Nations Security Council as more 
sanctions are placed on Iran.  Erdogan’s leadership style sheds a light on foreign policy 
behavior of Turkey.  Broadly speaking, an at–a–distant analysis of the interviews 
Erdogan gave in Turkey and abroad also suggests that leaders can alter their style 
depending on their primary audience.  Arguably, the variability of personality traits can 
be a personality trait itself.  More research is needed to assess the validity of such an 
argument, though.  The literatures discussed here provide the theoretical as well as 
empirical background to such an inquiry; the findings from Turkey’s prime minister 
Erdogan’s foreign policy interviews at home and away confirm that this would be a 
fruitful line of research and contribute to our understanding of political leaders and their 
leadership styles. 
 
Leaders would most likely differ to what degree they would be influenced by contextual 
factors and to the degree that those would affect policy.  Yet, among those factors is the 
audience, and it has been neglected this far.  Further investigations are necessary to 
explore this argument for other leaders than Turkey’s Erdogan.  This study illustrates that 
it is a worthy venue of research.  Audiences can be receptive, hostile, or neutral and 
leaders try to convince audiences to their policies and agendas.  This, in turn, may require 
different language and tactics to appeal to these audiences; hence, leaders may indeed 
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take on different leadership styles depending on their audience.  Moreover, it is worth 
reiterating that, as this chapter illustrates, beyond international constraints, domestic 
political circumstances affect leaders’ style on foreign policy matters. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
 
This dissertation aimed at meeting two goals: (1) linking personality variables with large-
N datasets, and (2) expanding the extant at–a–distance literatures of Leadership Traits 
Analysis and Operational Code Analysis to non–Western contexts.  To serve the purposes 
of the research design, I used Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) Levant and Turkey 
datasets, which are the most developed data available.  Since Israel and Turkey are the 
only states with free and fair elections in the KEDS datasets, these two countries become 
the focus of this research.  Next, I collected data (i.e., spontaneous foreign policy 
statements) for personality assessment of Israel’s and Turkey’s prime ministers in the 
post–Cold War era.  The result was a large, unique compilation of words–as–data for 
Israel’s and Turkey’s prime ministers since 1991.  For a total of seven prime ministers in 
each country, I created a comprehensive archive of spontaneous foreign statements that 
produced reliable profiles of the individual leaders’ as well as a general profile of a prime 
minister for both countries.  Once I presented these profiles, I discussed the results of 
statistical tests where I linked events data with personality variables.   
 
In this final chapter, first, I re–visit the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 3, review the 
results from both Israel and Turkey, and then discuss the empirical and theoretical 
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implications of this particular study broadly speaking, and for understanding Israel’s and 
Turkey’s political leadership and foreign policy behavior.  Finally, I conclude with 
suggestions for future research in similar vein.   
 
 
Hypotheses  
 
The results of the OLS tests would suggest cautiousness to argue for direct and 
significant implications of personality variables for explaining foreign policy behavior.  
In the meantime, the leadership style and operational code profiles of the post-Cold War 
prime ministers of Israel and Turkey fit well with the general perceptions of their foreign 
policy preferences.  For instance, among others, leadership styles of Israel’s Shamir and 
Turkey’s Erbakan explain how the former dragged his foot in negotiations with the 
Palestinians and the latter was motivated to enlist other Muslim nations to his mission 
against the West.  These notwithstanding, it is difficult to claim a conclusive statement 
about the strengths of Leadership Traits Analysis (Hypothesis 1a) and Operational Code 
Analysis (Hypothesis 1b) to explain foreign policy behavior as measured in events data.   
 
Other hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3 predicted certain relationship between the 
personality variables and foreign policy behavior, and between the personality variables 
themselves.  Table 7.1 and 7.2 display correlations between LTA variables and the four 
types of foreign policy behavior for Israel and Turkey, respectively.  In the case of Israel, 
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correlation results, as well as OLS results (Table 4.3 in Chapter 4), suggest that Distrust 
of Others (DIS) is indeed a powerful indicator of conflictual behavior, verbal and 
material.  While this level of significance can not be found in the tests with Turkey data, 
there is again at a least a marginally significant result in the OLS test which indicates that 
higher levels of Distrust of Others increase the number of material conflictual behavior 
(Table 5.3 in Chapter 5).  Hence, it is plausible to argue that results from the analyses 
here support that indeed the Distrust of Others variable positively correlates with 
conflictual behavior (Hypothesis 2a).   
 
 
Table 7.1 Correlations between LTA Variables and Foreign Policy Behavior: Israel 
 verbcoop matcoop verbconf matconf 
BACE .074 .089 .137 * .171 * 
CC -.002 .042 -.120 -.164 * 
DIS .012 .115 .289 ** .198 ** 
IGB .019 -.021 .002 -.011 
PWR -.037 -.036 .035 .100 
SC -.090 -.057 -.022 -.021 
TASK -.009 .018 .028 -.089 
** Significant at the .01 level. 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
Table 7.2 Correlations between LTA Variables and Foreign Policy Behavior: Turkey 
 verbcoop matcoop verbconf matconf 
BACE -.040 -.089 -.056 -.057 
CC -.027 -.051 -.094 .007 
DIS -.014 -.037 .047 .089 
IGB -.039 .049 -.032 -.060 
PWR -.113 -.023 .020 -.130 
SC .134 .147 * .110 .023 
TASK .140* .039 .137 * .083 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
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As to the other hypotheses, we do not find any such support in any of the statistical tests. 
it cannot be concluded that the Need for Power (PWR) positively correlates with 
conflictual behavior (Hypothesis 2b).1  Hence, Hypothesis 2b is not confirmed.  Likewise, 
there is no support for an expected positive correlation between P–1 (nature of the 
political universe) index and cooperative behavior (Hypothesis 3).  Finally, 
notwithstanding their similar theoretical constructs, there is no indication that Belief in 
Ability to Control Events (BACE) and P–4a (belief in ability to control historical 
development) index, as predicted by Hypothesis 4.  Thus, Hypothesis 4 cannot be 
confirmed either. 
 
 
Re-Interpreting the Results: Israel and Turkey 
 
Spontaneous foreign policy statements collected for Israel’s and Turkey’s post–Cold War 
prime ministers produced what would be broadly accepted profiles of seven political 
leaders from each country.  As such, these are significant contributions to explaining 
political leadership in both countries.  They also add to the leadership traits analysis 
(LTA) and operational code analysis literatures in terms of expanding their coverage.  
Notwithstanding these, the results of statistical tests seem to be somewhat disappointing.  
The most notable outcome of the regression tests was that an LTA variable, that is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This is a somewhat surprising result, since further correlation tests suggest that there is strong 
correlation between Distrust of Others (DIS) and Need for Power (PWR) variables.   
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Distrust of Others (DIS), emerged significant in explaining material conflict events in 
tests with both Israel and Turkey data.  What can be concluded from these results? 
 
The data in this study were aggregated at a monthly basis.  It is possible that lower–levels 
of aggregation may serve better in future research with the same motivation to match 
behavior with personality variables.  This may be particularly useful in explaining the 
relationship between the two at rather short periods of time such as during a particular 
crisis than about the two decades examined here.  Hence, it would go against the logic of 
covering an extended period of time and accounting for multiple political leaders, but it is 
possible that such a research design may produce stronger statistical relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables.  For instance, with the data collected 
here for Israel and Turkey, one can look at one particular time as political leadership 
deals with a specific crisis in foreign (or security) policy matters.  Israel and Turkey can 
provide one with multiple possible cases; the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and international 
negotiations between the two parties, or Turkey’s relationship with the European Union 
since the 1990s would make good candidates for such research. 
 
This dissertation did not aim for conducting such studies or other cases of foreign policy 
decision making.  It is, however, most definite that those would shed more light on the 
quantitative results presented here.  Moreover, such work could potentially make 
contributions to theoretical ground in at–a–distance study of political leadership and in 
broader literature.  Ongoing and future research emanating from the data collected for 
this dissertation aim at those goals.  For instance, in Chapter 6, I explore the idea that 
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political leaders take their audiences into consideration in their foreign policy statements, 
and they can assume rather different leadership styles addressing domestic and 
international audiences.2  In another study, I ask if the publicly perceived worldviews of 
political leaders about the role of religion in politics can indeed make any difference in 
terms of their foreign policy orientations.3   
 
Finally, in both Israel and Turkey, there are political leaders who democratically left their 
seats but were elected to make a come–back (Netanyahu and Yilmaz, respectively).  
These two cases can provide the background to study what leaders learn in such cases.  In 
both Israel and Turkey, many individuals already profiled here as prime ministers have 
held different offices in government.  For instance, in Turkey, Abdullah Gul was Prime 
Minister (November 2002-March 2003), Minister of Foreign Affairs (March 2003-
August 2007), and has been the President since.  How does Gul’s leadership style differ 
in these various positions he served?  Those would make a good reason to re–visit the 
argument “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Allison 1969) and can motivate 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This chapter looks at Turkey’s prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and assesses his two 
profiles in interviews he gave to the domestic and foreign press (for an article length version, see 
Kesgin 2010).  Findings suggest that Erdogan has two leadership styles at home in Turkey and 
away.  
 
3 Motivated by the oft-made references to “secular” and “religious” leadership in Turkey and their 
foreign policy preferences, this paper compares leadership traits and styles, as well as operational 
codes, of Bulent Ecevit with Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Kesgin 2009).  This paper does not find 
many differences between Ecevit and Erdogan.  
 
!
!
181 
similar studies in other cases. For instance, how does former U.S. vice president Cheney 
differ from the Secretary of Defense Cheney?  Does ‘where you sit is what you think’ 
translate into leadership styles or belief systems?  
 
Case studies have proven fruitful to this line of research (for instance, Dyson 2006). After 
all, neither this study nor the political leadership literature is based on the assumption that 
individual level variables will explain it all.  Instead, the argument is that individuals 
constitute the heart of international politics (Hudson 2005).  This recognizes the multiple 
other actors and various limitations that function along with the individual and limit him 
or her.  In the cases of Israel and Turkey, there are coalition governments, other 
influential actors such as the public or the military, systemic restraints of economic and 
security reliance on “great powers,” and cultural, ethnic or religious ties that affect and 
limit the individual leadership.  The findings here suggest that leaders, their leadership 
styles and beliefs make a difference in foreign policy behavior of both Israel and Turkey–
––while those factors mentioned above are held constant.  Further research with the data 
used for analyses in this dissertation and case studies can shed more light on their effect 
in particular contexts.  Next, I elaborate on the empirical and theoretical implications of 
this dissertation to the many literatures that it is related with and then discuss potential 
directions for future research as I conclude this final chapter. 
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Empirical and Theoretical Implications 
 
It is necessary to review the implications of this dissertation to multiple research areas it 
builds upon and is related to: (a) Leadership Traits and Operational Code in particular, as 
well as the political leadership literature in broad terms, (b) Israel and Turkey, as well as 
the Middle East broadly speaking, (c) foreign policy analysis, and finally (d) international 
relations.  In this section, I also compare the Israeli and Turkish prime ministers to 
average scores of world leaders. 
 
Differences in leadership styles of prime ministers are not inconsequential and these can 
affect foreign policies in parliamentary systems (Kaarbo 1997).  Here, conclusions from 
Israel’s and Turkey’s post-Cold War prime ministers indeed confirm this claim.  In 
particular, it is significant for the LTA literature and broadly for political leadership 
research that Distrust of Other (DIS) comes up as a crucial variable in the analyses here.  
Findings in this dissertation suggest that Distrust of Others is an important variable to 
explain conflictual behavior propensities of political leaders.   
 
Notwithstanding those conclusions, this variable has not received much attention. If the 
goal of understanding the role of prime ministers in specific and of political leadership 
broadly speaking is to “ascertain which individual characteristics are important when 
individual characteristics matter” (Kaarbo 1997: 560), then this dissertation provides 
some answers for that purpose.  As such, we need to understand the impact of Distrust of 
Others on political leaders’ decision making.  Likewise, I argue that another LTA 
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variable Task Focus (TASK) should be examined carefully.  This trait is significant in the 
Turkey data; elsewhere, I find that Task Focus can offer meaningful information about 
foreign policy orientations of political leaders (Kesgin 2010).  The question “Is the leader 
focused more on relationships or problem-solving?” indeed has important significance for 
foreign policy.   
 
Due to the insignificance of results in statistical tests, I do not discuss the operational 
code indices here.  However, the master indices P-1 and I-1, and the I-4a and I-4b indices 
in particular, deserve some further attention.  In the following pages, I briefly review the 
operational codes indices of Israel’s and Turkey’s prime ministers in comparison to a 
norming group of world leaders.  First, the same comparison with the leadership traits 
scores is in order. 
 
Table 7.3 compares average Israeli and Turkish prime minister profiles to a general 
profile of a ‘world leader.’  Compared to Dyson’s (2006) average profile of 51 political 
leaders, noteworthy differences are that: an average profile of Israel’s prime minister has 
relatively high scores in Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) and Self–Confidence 
(SC), significantly higher values of Distrust of Others (DIS), In-group Bias (IGB), and 
Need for Power (PWR).  With the same norming group, an average profile of a Turkish 
leader also exhibits a relatively high scores in Distrust of Others (DIS), and a 
significantly high score in In-group Bias (IGB) and Need for Power (PWR).  Otherwise, 
Israeli and Turkish leaders’ leadership traits scores are close to those of the norming 
group.  While I report the Social Science Automation scores for 214 political leaders in 
!
!
184 
Table 7.3, I do not discuss them since their Distrust of Others (DIS) and In-group Bias 
(IGB) numbers appear to be skewed.   
 
 
Table 7.3 Leadership Traits Scores of Israel’s and Turkey’s Post-Cold War Prime 
Ministers in Perspective 
Leadership Trait Israel’s Prime 
Ministers 
Turkey’s 
Prime 
Ministers 
51 political 
leaders 
(Dyson 2006) 
214 political 
leaders 
(SSA) 
Belief can control 
events 
Mean = .377 
Low <  .339 
High > .414 
Mean = .351 
Low <  .319 
High > .383 
Mean = .35 
Low <  .31 
High > .39 
Mean = .34 
Low <  .30 
High > .38 
Conceptual complexity Mean = .555 
Low <  .511 
High > .599 
Mean = .564 
Low <  .527 
High > .601 
Mean = .57 
Low <  .53 
High > .61 
Mean = .65 
Low <  .61 
High > .69 
Distrust of others Mean = .167 
Low <  .119 
High > .215 
Mean = .138 
Low <  .097 
High > .179 
Mean = .12 
Low <  .08 
High > .16 
Mean = .01 
Low <  0 
High > 0 
In-group bias Mean = .137 
Low <  .110 
High > .164 
Mean = .142 
Low <  .114 
High > .170 
Mean = .09 
Low <  .07 
High > .11 
Mean = .51 
Low <  .44 
High > .58 
Need for power Mean = .267 
Low <  .248 
High > .285 
Mean = .287 
Low <  .243 
High > .331 
Mean = .24 
Low <  .21 
High > .27 
Mean = .26 
Low <  .22 
High > .30 
Self confidence Mean = .455 
Low <  .358 
High > .552 
Mean = .400 
Low <  .320 
High > .480 
Mean = .41 
Low <  .33 
High > .49 
Mean = .36 
Low <  .27 
High > .45 
Task focus Mean = .621 
Low <  .584 
High > .657 
Mean = .637 
Low <  .572 
High > .702 
Mean = .63 
Low <  .57 
High >  .69 
Mean = .73 
Low <  .67  
High > .79 
 
 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5, in similar fashion, report the operational code indices of average 
profiles of Israel’s and Turkey’s prime ministers in comparison to a norming of 168 
!
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world leaders.4  In comparison to this norming group, operational code profile of an 
Israeli prime minister has a relatively high index in P-1 (nature of the political universe), 
P-3 (predictability of political universe), P-4 (belief in ability to control historical 
development, I-1 (direction of strategy), and I-2 (intensity of tactics).  Israel’s prime 
ministers flexibility between cooperative and conflictural tactics (I-4a), and between 
word and deed tactics (I-4b) are relatively low than the world leader’s average indices.  In 
terms of utility of means indices (reported in Table 6.5), Israel’s prime ministers resort 
less to Reward (I-5a) and more to Promise (I-5b) and Appeal (I-5c) as cooperative means.  
As to the indices of conflictual means, Threaten (I-5e) is the most preferred and higher on 
average than that of the norming group; Oppose (I-5d) and Punish (I-5f) are lower than 
the average of the norming group. 
 
Operational code profile of a Turkish prime minister is relatively high in P-1 (nature of 
the political universe), P-2 (prospects for realization of political values), P-3 
(predictability of political universe), P-4 (belief in ability to control historical 
development, I-1 (direction of strategy), I-2 (intensity of tactics), and I-3 (risk 
orientation).  With the exception of P-4, all other indices for an average profile of 
Turkey’s prime minister are higher than those of the Israel’s prime minister.  Turkish 
prime minister’s flexibility between cooperative and conflictural tactics (I-4a), and 
between word and deed tactics (I-4b) are relatively low than the world leader’s average 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Mark Schafer, Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, provided the data.  
The Social Science Automation document does not report the means and standard deviations for 
all operational code indices; hence they are not included here. 
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indices; in addition, these are lower than those of the Israel’s prime minister.  In terms of 
utility of means indices (reported in Table 7.5), compared to the world leaders, Turkish 
prime minister has a tendency to use Reward (I-5a) and Appeal (I-5c) as cooperative 
means.  As to the indices of conflictual means, all indices are lower than the average of 
the norming group.    
!
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Table 7.4 Operational Code Indices of Israel’s and Turkey’s Post-Cold War Prime 
Ministers in Perspective 
 Israel’s 
Prime 
Ministers 
Turkey’s 
Prime 
Ministers 
Norming 
Group 
N=168 
P-1 Nature of the political universe Mean .333 
Low  .270 
High .396 
Mean .352 
Low  .312 
High .392 
Mean  .273 
Low  -.007 
High .553 
P-2 prospects for realization of political values  Mean .125 
Low  .073 
High .176 
Mean .150 
Low  .112 
High .188 
Mean .123 
Low  -.095 
High .342 
P-3 predictability of political universe Mean .157 
Low  .125 
High .190 
Mean .169 
Low  .134 
High .203 
Mean .125 
Low  .068 
High .182 
P-4 belief in ability to control historical development Mean .330 
Low  .285 
High .376 
Mean .306 
Low  .255 
High .358 
Mean .207 
Low  .092 
High .321 
P-5 role of chance Mean .947 
Low  .930 
High .963 
Mean .948 
Low  .927 
High .968 
Mean .974 
Low  .953 
High .995 
I-1 approach to goals (direction of strategy) Mean .466 
Low  .361 
High .571 
Mean .523 
Low  .482 
High .564 
Mean .346 
Low  .009 
High .682 
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics) Mean .183 
Low  .124 
High .241 
Mean .253 
Low  .214 
High .292 
Mean .139 
Low  -.089 
High .367 
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of tactics) Mean .278 
Low  .202 
High .353 
Mean .336 
Low  .276 
High .396 
Mean .272 
Low  .130 
High .415 
I-4 timing of action: flexibility of: 
   
I-4a cooperative/conflictual tactics Mean .510 
Low  .417 
High .603 
Mean .443 
Low  .403 
High .482 
Mean .599 
Low  .332 
High .866 
I-4b word/deed tactics Mean .419 
Low  .375 
High .462 
Mean .398 
Low  .330 
High .466 
Mean .492 
Low  .188 
High .796 
!
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Table 7.5 Operational Code Utility of Means Indices of Israel’s and Turkey’s Post-
Cold War Prime Ministers in Perspective 
 Israel’s 
Prime 
Ministers 
Turkey’s 
Prime 
Ministers 
Norming 
Group 
N=168 
I-5a. Reward Mean .127 
Low  .099 
High .155 
Mean .161 
Low  .117 
High .205 
Mean .145 
Low  .008 
High .282 
I-5b. Promise Mean .071 
Low  .057 
High .084 
Mean .060 
Low  .030 
High .091 
Mean .065 
Low  -.021 
High .150 
I-5c. Appeal Mean .535 
Low  .487 
High .584 
Mean .528 
Low  .428 
High .628 
Mean .463 
Low  .275 
High .651 
I-5d. Oppose Mean .116 
Low  .094 
High .139 
Mean .139 
Low  .125 
High .153 
Mean .166 
Low  .018 
High .316 
I-5e. Threaten Mean .060 
Low  .094 
High .086 
Mean .035 
Low  .022 
High .048 
Mean .038 
Low  -.035 
High .111 
I-5f. Punish Mean .091 
Low  .077 
High .105 
Mean .076 
Low  .035 
High .117 
Mean .123 
Low  -.022 
High .267 
 
 
Beyond these differences, this dissertation has implications for foreign policy analysis 
and international relations.  First of all, this study is yet another testimony to the 
significance of individuals in foreign policy and international politics.  Popular 
perceptions of “hawkish” vs. “dovish” or “secular” vs. “religious” leadership, as the 
findings here show, cannot necessarily explain how a political leader understands the 
world and approaches to various issues they deal with.  Such oft-made contrasts, 
moreover, do not reveal anything about individual styles of decision making.  In contrast, 
the methods utilized here lay out such differences among the post-Cold War prime 
minister of Israel and Turkey, which do not immediately cross along the lines of hawks 
!
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and doves in Israel or secular and religious leaders of Turkey.  As such, it is significant 
that this dissertation assesses the role of political leadership in foreign policies of two 
very important countries in the Middle East.   
 
This study traces the effect of prime ministers’ personality features on their countries 
foreign policy behavior; as such, I look for how leadership traits or belief systems are 
reflected onto foreign policy outputs.  However, arguably, the decision making process 
would be the primary mechanism for prime minister leadership style would shape foreign 
policy (Kaarbo 1997).5  Then, the statistical tests here seek the effects of leadership styles 
and belief systems on foreign policy outputs, where the least direct effects are expected.  
Prime ministers “can establish subcommitees or interministerial consultation groups, 
absent themselves from important meetings, make decisions on their own, allow issues to 
be placed on cabinet agendas, and block the moving of a decision from an inner cabinet 
to a full cabinet” (Kaarbo 1997: 554).  Hence, there is more to learn from the quantitative 
results presented here.  Since due to decisions prime ministers make, some ideas are 
added or excluded, alternatives and advisors are brought in or not, etc., prime ministers’ 
influence on foreign policy can be indirect and can best be traced to decision making 
processes.  According to Kaarbo’s proposed framework, these direct and indirect effects 
of leadership style variables can be traced either individually or in combination.  Both 
Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis techniques provide tools to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"!According to Kaarbo (1997: 572), “leadership style affects process the most, outcomes the 
second, and outputs the least.”   
!
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assess such differences among leaders.  I discuss those in the following section, where 
directions for future research are outlined. 
 
 
Directions for Future Research  
 
There are multiple conclusions to draw from this study.  First of all, this work stands as a 
first attempt to link large–N data and personality variables at a temporal domain of 
almost two decades.  As such, distinct from few studies that used this combination for a 
relatively short period of time (for instance Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), it covers 
an entirety of the post–Cold War era.  Since events data are already available for some 
other countries (or can be developed with relatively short time investment), there remains 
a future task to conduct similar research with them.6   
 
One of the challenges, in those cases, would be the collection of words–as–data for 
political leaders.  Particularly when the goal is collecting all the spontaneous foreign 
policy statements, it can be a demanding, if not impossible, task in some cases.  Where 
already translated statements are not available, it would add to the challenge; and where 
the leadership is authoritarian, they may not have made enough statements to start with.  
Moreover, as it was the case with some leaders studied here, language barrier can lead to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The Levant dataset in the Kansas Events Data System includes data for Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestine from 1979 to the present day.  The extant dictionaries would 
serve as a great starting point for coding more countries. 
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multiple problems.  Leaders who are not fluent in English may not engage with the 
international press at all.  When they do, the true revelations of their words in their native 
languages may be lost in translation.  Despite Hermann’s argument that translation 
effects appear to miniscule and ignorable, it must be noted that her statement is based on 
tests that were made in the late 1980s.  It is intriguing that similar tests have not been run 
since Hermann’s findings.   
 
In Chapter 2, I briefly reviewed the ongoing debate about using scripted and spontaneous 
statements and contradictory findings about their utility in at–a–distance assessment of 
political leadership.  I exclusively used spontaneous statements in this study, but different 
from previous works I collected all the spontaneous statements made by the leader.  This 
included more than the interviews a leader gave, and press conferences were also added 
to the data.  Despite the fact that a large number of data were collected, the exclusive use 
of spontaneous materials may still have limited the study.  While Renfro (2009) argued 
for using both in this line of research, this debate seems yet to be settled.  Future works 
that would compare the results from each, or in line with Renfro’s suggestion utilizing 
both, would contribute to the literature. 
 
The next generation of research in this area will most likely experiment with novel 
methods of analysis as well.  Such work may be utilizing regression analysis but in the 
meantime introducing other automated methods to analyze words–as–data.  One example 
is Schrodt, Hudson, and Cantir’s (2009) paper about Israel’s prime ministers and their 
conflict behavior.  The authors use a customized pattern recognition tool to analyze 
!
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sequences of political events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  As Schrodt, Hudson, and 
Cantir were motivated to do, these attempts may very well concentrate on meeting one of 
the central goals of the present inquiry: linking behavior with personality variables. 
 
Integrating, or benefiting from the strengths of, both LTA and operational code literatures 
is another likely venue of fruitful research as well.  As this dissertation illustrates, one 
can find unique insights from the both in assessing political leadership.  This analysis 
here is but one of the few attempts in utilizing findings from both techniques.  In 
addition, there is more to borrow from other similar lines of research––for instance, 
motives.   
 
Otherwise, one of the closest associations between Leadership Traits and Operational 
Code is their corresponding variables that measure an individual’s ability to control 
events, respectively “Belief in Ability to Control Events” (BACE) and “P-4 control over 
historical development.”  Much like Young and Shafer’s (2005), this study does not find 
a correlation between the two constructs either with data for Israel’s prime ministers or 
with Turkish prime ministers’ scores.  This is most likely the best avenue for further 
research into linking leadership traits and operational code methods together.  Given the 
similarity between the two measures, do “Belief in Ability to Control Events” and “P-4 
control over historical development capture the same thing?  If there are any differences 
between the two, what are the reasons for those?   
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This study adds but two more countries and their leadership to the literature; as I argued 
earlier, many others can be brought in.  As it was argued earlier, the operational code 
literature is much diverse in this regard and some recent works (particularly by Malici 
and his associates) profiled many non–Western leaders.  Notwithstanding Hermann’s 
own research, the Leadership Traits Analysis lacks similar diversity.  The challenge there 
would be geographically and culturally expanding the literature not merely for the sake of 
doing so, but also contributing to relevant theoretical debates.  Above I already suggested 
one about the source of material.  Furthermore, I outlined my ongoing and future research 
deriving from this dissertation, which are motivated to make such contributions.  It is 
foreseeable that similar research projects would find their own niche in theoretical 
debates of this literature.  As Young and Schafer (1998) argued, the study of human 
cognition in international relations still remains a young area.   
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Appendix: CAMEO Codelist (0.9b5) 
 
 
 
01: MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT 
010: Make statement, not specified below 
011: Decline comment 
012: Make pessimistic comment 
013: Make optimistic comment 
014: Consider policy option 
015: Acknowledge or claim responsibility 
016: Deny responsibility 
017: Engage in symbolic act 
018: Make empathetic comment 
019: Express accord 
 
02: APPEAL 
020: Make an appeal or request, not specified below 
021: Appeal for material cooperation, not specified below 
0211: Appeal for economic cooperation 
0212: Appeal for military cooperation 
0213: Appeal for judicial cooperation  
0214: Appeal for intelligence 
022: Appeal for diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support) 
023: Appeal for aid, not specified below 
0231: Appeal for economic aid 
0232: Appeal for military aid 
0233: Appeal for humanitarian aid 
0234: Appeal for military protection or peacekeeping 
024: Appeal for political reform, not specified below 
0241: Appeal for change in leadership 
0242: Appeal for policy change 
0243: Appeal for rights 
0244: Appeal for change in institutions, regime 
025: Appeal to yield, not specified below 
0251: Appeal for easing of administrative sanctions 
0252: Appeal for easing of political dissent 
0253: Appeal for release of persons or property 
0254: Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 
0255: Appeal for target to allow international involvement (non-mediation) 
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0256: Appeal for de-escalation of military engagement 
026: Appeal to others to meet or negotiate 
027: Appeal to others to settle dispute 
028: Appeal to engage in or accept mediation 
 
03: EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE 
030: Express intent to cooperate, not specified below 
031: Express intent to engage in material cooperation, not specified below 
0311: Express intent to cooperate economically 
0312: Express intent to cooperate militarily 
0313: Express intent to cooperate on judicial matters  
0314: Express intent to cooperate on intelligence 
032: Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support) 
033: Express intent to provide material aid, not specified below 
0331: Express intent to provide economic aid 
0332: Express intent to provide military aid 
0333: Express intent to provide humanitarian aid 
0334: Express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping 
034: Express intent to institute political reform, not specified below 
0341: Express intent to change leadership 
0342: Express intent to change policy 
0343: Express intent to provide rights 
0344: Express intent to change institutions, regime 
035: Express intent to yield, not specified below 
0351: Express intent to ease administrative sanctions 
0352: Express intent to ease popular dissent 
0353: Express intent to release persons or property 
0354: Express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 
0355: Express intent to allow international involvement (non-mediation) 
0356: Express intent to de-escalate military engagement  
036: Express intent to meet or negotiate 
037: Express intent to settle dispute 
038: Express intent to accept mediation 
039: Express intent to mediate 
 
04: CONSULT 
040: Consult, not specified below 
041: Discuss by telephone 
042: Make a visit 
043: Host a visit 
044: Meet at a “third” location 
045: Mediate 
046: Engage in negotiation 
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05: ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION 
050: Engage in diplomatic cooperation, not specified below 
051: Praise or endorse 
052: Defend verbally 
053: Rally support on behalf of 
054: Grant diplomatic recognition 
055: Apologize 
056: Forgive 
057: Sign formal agreement 
 
06: ENGAGE IN MATERIAL COOPERATION 
060: Engage in material cooperation, not specified below 
061: Cooperate economically 
062: Cooperate militarily 
063: Engage in judicial cooperation 
064: Share intelligence or information 
 
07: PROVIDE AID 
070: Provide aid, not specified below 
071: Provide economic aid 
072: Provide military aid 
073: Provide humanitarian aid 
074: Provide military protection or peacekeeping 
075: Grant asylum 
 
08: YIELD 
080: Yield, not specified below  
081: Ease administrative sanctions, not specified below 
0811: Ease restrictions on political freedoms 
0812: Ease ban on political parties or politicians 
0813: Ease curfew 
0814: Ease state of emergency or martial law 
082: Ease political dissent  
083: Accede to requests or demands for political reform, not specified below  
0831: Accede to demands for change in leadership 
0832: Accede to demands for change in policy 
0833: Accede to demands for rights 
0834: Accede to demands for change in institutions, regime 
084: Return, release, not specified below 
0841: Return, release person(s) 
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0842: Return, release property 
085: Ease economic sanctions, boycott, embargo 
086: Allow international involvement, not specified below 
0861: Receive deployment of peacekeepers 
0862: Receive inspectors 
0863: Allow humanitarian access 
087: De-escalate military engagement 
0871: Declare truce, ceasefire 
0872: Ease military blockade 
0873: Demobilize armed forces 
0874: Retreat or surrender militarily 
 
09: INVESTIGATE 
090: Investigate, not specified below 
091: Investigate crime, corruption 
092: Investigate human rights abuses 
093: Investigate military action 
094: Investigate war crimes 
 
10: DEMAND 
100: Demand, not specified below 
101: Demand material cooperation, not specified below 
1011: Demand economic cooperation 
1012: Demand military cooperation 
1013: Demand judicial cooperation  
1014: Demand intelligence cooperation 
102: Demand diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support) 
103: Demand material aid, not specified below 
1031: Demand economic aid 
1032: Demand military aid 
1033: Demand humanitarian aid 
1034: Demand military protection or peacekeeping 
104: Demand political reform, not specified below 
1041: Demand change in leadership 
1042: Demand policy change 
1043: Demand rights 
1044: Demand change in institutions, regime 
105: Demand that target yields, not specified below 
1051: Demand easing of administrative sanctions 
1052: Demand easing of political dissent 
1053: Demand release of persons or property 
1054: Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 
1055: Demand that target allows international involvement (non-mediation) 
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1056: Demand de-escalation of military engagement 
106: Demand meeting, negotiation 
107: Demand settling of dispute 
108: Demand mediation 
 
11: DISAPPROVE 
110: Disapprove, not specified below 
111: Criticize or denounce  
112: Accuse, not specified below 
1121: Accuse of crime, corruption 
1122: Accuse of human rights abuses 
1123: Accuse of aggression 
1124: Accuse of war crimes 
1125: Accuse of espionage, treason 
113: Rally opposition against 
114: Complain officially  
115: Bring lawsuit against  
116: Find guilty or liable (legally) 
 
12: REJECT 
120: Reject, not specified below 
121: Reject material cooperation 
 1211: Reject economic cooperation 
 1212: Reject military cooperation 
122: Reject request or demand for material aid, not specified below 
1221: Reject request for economic aid 
1222: Reject request for military aid 
1223: Reject request for humanitarian aid 
1224: Reject request for military protection or peacekeeping 
123: Reject request or demand for political reform, not specified below  
1231: Reject request for change in leadership 
1232: Reject request for policy change 
1233: Reject request for rights 
1234: Reject request for change in institutions, regime 
124: Refuse to yield, not specified below 
1241: Refuse to ease administrative sanctions 
1242: Refuse to ease popular dissent 
1243: Refuse to release persons or property 
1244: Refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 
1245: Refuse to allow international involvement (non mediation) 
1246: Refuse to de-escalate military engagement 
125: Reject proposal to meet, discuss, or negotiate 
126: Reject mediation 
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127: Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute 
128: Defy norms, law 
129: Veto 
 
13: THREATEN 
130: Threaten, not specified below 
131: Threaten non-force, not specified below 
1311: Threaten to reduce or stop aid 
1312: Threaten with sanctions, boycott, embargo 
1313: Threaten to reduce or break relations 
132: Threaten with administrative sanctions, not specified below 
1321: Threaten with restrictions on political freedoms 
1322: Threaten to ban political parties or politicians 
1323: Threaten to impose curfew 
1324: Threaten to impose state of emergency or martial law 
133: Threaten with political dissent, protest 
134: Threaten to halt negotiations 
135: Threaten to halt mediation 
136: Threaten to halt international involvement (non-mediation) 
137: Threaten with repression 
138: Threaten with military force, not specified below 
1381: Threaten blockade 
1382: Threaten occupation  
1383: Threaten unconventional violence  
1384: Threaten conventional attack   
1385: Threaten attack with WMD 
139: Give ultimatum 
 
14: PROTEST 
140: Engage in political dissent, not specified below 
141: Demonstrate or rally, not specified below 
1411: Demonstrate for leadership change 
1412: Demonstrate for policy change 
1413: Demonstrate for rights 
1414: Demonstrate for change in institutions, regime 
142: Conduct hunger strike, not specified below 
1421: Conduct hunger strike for leadership change 
1422: Conduct hunger strike for policy change 
1423: Conduct hunger strike for rights 
1424: Conduct hunger strike for change in institutions, regime 
143: Conduct strike or boycott, not specified below 
1431: Conduct strike or boycott for leadership change 
1432: Conduct strike or boycott for policy change 
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1433: Conduct strike or boycott for rights 
1434: Conduct strike or boycott for change in institutions, regime 
144: Obstruct passage, block, not specified below 
1441: Obstruct passage to demand leadership change    
1442: Obstruct passage to demand policy change 
1443: Obstruct passage to demand rights 
1444: Obstruct passage to demand change in institutions, regime 
145: Protest violently, riot, not specified below 
1451: Engage in violent protest for leadership change  
1452: Engage in violent protest for policy change 
1453: Engage in violent protest for rights 
1454: Engage in violent protest for change in institutions, regime 
 
15: EXHIBIT FORCE POSTURE 
150: Demonstrate military or police power, not specified below 
151: Increase police alert status 
152: Increase military alert status 
153: Mobilize or increase police power 
154: Mobilize or increase armed forces  
 
16: REDUCE RELATIONS 
160: Reduce relations, not specified below 
161: Reduce or break diplomatic relations 
162: Reduce or stop material aid, not specified below 
1621: Reduce or stop economic assistance 
1622: Reduce or stop military assistance 
1623: Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance 
163: Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions 
164: Halt negotiations 
165: Halt mediation 
166: Expel or withdraw, not specified below 
1661: Expel or withdraw peacekeepers 
1662: Expel or withdraw inspectors, observers 
1663: Expel or withdraw aid agencies 
 
17: COERCE 
170: Coerce, not specified below  
171: Seize or damage property, not specified below 
1711: Confiscate property 
1712: Destroy property 
172: Impose administrative sanctions, not specified below 
1721: Impose restrictions on political freedoms 
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1722: Ban political parties or politicians 
1723: Impose curfew 
1724: Impose state of emergency or martial law 
173: Arrest, detain, or charge with legal action  
174: Expel or deport individuals 
175: Use tactics of repression   
 
18: ASSAULT 
180: Use unconventional violence, not specified below 
181: Abduct, hijack, or take hostage  
182: Physically assault, not specified below 
1821: Sexually assault 
1822: Torture 
1823: Kill by physical assault 
183: Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing, not specified below 
1831: Carry out suicide bombing 
1832: Carry out car bombing 
1833: Carry out roadside bombing 
1834: Carry out location bombing  
184: Use as human shield  
185: Attempt to assassinate 
186: Assassinate  
 
19: FIGHT 
190: Use conventional military force, not specified below 
191: Impose blockade, restrict movement  
192: Occupy territory 
193: Fight with small arms and light weapons 
194: Fight with artillery and tanks 
195: Employ aerial weapons 
1951: Employ precision-guided aerial munitions  
1952: Employ remotely piloted aerial munitions 
196: Violate ceasefire  
 
20: USE UNCONVENTIONAL MASS VIOLENCE 
200: Use unconventional mass violence, not specified below 
201: Engage in mass expulsion 
202: Engage in mass killings 
203: Engage in ethnic cleansing 
204: Use weapons of mass destruction, not specified below 
2041: Use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons 
2042: Detonate nuclear weapons 
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Appendix: Word Counts 
 
 
 
 
Prime Minister Total Word Count Months Average Word 
Count, monthly 
Shamir 9298 9 1162 
Rabin 129464 40 3237 
Peres 18011 7 2573 
Netanyahu 203126 46 4416 
Barak 71809 20 3590 
Sharon 104678 58 1805 
Olmert 58726 39 1506 
All 595112 218 2730 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prime Minister Total Word Count Months Average Word 
Count, monthly 
Demirel 19357  19 1019 
Ciller 27402  32 856 
Yilmaz 18162  22 826 
Erbakan 10147  12 846 
Ecevit 34843  46 757 
Gul  6799 4 1700 
Erdogan 100482 82 1225 
All 217961 218 1000 
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Appendix Table 1: Turkey, Events and LTA with controls 
 
Signif. codes:    0  ‘***’ 0.001  ‘**’ 0.01  ‘*’ 0.05  ‘.’ 0.1   ‘ ’ 1 
 
 verbcoop matcoop verbconf matconf 
Belief in 
Ability to 
Control Events 
(BACE) 
-8.5249 * 
(16.2661) 
-3.7391 
(3.2607) 
-4.8113 
(6.0870) 
-8.6208 
(5.6378) 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
(CC) 
-23.5668 
(19.8118) 
-6.9621 . 
(3.9589) 
-2.7463 
(7.6871) 
-5.2860 
(6.8592) 
Distrust of 
Others  
(DIS) 
33.9008 . 
(18.6473) 
6.7268 . 
(3.7476) 
14.3356 * 
(6.9304) 
16.5001 * 
(6.4931) 
In-group Bias 
(IGB) 
11.2475 
(19.2755) 
-1.3471 
(3.8653) 
7.4427 
(7.1955) 
11.1202 
(6.7321) 
Need for Power 
(PWR) 
-31.6125 . 
(18.8104) 
-1.2324 
(3.8035) 
-6.0541 
(7.0851) 
-13.8242 * 
(6.6387) 
Self-
Confidence 
(SC) 
2.3046 
(8.4646) 
.8209 
(1.6844) 
.3094 
(3.1631) 
2.570 
(2.9676) 
Task Focus 
(TASK) 
-4.6016 
(15.1924) 
-1.8642 
(2.9524) 
.0609 
(5.4934) 
.5833 
(5.1106) 
Inflation -.6647 
(.822) 
-.0042 
(.1633) 
-.4382 
(.3021) 
-.3067 
(.2913) 
Public Opinion .4722 
(.5464) 
.1177 
(.1093) 
.0534 
(.2021) 
-.3439 . 
(.1898) 
Reciprocity .413 ** 
(.1196) 
.1794 
(.1427) 
.0932 
(.0839) 
.2359 * 
.1066 
cons 34.3326 
(2.134) 
7.3422 * 
(3.2417) 
9.7341 
(6.2422) 
16.022 ** 
(5.5863) 
N 
R-square 
adj. R-square 
Prob 
RMSE 
201 
0.2822 
0.1585 
0.02486 
13.53 
201 
0.1472 
0.0001 
0.4534 
2.73 
201 
0.1284 
-0.0218 
0.8546 
5.053 
201 
0.25 
0.1207 
0.05856 
4.736 
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Appendix Table 2: Turkey,  Events and Operational Code with controls 
 
 verbcoop matcoop verbconf matconf 
P-1 nature of the political 
universe 
46.7287 
(29.2294) 
.0325 
(6.4203) 
4.925e+00 
(1.067e+01) 
-3.0402 
(11.5391) 
P-2 prospects for realization of 
political values  
-58.3154 
(41.0901) 
1.6656 
(9.0252) 
-8.388e+00 
(1.494e+01) 
5.9308 
(16.0937) 
P-3 predictability of political 
universe 
-224.1104 * 
(88.2534) 
-35.1190 . 
(19.0942) 
-4.789e+01 
(3.244e+01) 
-26.8914 
(35.1472) 
P-4 belief in ability to control 
historical development 
-81.9114 
(49.8741)  
-22.4228 * 
(10.8418) 
-3.222e+01 . 
(1.832e+01) 
-16.3027 
(19.7749) 
P-5 role of chance -464.9538 . 
(238.0802)  
-113.755 * 
(51.9051) 
-1.401e+02 
(8.727e+01) 
-46.3086 
(94.3716) 
I-1 approach to goals (direction 
of strategy) 
66.763 . 
(36.5402) 
2.053 
(7.9991) 
-1.661e+01 
(1.332e+01) 
-.6134 
(14.335) 
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of 
tactics) 
-57.4484 
(34.4898) 
-.1519 
(7.5676) 
1.631e+00 
(1.268e+01) 
-1.7966 
(13.6262) 
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of 
tactics) 
-57.9889 . 
(30.8416) 
-8.5479 
(6.8218) 
-1.642e+01 
(1.105e+01) 
-20.2123 . 
(11.8993) 
I-4 timing of action: flexibility 
of: 
    
I-4a cooperative/conflictual 
tactics 
-18.5394 
(25.2928) 
-2.5214 
(5.5073) 
-2.434e+01 * 
(9.337e+00) 
-11.0417 
(9.9406) 
I-4b word/deed tactics -4.3316 
(15.6183) 
-.8577 
(3.3936) 
-4.413e+00 
(5.576e+00) 
-1.1364 
(5.9958) 
I-5 utility of means     
I-5a. Reward -115.5962 
(3215.6082)  
309.5914 
(690.7175)  
1.831e+03 
(1.167e+03) 
-444.7342 
(1256.5927) 
I-5b. Promise -156.2507 
(3228.207)  
302.2272 
(693.1768)  
1.815e+03 
(1.171e+03)  
-455.4188 
(1260.7744) 
I-5c. Appeal -95.1017 
(3222.6345)  
313.8979 
(692.2765)  
1.841e+03 
(1.169e+03) 
-428.3783 
(1259.4635) 
I-5d. Oppose -20.7793 
(3217.2245)  
312.1840 
(691.1788)  
1.835e+03 
(1.167e+03) 
-437.3543 
(1257.4841) 
I-5e. Threaten -60.3336 
(3226.7816)  
310.9804 
(693.1642)  
1.829e+03 
(1.171e+03) 
-432.85 
(1260.9135) 
I-5f. Punish -67.1410 
(3213.2064)   
312.2508 
(690.3243)  
1.847e+03 
(1.166e+03) 
-424.7038 
(1256.0233) 
Inflation .3383 (.7881) .0634 
(.1699) 
-1.822e-01 
(2.850e-01) 
-.1582 
(.3136) 
Public Opinion .2404 
(.5552) 
.1065 
(.1208) 
-5.397e-02 
(2.034e-01) 
-.2391 
(.2203) 
Reciprocity .5291 *** 
(.1205) 
.2676 
(.1684) 
1.159e-01 
(7.954e-02) 
.2124 . 
(.1266) 
cons 599.5903 
(3213.9848)  
-187.6247 
(689.5763) 
-1.653e+03 
(1.166e+03) 
509.789 
(1255.3193) 
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 verbcoop matcoop verbconf matconf 
 
N 
R-square 
adj. R-square 
Prob 
RMSE 
 
217 
0.4043 
0.1986 
0.02682 
13.03 
 
217 
0.167 
-0.1207 
0.9044 
2.833 
 
217 
03063 
0.0666 
0.2356 
4.77 
 
217 
0.2659 
0.0122 
0.4261 
5.14 
 
Signif. codes:   0  ‘***’ 0.001  ‘**’ 0.01  ‘*’ 0.05  ‘.’ 0.1   ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
 
